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ABSTRACT
The process of setting administrative regulations or guidelines to
govern the implementation of public policies has received little attention
from scholars of the policymaking process. Yet rules and guidelines have
the power to authoritatively mold the content of policy as it will be
reflected in the routines of administrative practice, often in very
significant ways.
On the case of the nation's major urban policy initiative, the
Community Development Block Grant program, bureaucratic regulatory actions
played an especially critical role in shaping two features central to the
policy's character - both the degree to which local authorities were ceded
power to set program priorities and the degree to which funds would be used
to benefit economically disadvantaged groups. Administrative regulations
used from 1974-1977 stressed revenue sharing aspects of the program, ceding
maximum discretion to localities and affording no special priority to the
needs of low income groups. Regulations employed from 1977-81 reversed
direction, mandating earmarking of 50-75% of funds for low-income projects
and nationally circumscribing localities' decisionmaking powers. In 1981,
new regulatory edicts again reversed the basic thrust of the program,
erasing low income targeting requirements and reinstating the revenue
sharing approach utilized in the block grant's earliest years.
This study examines administrative rulemaking for the CDBG program
during the 1974-83 period in order to discern the forces which shaped
bureaucratic regulatory choices and to discover why stable regulatory policy
proved so difficult to secure. Neither reforms in statutory language, nor
conventional bureaucratic concerns with attainment of effective and
efficient bureaucratic operations were found to have played a significant
role in accounting for shifts in regulatory direction. Instead, the
bureaucratic erraticism which marked CDBG regulatory efforts was
attributable to a vigorous and contentious "post-policymaking" politics
which surrounded administrative rulemaking activity.
The succession of bureaucratic leaders who attempted to fashion
"appropriate" guidelines to govern the implementation enterprise were forced
not only to contend with cross-pressures spawned by a clientele sharply
divided on the issues in question, but with persistent, competing and
problematic demands for regulatory accountability emanating from higher
authorities in both the'legislature and the executive branch. At various
times in the program's history, rulemaking activities became bound up in
tenacious intra-Congressional battles over the "true meaning" of statutory
mandates and in struggles for ascendency between the Congress and the upper
tiers of the Executive Branch.
Though other case analyses are needed, the study findings suggest that
both Congressional and Executive attention to the rulemaking function may be
on the upswing. If so, a new era of more complex and contentious
administrative politics may be beginning to emerge.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Bernard J. Frieden
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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PREFACE
The process of research and scholarly inquiry seldom proceeds in as
linear and straightforward a manner as one hopes it will at the onset of
the effort. Especially in the field of public policy, unforseen events and
occurrences often serve to upset the most well-intended research plans.
Questions one sets out to discern answers to are often modified or refined
as the process of inquiry reveals other more significant or noteworthy
intellectual puzzles to be resolved. At times, new questions that surface
prove to be so compelling as to prompt a major reorientation of the
research venture. Such was the case with the research reflected in this
dissertation.
This study of bureaucracy and policymaking as it occurs through the
process of administrative regulation or guideline development had its
origins in an earlier research initiative which I had presumed would form
the base for my dissertation research. My dual interests in implementation
and the administrative process, and in intergovernmental affairs had aroused
my curiosity about the functioning of a major domestic policy initiative--
the Community Development Block Grant Program-- the "grandaddy" of the
nation's New Federalism approaches to intergovernmental policy and its
primary strategic route for the provision of urban aid.
At the heart of my interest in the CDBG program was a particular
concern with the implications of the new intergovernmental order for the
racially and economically disadvantaged segments of the nation's urban
populace. Like other observers of urban policy, I was well-aware that
despite two decades of experimentation with various federal initiatives,
promises to the urban poor of better housing, employment opportunities and
upgraded neighborhood environments had yet to be fulfilled. With many
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others, I shared a special interest in the degree to which the restructured
federal-local arrangements called for in the block grant experiment were
proving responsive to these critical urban poverty needs.
Given the thrust of my programmatic interests, my attention was drawn
to a particular administrative initiative undertaken in 1977. Three years
after creation of the block grant program, officials in the Department of
Housing and Urban Development introduced reforms aimed at assuring federal
block grant allocations would be targeted in a manner that better served the
nation's urban poor. New administrative regulations promulgated in 1977 and
78 expanded federal bureaucratic responsibilities for oversight of local
grant activity and called for reorientation of local efforts by, among other
things, requiring that localities devote at least 50-75% of their grant
allotment to projects directly serving low income needs. For any locality
which failed to do so, federal sanctions were to be applied. My original
dissertation plan involved examination of how this intergovernmental grant
reform was implemented. Consistent with implementation studies of a similar
nature, I planned to explore how these regulations were put in place
administratively; to what extent federal and local bureaucratic agents had
responded to the new guidelines by altering past practices and behaviors;
and what ultimate effect on programmatic outcomes had been achieved in the
years following introduction of the regulations.
But during the 1981-82 period in which I had begun conducting my
preliminary fieldwork, events were taking place within the agency which
significantly altered the thrust of my research. A new administrative team
had assumed positions of authority, and within the year, HUD's official
demeanor toward the program had undergone radical change. In direct
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contradiction to the agency's earlier assertions that legislative mandates
necessitated establishment of the low income targeting guidelines, agency
authorities now maintained that legislative mandates for programmatic
decentralization required rules providing full local discretion in deciding
how grant funds were to be spent. By mid 1981 the targeting regulations had
been revoked, supplanted by new regulatory proposals designed to enforce a
non-redistributive, revenue sharing approach to grant administration similar
to that employed in the program's initial years.
For the program, this new effort represented the second complete 1800
turnabout in the thrust of its administrative regulations in eight years,
despite the fact that the legislation itself had remained fundamentally
unchanged since 1974. Moreover, of great significance with respect to these
regulatory choices was the fact that their content had such weighty
implications for CDBG policy as it would be reflected in administrative
practice. Few programmatic issues have greater consequences for policy
outcomes than those related to the distribution of power and authority among
levels of government or those which circumscribe who is to benefit from use
of programmatic funds. Yet these major determinations were being rendered
wholly through the process of regulatory choice.
Furthermore, the political pressures brought to bear on the agency's
regulatory development activities proved extraordinarily weighty and
complex. It was evident that not only in 1981-82 but in prior regulatory
drafting periods, the political machinations surrounding deliberations over
"appropriate" guidelines to govern the implementation enterprise had assumed
the kind of prominence, intensity and conflictual character typically
associated not with "technical" administrative rulemaking activity but with
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major legislative policy debate.
As the 1981-82 controversies heightened my attentiveness to these
aspects of the program's history, my interest in the administrative
aftermath of rulemaking activity gave way to a desire to understand the
prior process of regulatory development and choice. Yet a search of the
implementation literature provided little useful guidance.
Though many implementation scholars make mention of guideline or
regulatory development tasks as part of the post-legislative implementation
process, few explore the forces shaping bureaucratic behavior during the
guideline development stage. In part as a consequence of this gap in the
literature, and in part due to the extreme import of the issues being
contended in guideline forums, I became convinced much could be learned from
an analysis of administrative guideline development focused on the CDBG
case.
My dissertation was thus recast from its earlier manifestation as a study
of how guidelines were put into effect into a study of how they were
formulated; from an analysis of one brief period of the program's history
to one with a broader longitudinal sweep, whose ultimate aim was to discern
what forces served to shape the behavior of administrative authorities in
electing the regulatory content they did; and in a more general sense to
uncover the reasons regulatory development efforts during this protracted
period were rendered so unstable, erratic, subject to radical change.
As soon became quite clear, however, a foray into the regulatory history
of the CDBG program is a bit like taking a walk through a labyrinth.
Interviews with key actors active in guideline development
forums yielded quite disparate recollections of the agreements reached at
vvarious stages of the program's operations, and contradictory understand-
ings of what the words contained in formal legislative documents truly
meant. Although this rendered the research effort more difficult and
frustrating a venture that I had anticipated, and necessitated a copious
review of documents and files for confirmation of events, these disparities
became a key part of the guideline development story, and essential to an
understanding of why the crafting of stable regulations for the CDBG
program proved so problematic to achieve.
This study is an examination of the process of guideline development and
formulation as it occurred during the first ten years of CDBG
operations. Unlike other studies of program implementation efforts, it is
not a study concerned with how guidelines are carried out in administrative
practice, with what programmatic effects. Rather it is a study of
bureaucratic policymaking activity as it occurs through the process of
guideline development, wherein law, administrative considerations, and
external political pressures can be seen to interact.
Research material contained in this case study was derived from a variety
of sources. In addition to materials in the public domain such as
legislative documents, agency records, and various governmental and non-
governmental studies and reports, sources include items made available to
me from internal agency, Congressional and interest group files. Moreover,
the study draws from personal interviews held with more than two dozen key
agency, Congressional and interest group actors, many of whom had been
continuously involved in guideline development efforts throughout the ten
year period. Several gave generously of themselves to this effort, making
themselves available for multiple interviews and devoting what sometimes
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came to be several hours of their time helping me to disentangle the
confusing and complex events surrounding the case. To these individuals,
many of whom at their own request must go unnamed, a special note of thanks
is due.
My appreciation also extends to the Joint Center for Urban Studies of
MIT and Harvard for providing financial support during the initial phase of
this project. But adequately expressing gratitude for other debts incurred
during the course of this research proves a far more difficult task.
I was most fortunate to have benefit from the sound ideas and advice
provided by my dissertation advisers, Bernard Frieden and Michael Lipsky of
MIT, and Robert Hollister of Tufts University. Despite the barriers of
distance, each proved an invaluable source of ongoing intellectual
sustenance and personal encouragement during the various stages of this
effort. For their patient counsel and their continued support throughout
the lengthy period of completion of this work, I am enormously grateful.
I would also like to convey my sincere thanks to Evelyn Brodkin, Carol
Jones, Adrian Walter, and Marie Howland - friends and colleagues whose
expressions of personal interest, insights and suggestions contributed both
substantively and personally to this work.
Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my husband
Dennis Muniak, whose criticisms (though not always welcomed at the time)
invariably served to improve the quality of the final product, and whose
abiding faith in the significance of this research sustained me during the
more discouraging periods of the work. For his tireless support, unwavering
confidence and good humor throughout this enterprise, I owe a debt too great
to be repaid.
CHAPTER 1: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT:
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Policy Implementation as a Field of Study
Until as recently as 12 years ago, the implementation stage of the
Policy process had been severely neglected as an area of scholarly research.
Prior to Pressman and Wildavsky's seminal study of the implementation
process, published in 1973, the attention of scholars of American public
policy had been directed almost exclusively toward discerning both the
process and the politics of policy formulation and adoption. Researchers
had oriented their scholarly efforts toward tracing the routines by which
public problems came to secure a place on the political agenda of policy-
makers, and toward understanding the interplay of political forces which
culminated in the acceptance or legitimation of a policy as a remedy for a
perceived societal problem. But with respect to those processes which
ensued after the formal adoption of a policy through legislation, the
literature was virtually silent. Policy implementation was simply not
perceived to be of great consequence to our understanding of policy
processes. As Van Meter and Van Horn explained in 1975:
The implementation process is assumed to be a series of mundane
decisions and interactions unworthy of the attention of scholars
seeking the heady stuff of politics. Implementation is deceptively
simple: it does not appear to involve any great issues. Most of
the crucial policy issues are often seen to have been resolved in
the prior decisions of executives, legislatures and judges.1
Moreover, the era was marked by a profound naivete about the character
of events in the post-policymaking phase of the policy process. Neglect of
implementation as an object of study can be traced, in part, to the prevail-
ing assumption adhered to by both policymakers and scholars alike "once a
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Policy has been 'made' by a government, the policy will be implemented and
the desired results of the policy will be near those expected by policy-
makers".2
But our naivete about the character of implementation processes began
to fall away during the mid-1970's. As evidence began to accumulate that
the social programs of the Great Society were failing to accomplish all that
had been expected of them, researchers began to attempt to discern exactly
what had gone wrong. Were these policies failing because of flaws in their
theoretical underpinnings? Or were these failures attributable to
unanticipated problems in putting the proper administrative machinery in
place? These questions led to an outpouring of studies exploring the
process of policy implementation.
While these studies did much to highlight the complexities and pitfalls
involved in attempts to implement policies set forth in legislation,
conceptually they lacked a clear focus. In part, this theoretical failing
can be traced to the broad-brush approach these studies adopted toward the
delineation of the policy implementation process.
Policy implementation was viewed in a very comprehensive, all-
encompassing fashion as involving "those events and activities that occur
after the issuing of authoritative policy directives".3 Defined in this
fashion, policy implementation encompassed a very diverse and complex set
of behaviors and interactions including such elements as the behavior of
upper-level bureaucrats in operationalizing the policy mandates, the series
of interactions among program administrators at all levels of the implement-
ing agency, interactions between implementing actors at all levels of
government (in the case of intergovernmental policy), and interactions
between lower level service deliverers and members of the policy's target
group, all of which had discernible impacts on the ultimate policy
outcomes.
But, as the literature evolved, implementation scholars began to
recognize the theoretical weakness inherent in adopting such a comprehen-
sive approach to implementation. As a result, they began to attempt to
disentangle and clarify distinct components of the policy implementation
process.
Substages of Implementation
While the field of implementation studies remains clouded by conceptual
ambiguity, a significant advance was made by the theoretical work of Rein,
Rabinovitz and Pressman.4 In their conceptualization of implementation,
they see merit in disaggregating implementation phenomena by viewing the
process as a series of distinct substages. Sequentially, the first substage
involves the process of guideline development. This is the process through
which formal rules and regulations (as well as less formal administrative
guidelines) which are to govern program operations are distilled from the
policy legislation.
Subsequently, a second stage of policy implementation is said to occur
in which these guidelines are applied in administrative practice. Major
components of this substage include the routine administration and enforce-
ment of the established rules and regulations, and the deployment of
administrative resources in support of the program effort.
The merit of the Rein, Rabinovitz and Pressman work lies in its utility
as an organizing framework for separating out the diverse set of implementa-
tion problems uncovered in the voluminous empirical work compiled to date.
Implementation: Administrative Paradigm
Taking the second of their substages first, that stage involving the
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routine application and enforcement of programmatic guidelines, much of the
implementation literature can be seen as adhering to an Administrative
paradigm, in which the conventional problems encountered in administrative
practice are of central concern. Within this Administrative paradigm, the
researcher's attention is drawn to a series of problems endemic to the
process of bureaucratic administration of policy. These problems would
include such elements as:
a) the sufficiency of resources; that is, whether adequate funds,personnel and facilities are available to allow effective
administration of the program effort.
b) difficulties in the process of inter and intra organizational
communication through which directives regarding expected behavior
of implementing (or administering) actors are conveyed.
c) difficulties in securing compliance and cooperation of those
organizational actors whose cooperation is essential to successful
execution of the program effort.
Examining the theoretical and empirical literature on implementation,
one can see that much of our work to date is linked to elements subsumed
under the Administrative paradigm.
Sufficiency of Resources
Several theoreticians have pointed to the importance to the
implementation process of having available resources commensurate with
administrative needs.5 And they caution that inadequate resources can
seriously impair an organization's ability to achieve the policy goals set
forth in legislation. In the empirical work on implementation, several
studies have highlighted the adverse impact various forms of resource
inadequacy have had on the effectiveness of the implementation process.
Research has pointed to such specific resource problems as the inadequacy
of staff size; 6 inadequacies in the training and competence of
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administrative personnel; 7 the insufficiency of funding; 8 and the shortage
of time in which to carry out necessary administrative tasks. 9 The
empirical work, then, is replete with references to resource problems as
implementation dilemmas of the Administrative paradigm.
Problems of Communication
Another major component in the implementation literature that can be
tied to the Administrative paradigm relates to the problematic nature of
communications as they flow through the administrative or implementing
organizational system. One widely recognized precondition of securing
effective policy implementation is that the lower level implementors in the
administrative system must be able to discern, with sufficient clarity and
accuracy, the new behaviors that are expected of them in the course of
carrying out their implementation responsibilities. In other words, policy
directives and guidelines for program operation must be conveyed in a
sufficiently straightforward and unambiguous manner that lower level
administrators glean an appropriate understanding of their new
responsibilities for program execution.
Implementation theorists have long recognized, however, the potential
for distortion in the communication program directives, as administrative
messages (implementation orders) are transmitted downward through the
bureaucracy.10 Directives regarding expected changes in the behavior of
lower level administrators are subject to persistent and cumulative
misinterpretations which may impair the effectiveness of the implementation
process. Lack of clarity or consistency in the communication of
implementation orders provide lower level administrators with discretion
that enables them to act in ways that may prove inconsistent with the
original meaning or intention of the policy.
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Several of the empirical studies on implementation have highlighted the
barriers faulty communications can pose to attaining successful policy
implementation.11 Moreover, these studies have demonstrated that the
problems of communication are attenuated in implementation systems which
rely upon complex, loosely-linked organizational systems for execution of
the policy. Communication problems loom large, for example, in policies
which rely upon intergovernmental arrangements for their administration.
Problems of Compliance and Enforcement
Even if lower level implementors perceive with accuracy and clarity
implementation directives that are conveyed by their ostensible
bureaucratic superiors, implementation may falter if the lower reaches of
the implementing organizational system choose to disregard or disobey their
marching orders. Thus the problems of securing compliance with mandated
behavior looms emerges as a key implementation problem in the
Administrative paradigm.
Scholars working in the implementation field have devoted a major
share of their attention to explicating the dilemmas involved in motivating
lower level implementors to alter their behavior to conform to the
directives regarding program execution they receive. Several factors have
been highlighted in the implementation literature as reasons why the
ostensible "subordinates" in the implementing organization fail to carry
out the implementation tasks with which they are charged. These include
such things as inconsistency of new directives with the standard operating
procedures implementors are accustomed to following; 12 resistance rooted in
subordinates disagreement with the goals and objectives the new policy
seeks to advance 1 3 , either because they conflict with subordinate's
personal values, or because they are perceived as inconsistent with the
agency's organizational mission;14 and resistance stemming from the
inability of subordinates to reconcile new implementation tasks with the
dictates of competing or conflicting pressures inherent in the structure of
their work. 1 5
Moreover, while several empirical studies have documented the dilemmas
of securing compliance with implementation directives as they are transmit-
ted within a single bureaucratic organization, others have revealed the
additional dilemmas involved in securing compliance of implementors when
policies are implemented through intergovernmental systems.16 In these
settings, the difficulties in securing compliance of lower level
implementors are attenuated by the inability or unwillingness of
bureaucrats at "higher" governmental levels to produce and use either
sanctions or incentives powerful enough to induce necessary changes in the
behavior of implementing officials in "lower" levels of government.
The vast majority of work on implementation to date has had as its most
predominant theme a focus on problems endemic to the routine execution of
implementation - problems which can be subsumed under the Administrative
paradigm. But as the work of Rein, Rabinovitz and Pressman points out,
there exists a prior and crucial stage of the implementation process about
which little is known. This is the stage which bridges formal legislative
Policymaking and the routines of administrative practice. What marks this
stage is the prevalence of activities through which policy mandates
contained in the legislation are transformed into a concrete set of rules
and guidelines which serve as the prescription for administrative action.
It is the stage that they refer to as the stage of guideline development.
The Nature and Function of Guidelines in Implementing Systems
Through the process of guideline development, the implementing
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bureaucracy fashions from the legislation a series of programmatic rules,
regulations and operating procedures which are to govern the day-to-day
actions of implementing officials as they execute the statutorily-mandated
policy. The process of guideline-setting then, in a very concrete way,
involves the establishment of a kind of a strategic administrative
framework within which the ensuing routines of administration (which have
received so much attention in implementation research) are to take place.
Guidelines, in essence, constitute a set of interrelated, centrally-
forged instructions to actors engaged in the implementation enterprise,
specifying how they are expected to behave in the latter administrative
stage of implementation. As such, they may prescribe such things as the
operating procedures bureaucrats are to follow in carrying out their
implementation responsibilities, the principles which are to be employed by
agents of policy implementation in exercising discretionary judgment during
program administration, the standards of performance to which implementa-
tion intermediaries (such as other levels of government or private sector
organizations involved in policy execution) are to be held, and the
sanctions which are to be applied where non-compliance with implementation
directives is uncovered.
Guidelines specifying these elements of administrative practice may
assume a variety of forms. In their most formal manifestation, they may be
incorporated as part of the program's formal administrative regulations,
published in the Federal Register and issued in accordance with the
procedures contained in the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946.
Frequently, however, guidelines assume other forms. They may be set forth
in the agency's administrative handbooks governing the program's
operations, or contained in the written administrative directives conveyed
from bureaucratic headquarters to the agency's field staff. In some
instances, guidelines may even assume a less-formalized non-written form,
systematically transmitted from central actors to implementation agents
only verbally, as, for example, during program training sessions.
Regardless of the particular form they assume, in complex
organizational structures such as those through which national policy is
implemented, guidelines are an essential ingredient of administration. For
the implementing bureaucracy, they serve several important functions.
First, they serve to direct the behavior of the diverse network of
implementation actors toward the accomplishment of organizational tasks.
In delineating the sequence of events and activities which are to ensue in
order to place the policy in operation, and specifying the roles to be
assumed by various administrative agents and the procedures they are to
follow in executing their roles, guidelines serve a coordinative function.
By designating who is to do what to whom, when, and how, guidelines attempt
to ensure that the energies of implementation actors are merged and
channeled in ways that are presumed to lead to the attainment of stated
policy goals.
Second, guidelines represent an attempt to constrain the discretionary
behavior of implementing actors, and to assure the consistency of their
actions with the content of policies arrived at through democratic means.
Especially given the presumed link between legislation and guidelines,
guidelines can be seen as providing a kind of check on the exercise of
power of actors in the administrative state. In the absence of guidelines
ostensibly rooted in law, the discretionary behavior of individual
bureaucratic actors would be untethered from its democratic foundation,
thereby posing a threat to the tenets of democracy. 17
Third, guidelines reflect attempts to assure that actions of the
implementing agency conform with the bureaucratic ideal. By specifying
common procedures and standards to be applied during implementation, they
represent efforts to inject impartiality into the administrative process,
and to assure bureaucratic fairness by providing for the uniform treatment
of those affected by the implementation enterprise.
Neglect of Research on Guideline Development
To date, the guideline development stage of implementation has been
largely ignored as a subject of scholarly inquiry. Works aimed at
specifying the character of components of the guideline development
process, or identifying the forces influencing the outcomes of guideline
development activities are largely absent from the implementation
literature. In part the lack of theoretical or empirical work on these
topics may be attributable to the same set of biases among policy scholars
which inhibited research on implementation for such a long time. As Van
Meter and Van Horn point out, implementation has long been presumed to
involve only "a series of mundane decisions ... unworthy of the attention
of scholars ... ".18 In this conventional view of the policy process, all
the important substantive policy issues are seen as having been resolved
"in the prior decisions of executives, legislatures and judges" --
decisions which have served as the focal point for the bulk of policy
research.
But this does not explain why our knowledge about the process of
guideline development has remained scanty, even as the volume of research
on the implementation of policy has grown. While several implementation
researchers have drawn attention to the existence of guideline development
as a component of the implementation process19 they have failed to fully
21
disaggregate this set of activities from the broader set of implementation
tasks, or to initiate any independent investigations into the process
through which guidelines are created, or the forces which influence the
content of guidelines as they emerge during the implementation of policy.
What, then, accounts for the absence of attention to guidelines among
scholars seeking knowledge of the processes involved in implementation? In
part the answer lies in the widespread acceptance of legalistic and
technocratic conceptions of the guideline development process.
In seeking to explain the dearth of guideline development studies in
the implementation literature, Rein, Rabinovitz and Pressman draw attention
to the presumed "technocratic" character of the guideline development
process. They argue that research on this substage of the implementation
process has been neglected because "at first glance it seems so simple and
so technical. Congress drafts a law and administrators write rules that
provide detailed instructions for carrying out the law." 2 0 Conceived in
this way, the outcomes of the guideline development process are seen as
insignificant, the process itself of little interest since it is
simplistically presumed to be no more than a kind of neutral, apolitical
technical administrative exercise of the sort that Woodrow Wilson
envisioned when he maintained that administration could, and should be
divorced from politics. 2 1
Moreover, other researchers of the guideline process maintain that
empirical investigation into the full dynamics of guideline formulation has
been impeded by the widespread acceptance among scholars of a "legalistic"
image of the guideline development process. 2 2 Frieden and Brown assert that
"the legalistic model views guidelines as products of a close examination
of statutory language ... ". Extracted in a straightforward manner from the
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wording contained in the statue forged in formal legislative policymaking
forums, guidelines, in this legalistic model, become "in essence glosses on
statutory language and intent, divining [from legislation] the behavior
that lawmakers were (or would be) most concerned to monitor, require or
Prohibit". 23 As a result of the pervasiveness of this legalistic image,
the authors argue, and the widespread acceptance of the validity of the
assumptions inherent in it (that the guideline setting process is dominated
by legal considerations, and that guideline content is largely
circumscribed by clear authoritative language set forth in statutory law),
the bulk of research or guideline development has been undertaken by
scholars preoccupied with issues of administrative law.
[Note: To the extent that administrative law scholars have addressed
issues linked to guideline development processes, they have focused their
work on such issues as bureaucratic use of adjudicatory processes (case by
case reconciliation of individual circumstances to law) vs. rulemaking (the
establishment of a priori standards which circumscribe uniform treatment of
cases under law); the influence of legal requirements such as the
Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 on the bureaucracy's choice of which
approach to employ; the reconciliation of notions of liberty, formal
justice, and due process with an agency's use of its state sanctioned
powers of coercion; and the role of the judiciary as it impacts the
administrative process. 2 4 In the broader sense in which the term
"guidelines" is employed here, these works prove of limited utility. First
of all, they confine their attention to only the most formal types of
rulemaking, ignoring the less formally structured manifestations of
guidelines noted here. Secondly, many of these works tend to focus as does
the broader literature on regulation, on the behavior of Independent
Regulatory Commissions, charged with regulating private sector economic
activity. Given the distinctive nature of these Commissions as
governmental bodies, and the manner in which their activities differ in
nature from those of other administrative agencies, these studies are of
limited utility in developing the framework espoused here. Finally, as is
argued in the remainder of this section, these studies share with other
aspect of the literature the fatal flaw of downplaying or ignoring the
impact of political forces held to be of great import in understanding
rulemaking or guideline setting activity.]
If language put forth in policy-setting legislation was uniformly
clear, concise, comprehensive and unambiguous, then perhaps the lack of
attention afforded guideline development in the implementation literature
might well be warranted. Under these conditions, guideline development
activities would presumably have little independent impact on the content
of policy (since all pertinent policy-shaping details would have been set
forth in the products of formal policymaking activities) rendering
guideline-setting a relatively insignificant process. Moreover, under
these conditions, the composite image of the guideline development process
as a simplistic and purely legalistic or technocratic, apolitical
administrative exercise might sufficiently capture all the relevant
qualities inherent in guideline development tasks.
But as the authors are quick to note, such a vision is a far cry from
the realities of American policymaking.
Both sets of guideline development researchers point to the fact that
the policymaking process is prone to yield policy products that are in some
way vague or incomplete. These assertions receive widespread support from
the findings of other scholars investigating both policymaking and
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implementation processes. With some regularity, Congressional policymaking
activities have been found to yield policy products that are in some way
vague or incomplete. These assertions receive widespread support from the
findings of other scholars investigating both policymaking and implementa-
tion processes. With some regularity, Congressional policymaking
activities have been found to yield statutes which are deficient in several
ways. They may contain unclear or ambiguous directives to the administer-
ing agency on how program implementation is to proceed; vague or lofty goals
unaccompanied by details suggesting the strategic framework through which
they are to be accomplished; or multiple policy objectives any one of whose
attainment may be incompatible with another. 2 5
Long recognized in the broader political science and policy
literature, the phenomenon of Congressional failure to routinely fashion
clear, detailed, fully explicated policy statutes has been attributed to
a variety of sources. Congress is said to face severe limitations with
respect to time and staff support -- factors which can constrain its
ability to provide comprehensive policy legislation. 2 6 Moreover, the
Congress, despite its moves over the past decades to develop greater
specialization within its institutional structure, remains at root a body
composed of policy generalists. As a consequence, statutory framers may
lack (or at least believe they lack) sufficient knowledge about precisely
what types of actions are required to remedy a particular societal problem,
and thus may, by conscious design, do no more than set forth general goals
in policy legislation -- deferring to the presumed "superior expertise" of
the administering agency, decisions regarding the means through which to
accomplish stated ends. 2 7
But most frequently, the vagueness and irrationalities of statutory
products are said to be rooted in Congress's need t fashion, out of
conflicting demands, some "policy" on which contending interests can agree.
Given the weaknesses in contemporary institutions of governance, the
dictates of political consensus-building often require that Congressional
policies be kept vague, or even internally contradictory, in order to amass
sufficient consent to act.28 As Nakamura and Smallwood note "it is easier
to get agreement on an abstract statement of principles ... than it is to
reach agreement on more concrete statements that involve difficult trade-
offs among values."29
The Consequences of Vague Policy for Guideline Development
Regardless of its sources, the inescapable reality that many if not
most policy products passed on to the bureaucracy for implementation are
either vague, incomplete, or internally inconsistent has two significant
and related consequences. First, it renders guideline development as an
especially crucial stage of the implementation process, wherein important
discretionary choices affecting the substance of policy will be made. As
Frieden and Brown point out, when Congressional legislation obscures key
elements of policy, "federal administrators must shoulder twin
responsibilities of goal refinement (stating general program goals in clear
operational terms) and goal reconciliation" (resolving conflict among
competing program priorities) 3 0 (emphasis added) as part of their guideline
setting tasks. The outcome of these activities can be seen as having
significant impact on the content of the policy being implemented. It is
at the stage of guideline development, then, that the vagarities of policy
legislation must be clarified, that the policy issues left open in the
legislation must, out of administrative necessity be addressed and
resolved.
Second, precisely because vague or unclear products of formal
policymaking have the effect of ceding to administrators substantial
discretion in framing rules and guidelines, the exercise of which has
important impacts on policy substance, our prevailing conceptions of the
guideline development process are rendered deficient. They can be seen to
inaccurately depict its character, and to deflect attention away from
important qualities inherent in guideline development tasks.
Though conventionally viewed as part of the administration of
preordained policies, the process of guideline setting may in fact be more
akin to policymaking than administration. Under conditions generated by a
vague or incomplete product of legislative forums, the decisive act of
framing rules and guidelines for implementation may more closely resemble
the act of substantive policymaking itself. Moreover, though carried out
under the guise of the technical translation of law into administrative
practice, guideline choices may at root be more political than technical in
nature. As Brodkin points out, "The actions that administrative agencies
take to operationalize policy are imbued with political significance
because they embody policy choices." 3 1 Where these policy choices
encompass resolution of important substantive issues, the political
significance of the guideline development process looms large.
What is more, as a result of these factors, the nature of the process
through which guidelines are arrived at by the bureaucracy may be
inaccurately depicted in prevailing models. If the process of guideline
development, in fundamental ways, resembles the process of policymaking
itself, then through means we have yet to fully understand, alternative
rules and program specifications are formulated, debated, and a course of
action selected. During this process, opportunities arise as alternative
guidelines are being considered by the implementing bureaucracy for
contending organized interests to bring political pressures to bear in an
effort to see that their perspectives and policy preferences are reflected
in the guideline products that result. To the extent that guidelines have
great policy significance, such political activities become likely. Thus,
while prevailing images of the guideline process foreclose the possibility
that political influences mark the process, concentrating solely on either
administrative or legal ones, the tendency of Congress to produce vague or
incomplete policy may render political qualities of the process important
ones. It is in recognition of this fact that Rein, Rabinovitz and Pressman
were prompted to characterize the guideline development process as the
"continuation into another arena of the political process." 3 2
Implementation: The Political Process Paradigm
The conceptualization of policy implementation as a set of activities
shaped in important ways by political forces is not without its referents
in the broader implementation literature which has both preceded and
followed Rein, Rabinovitz, and Pressman's collective work. Several
implementation scholars have made note of the fact that politics pervade
the implementation process. Sabatier and Mazmanian assert in their
writings that "the policy outputs of implementing agencies are essentially
a function of interaction between legal structure and the political
process." 3 3 Nakamura and Smallwood note that during the entire course of
the implementation activities "outside groups attempt to pressure
implementors to administer policies in ways that advance their perceived
self interest." 3 4 And Ripley and Franklin state that "the activities of
interest groups do not cease after legislation is enacted", though they
concede that "little is known about their role in implementation."3 5
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While these writings enhance our understanding of implementation by
disclosing the fact that implementation has a political dimension as well
as an administrative one, their weakness lies in the authors' failure to
distinguish among stages of the implementation process and to identify the
subtasks of implementation around which political activity is prone to be
most fully manifest. To a degree, their broad-brush approach is
justifiable. It is undoubtedly the case that the political forces
highlighted in these writings make themselves felt throughout both stages
of implementation cited in Rein, Rabinovitz, and Pressman's work. Indeed
scholars of public administration have long been aware that even the
routines of administrative practice (discussed here under the Administra-
tive Paradigm of Implementation) are "infected" by the forces of politics36
But is perhaps at the earlier guideline development stage of implementation
that political forces find their fullest expression.
Since rules and regulations are designed to serve as uniform and
authoritative constraints on subsequent administrative action, affecting
all parties touched by implementation efforts, decisions made at the
guideline development stage will presumably have the most systematic and
wide-ranging impact of any post-legislative implementation actions. It is
around the tasks of guideline development, then, that political efforts to
attain influence may be most rigorous. It is during the guideline
development stage of implementation that the policy stakes are highest, the
greatest political gains and losses to be made.
Bardach supports this concept, highlighting the stress contending
political interests place on securing influence during guideline setting
when he states that
The bargaining and maneuvering, the pulling and hauling of the policy
adoption process carries over into the policy implementation process.
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Die hard opponents of the policy who lost out at the adoption stage
seek and find means to continue their opposition when ...
administrative regulations and guidelines are being written. 3 7
Summary
Given these realities, neither the existing literature on policy
implementation nor the dominant conceptualizations of guideline development
in the broader of public administration and administrative law literatures
serve as adequate guides to our understanding of guideline development
activities. In general, implementation scholars have tended to focus on
discovery of problems tied to the routine administration of policy,
ignoring the distinctive nature of antecedent guideline setting efforts,
and implicitly dismissing the potential policy salience of these pre-
administrative implementation tasks. Moreover, in the other literatures,
where guideline development has implicitly been acknowledged as a discrete
set of implementation activities, characterizations of the guideline-
setting process have been too narrowly cast. The weight afforded
predominant models of the guideline development process as a strictly
legalistic and/or technical bureaucratic exercise of neutrally translating
legislative products'into administrative practice has deflected attention
away from the political significance of these activities, and ignored the
likelihood that political forces and considerations will play a crucial
role in shaping guideline choices that are made.
As has been pointed out in this chapter, these weaknesses in the
literature have their root in faulty conceptions regarding the nature of
formal policymaking. If Congress were, with some consistency, to fully
explicate formal policy in legislation, the act of setting guidelines in
implementation would presumably possess no independent "policymaking" force
at all. Guideline development activities and outcomes would be rendered
insignificant elements of the implementation process; political forces
would be discouraged from seeking influence over their content, and
legalistic, technical apolitical models of the process would likely hold
true. But when Congress leaves policy vague or incomplete in legislative
edicts, as it frequently does, guideline development is transformed into a
process laden with policy significance. Guideline development thus becomes
an important stage of implementation in which unspecified but potentially
significant substantive elements of policy may be added, in which policy
issues left indeterminant in formal policy must ultimately be resolved.
Under these conditions, the tasks of guideline setting come to constitute a
form of de facto policymaking albeit policymaking whose dimensions we have
yet to fully understand. Moreover, given the potential import of guideline
outcomes for policy substance, the prospect is heightened that political
forces described in the implementation literature will come into play as
guidelines are being forged.
Under these conditions, the relative neglect of empirical and
theoretical treatment of guideline development in implementation leaves
important gaps in our knowledge. The "policymaking" qualities inherent in
guideline development, which distinguish this set of implementation activi-
ties from the more purely administrative implementation tasks, render guide-
line development an especially important subject for research. If policy
choices are embodied in guidelines forged during implementation, then we
need to know more about the process through which guidelines are created and
the forces which play a determinative role in shaping the guideline choices
that are made. An understanding of guideline development thus becomes
crucial to a more complete understanding not only of implementation, but of
the policy process as it progresses from beginning to end.
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CHAPTER 2: ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDELINES AND REGULATIONS:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Guideline development has been seen to merit recognition as a discrete
stage of the implementation process. It is a stage marked by a distinct
set of activities directed toward the establishment of a strategic
framework of rules and guidelines which set the parameters within which the
routines of administration (those activities involved in the latter stage
of implementation) are to ensue. Guidelines are necessitated by the need
to provide for coordination of, and uniformity within, the implementation
undertaking, and by the need to reconcile the routines of administration
with mandates arrived at through democratic means.
Though we have historically dismissed this stage as inconsequential to
the study of public policy, the weaknesses inherent in contemporary
Congressional policymaking activity force a reassessment of this view. If
we acknowledge Congressional tendencies to fashion policy in a manner which
may leave important aspects of its character ill-defined or ambiguous in
the legislative products they pass on for implementation, then guideline
development can no longer be presumed to encompass just insignificant
administrative plan making activity. To the extent that Congressional
irresolution may cede incomplete policy to administrative forums, the tasks
of setting the strategic framework of rules and regulations governing
implementation may instead be more accurately cast as an extension of the
policymaking process, whose outcomes are revealed to have important con-
sequences for policy as it will be manifest in administrative routines.
Under these conditions, guideline development becomes an especially
important topic for empirical inquiry. An understanding of how guideline
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development activities are undertaken, with what results, becomes crucial
to our understanding of policy and the full set of processes through which
it is forged and sanctioned.
Yet empirical efforts directed toward the study of guideline develop-
ment activity must be guided by reformed conceptions of the process and its
products. While past models depict guideline development as a simple
straightforward technical exercise (of translating law into administrative
practice), guideline products as containing no more than policy-neutral
administrative detail, under conditions where Congressional irresolution
may be manifest in formal policymaking, the accuracy of these conceptions
(which would be suspect even where policy was more fully specified) can be
seen to fall far from the mark. Guideline products are revealed to have
potentially weighty policy-shaping content, the process of their creation
to involve more complex processes of policy deliberation and policy choice.
Under these conditions, the tasks of guideline development might more
properly be approached for study as a discrete and discretionary
policymaking enterprise, albeit one that takes place at the hands of non-
elected officials, under the auspice of filling in mere administrative
detail to which Congress failed to attend.
Guideline Developers as Policymakers
If we acknowledge guideline development to have these qualities, then
empirical research aimed at understanding how policy is ultimately "made"
or refashioned as guideline development progresses must ultimately center
on understanding the behavior and choices rendered by the authoritative
actors who control the guideline development process. While legislators
serve as the ultimate authoritative decisionmakers in the legislative
arena, bureaucratic actors serve as the ultimate authoritative decision-
makers in the implementation arena of which guideline development
constitutes a subpart. Ripley and Franklin note "it is in the realm of
implementation that agencies dominate ... they are not impervious to
outside influence ... but implementation is their major activity and the
arena in which they clearly claim pre-eminence. 1
When ill-specified policy is passed from legislative to administrative
forums, the top tier of program officials charged with responsibilities for
the coordination and management of the implementation enterprise are, in
effect, ceded an informal but important discretionary role in shaping
policy -- a role akin to a policymaking role. Under these conditions,
bureaucratic guideline authorities are transformed from mere technical
agents of policy execution into discretionary policymaking actors, on whose
authoritative choices regarding guideline content the true character of
policy (as it will be manifest in administrative actions) can be seen to
depend.
If we approach guideline development in this manner -- as a discrete
stage of the policymaking-implementation continuum, in which bureaucratic
actors assume the mantle of the pre-eminent policymaking operatives who
render important and authoritative policy-setting decisions as part and
parcel of their guideline development tasks -- then empirical efforts to
understand the behavior and choices rendered by these actors must be guided
by some conceptions of the forces of influence which we would expect to
play a role in shaping the conduct and the products of their guideline
development work. Just as empirical work on formal policymaking is guided
by conceptions of the forces which fashion the contours of policy as it
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emerges from legislative arenas, so too must empirical work on this
secondary policymaking process be guided by conceptions of the forces we
would expect to shape "policy" as it emerges from guideline development
forums. Yet here again past models prove deficient as guides to empirical
inquiry.
Though past conceptions of the guideline development process depict
guideline outcomes as captive to a singular deterministic set of influences
-- either legalistically predicated or technocratically derived--where
important policy stakes are subsumed in guideline decisionmaking processes
(as they are when Congressional vagueness or ambiguity prevail) the
prospect is heightened that political considerations and influence, ignored
in earlier conceptions, will play some role in shaping both process and
outcomes as guideline choices are being made. Thus we must allow for the
prospect that guideline development outcomes are shaped by a broader and
more complex set of influences than prevailing models would lead us to
portend.
To date, the scholarly work which offers the most useful and compre-
hensive framework for understanding decisions rendered at the guideline
development stage, has been crafted at the hands of Rein, Rabinovitz and
Pressman. The authors (in two separate pieces, one prepared by all three
scholars, the other by Rein and Rabinovitz alone), posit that the behavior
and choices of bureaucratic guideline developers are shaped by their need
to respond to three distinct sets of influences of "imperatives." 2 These
they characterize as -- the Legal Imperative, the Bureaucratic Imperative,
and the Consensual (Political) Imperative.
The Legal Imperative
In creating guidelines governing the implementation undertaking, the
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behavior and choices of guideline developers are presumed to be influenced,
first and foremost, by the legal imperative. The legal imperative directs
attention to the priority afforded by guideline developers to
considerations of statutory content and meaning, and to any constraints on
guideline choices which they perceive the legislative language of the
statute to impose.
Under the legal imperative, guideline developers are impelled to be
faithful to the policy intentions expressed by the Congress; to craft
guidelines such that they are consonant with legislative language; to craft
guidelines which are consistent in their aim and impact, with Congressional
intent as that intent is embodied in statutory law. Under the legal
imperative, Rein and Rabinovitz note "the law itself becomes the referent
for all actors in the process." 3
The legal imperative has special importance to the guideline develop-
ment process because, ultimately, the authority under which bureaucratic
actors are empowered to draft rules and regulations for implementation has
its root in the legislature itself. Only the legislature is constitu-
tionally endowed with the authority to set legally-binding policies. But
it has become common practice, as societal governance has grown more com-
plex, for Congress to formally delegate to the bureaucracy, the authority
to frame rules and regulations which carry with them the full force of law.
The exercise of the bureaucracy's formal rulemaking authority, however, is
constrained by the requirement that these rules and regulations conform to
the mandates contained in the original policy statute. While less formal
guidelines governing program operations may fall outside the bounds of this
formal authority (and thus not bear the full unquestionable weight of the
law in their enforcement) they too, are subject to the test of consistency
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with statutory language. As Rein and Rabinovitz note "Because laws are
best understood as expressions of citizen will, bureaucratic compliance
with legislative intent is morally justified and deemed necessary."4
(emphasis added) Thus administrators are bound, both by law and the
dictates of democratic morality to exercise their guideline development
authority consonant with the wishes and intentions of Congress, as they are
manifest in the language of the law.
The Bureaucratic-Rational Imperative
In casting their guideline verdicts regarding rules and procedures,
administrative authorities are subject to an independent set of influences
emanating from a different source. According to Rein, Rabinovitz and
Pressman, bureaucratic guideline developers are subject as well to a set of
bureaucratically-rooted pressures which the authors encompass under the
label of the Rational/Bureaucratic Imperative.
During the process of guideline development, the authors note, the
legal mandates contained in the law are transformed into a blueprint for
administrative activity. The Bureaucratic Imperative directs attention to
the fact that as the.law is transformed into a blueprint for administrative
action, bureaucratic pressures develop to ensure the plan will be fashioned
in a manner consistent with the principles of effective administrative
practice.
Implicitly, this part of their construct is grounded in the assumption
that for any programmatic operation, there exists an internal bureaucratic
constituency in which guideline developers both partake, and on which they
must depend. This constituency consists of the myriad of bureaucratic
actors granted a role in policy implementation activities, including both
those responsible for the execution of administrative procedures and the
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application of prescribed rules, as well as those responsible for success-
ful coordination and management of the implementation enterprise as a whole
(the guideline developers themselves). Foremost among the values advanced
by this constituency, as the authors characterize them, are concerns with
administrative rationality and the technical efficacy of administrative
operations under which policy implementation is to be carried out.
These assertions regarding the values brought to bear by this internal
constituency are grounded in "non-partisan" conceptions of the impulses
which motivate bureaucratic agents in the conduct of their administrative
work. Cast in the role of neutral administrative experts, this bureau-
cratic constituency is held to be guided not by political or philosophical
judgements regarding the proper substance of policy, but instead by a kind
of technocratic logic which is believed to predominate in the bureaucratic
culture of which they form a part.
Under the Rein, Rabinovitz and Pressman framework, then, we would
expect the behavior and choices rendered by bureaucratic agents during
guideline developnent to be shaped not only by legal, but also by adminis-
trative dictates. As those responsible for coordination and management of
the implementation undertaking, guideline developers are held to be
impelled by both inherent role-related values as well as overt pressures
from their bureaucratic peers to be attentive to issues of pragmatism and
bureaucratic efficacy as they frame guidelines which will direct the
execution of administrative tasks. Thus we can expect guideline decisions
to be cast with an eye toward not only what is legally required, but also
with an eye toward what is technically sound and administratively feasible
given the capacities of the implementation system; with an eye toward not
only the language of the law but also with an eye toward what is required
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to ensure smooth, continuous and efficient bureaucratic functioning as the
routines of administration are carried out.
The Consensual Imperative
In alleging that bureaucratic decisionmaking undertaken during the
guideline development stage is shaped by the legal content of the statute
and by the dictates of effective bureaucratic functioning, Rein, Rabinovitz
and Pressman draw from the predominant visions in the literature of
guideline development as a process of legal translation of law into
practice, and as a process of strategic administrative planning. But in
recognition of the deficiencies of these models, they include a third set
of influences which they anticipate will also shape the outcomes of
guideline development efforts. These are political influences and
considerations which they encompass under the label of "the Consensual
imperative."
The Consensual imperative directs attention toward the bureaucracy's
need to be responsive to the forces active in the agency's political
environment; in particular the forces linked to the organized interests who
form the base for the agency's political support. Writing about the
process of implementation, Ripley and Franklin point out "Every
bureaucratic agency is involved in a web of relationships with important
others ... Primary relationships in the implementation realm are those
among bureaucratic units and their clients." 5 Consonant with this view,
Rein and Rabinovitz state that the consensual imperative impels agency
administrators to fashion guidelines in a manner which "take(s) into
account the interest groups affected by the legislation."6
The importance which Rein and Rabinovitz vest in these political
factors and influences as impulses which shape the outcomes of bureaucratic
decisionmaking during guideline development is lent credence by the
findings of several implementation scholars that active interest group
involvement in attempts to fashion the contours of public policy does not
cease once the stage of formal legislative policymaking has passed. 7
Rather than diminishing in the post-policymaking period, interest group
activities and pressures tend to persist throughout the implementation
stage, and may even intensify at the point where guideline decisions are
cast.
In highlighting the consensual imperative as one of three sets of
influences upon the guideline development process, Rein and Rabinovitz
affirm that guideline developers are not immune to the interplay of these
important political forces. If agencies are to operate without disruption,
they must seek in their actions to ensure the political quiescence of
important clienteles to whom they are beholden. If they are to maintain
themselves as resource-laden institutions, they will be impelled to render
guideline decisions in a manner which responds to the actions and pressures
brought to bear upon the agency by important interest groups. "When an
agency owes its existence to outside interests that also control the legis-
lative process through which its programs develop," Rein and Rabinovitz
note, "it has to pay substantial obeisance to these groups." 8
The consensual imperative, then, directs attention to the fact that
the tasks of devising rules and regulations are conducted with an eye
toward the bureaucracy's need to secure the appeasement of pertinent
interest groups with a stake in the outcomes. Under the consensual
imperative, then, influences and considerations tied to the political
interests of organized program constituencies take their place alongside
legal and bureaucratic ones as factors which are expected to play an
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important role in shaping the products of guideline development efforts.
Implications of the Rein, Rabinovitz and Pressman Framework
The Rein, Rabinovitz and Pressman framework represents a great advance
over earlier conceptions of guideline development activities. Given what
we know about the incompleteness of the formal policymaking process and the
opportunities for the exercise of bureaucratic discretion at this stage,
their model can be seen to more accurately reflect the greater complexity
of guideline development decisionmaking which we would expect to be
manifest in the post-policymaking stage of governmental activity. It can
be seen to more realistically and comprehensively depict the set of forces
which would be expected to shape the outcomes of the guideline development
process - forces to which empirical attention should be drawn. They
eschew, in their model the view that the contents of guidelines are
singularistically or determinatively shaped by either law or administrative
dictates. Instead, under their conception, the contents of rules and pro-
cedures (and the policy-shaping features they contain) are only in part
legally influenced, in part administratively fashioned, and in part
politically impelled. To understand the behavior and choices elected by
bureaucratic guideline authorities, then, one must look to the contents of
the law, the pressures emanating from bureaucratic self interest, and the
activities of the interest group network active in the bureaucracy's
political field.
Moreover, their framework has important implications for our under-
standing of the character of the guideline process and the nature of the
guideline developers role. Their model suggests that guideline development
is neither strictly an exercise in the translation of law, nor simply an
exercise in strategic administrative planning. Rather, as they cast it,
the guideline development process is fundamentally a more complex and
political process in which law, bureaucracy, and interest group politics
interact. Under the Rein, Rabinovitz and Pressman framework the tasks of
guideline development become, in essence, tasks of political reconciliation
involving the melding of the influences of the law, technical bureaucratic
considerations, and felt interest group concerns into a coherent framework
Of rules and procedures governing the implementation enterprise. As the
authors note, during the guideline process
"An executive at the federal level responds to a piece of legis-
lation not only in terms of what it directs but also in terms of
constituent opinions, and the demands of administration in a world
of scarce resources. It is his job to turn legislation into
workable practice by balancing the claims of legislative intent,
[constituency] opinion and administrative effectiveness [in the
guideline products produced)" 9
The Weakness of Their Model: The Legal Imperative Revisited
Though of great utility in directing empirical researchers to consider
the effect of not one but three sets of influences (the law, bureaucratic
concerns with administrative efficacy and technical feasibility, and
interest group political pressures) which conjointly account for the
content of guidelines elected during the guideline stage of implementation,
their model does prove weak or faulty on one important count. Their
conception of the legal imperative leads the model to neglect an important
related set of influences on guideline development which must be examined
in empirical research on guideline development activity.
In their discussion of the legal imperative, the authors argue that
"the law ... becomes the referent for all the actors in the [guideline
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development] process." 10 Implicit in this conception is the view that the
sole Congressionally-based influence on guideline development resides in
the statute itself. One minor flaw with this conception is that it ignores
the significance of the content of other Congressional policy documents
which are intended to supplement the law.
Congressional policymaking actors seek to convey their conception of
legislative intent and expectations about policy implementation through not
only the law itself but also through a variety of non-statutory documents
which precede and accompany the bill forged into law. Since the policy
content circumscribed in law is generally a product of Congressional
Committee effort (to which the Congressional body as a whole tends to defer
in passing legislation), messages contained in Committee-issued documents
such as Committee Reports which accompany House and Senate versions of the
bills later forged into law, can be expected to have significant influence
in shaping bureaucratic choices during the guideline development phase, as
will statements of key Committee members entered into the legislative
record during floor debate on the legislation. These supplementary
documents become especially important addendums to the law where statutory
language itself proves vague or unclear.
But the more important weakness in this portion of their model lies in
the presumption-inherent in the legal imperative as they present it - that
Congressional influences on the guideline process are frozen at the point
of legislative enactment (i.e. derive solely from legislative actions
preceding the crafting of guidelines); that direct Congressional
involvement in the policy process ends at the point at which legislative
decisions are cast. This presumption regarding the absence of
Congressional forces during the post-policymaking period may have its root
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in the assertions of Congressional scholars that Congress manifests little
interest in conducting legislative oversight of bureaucratic operations.
Indeed at one time the preponderance of evidence led Congressional scholars
to almost universally conclude that Congressional members were unconcerned
with the "details of administration" - grossly negligent of their
legitimate responsibilities for reviewing bureaucratic implementation
efforts to ensure their fealty to legislative intent.
As one set of prominent Congressional observers has attested "over-
sight [of implementation] by Congress happens only occasionally ...
motivations to engage in detailed continuous oversight is often missing or
weak at best." 1 1 Scholars researching this phenomenon have found that the
personal and professional rewards to Congressional members for engaging in
oversight of implementation tend to be too paltry to induce post-
legislative oversight interventions; the costs in terms of loss of time,
and of energy invested in the mastery of the details of administrative
functioning tend to be so great as to suppress Congressional implementation
review. 1 2
These findings have served to intensify criticism emanating from both
legislative and scholarly quarters that Congressional neglect of its
oversight function has been producing insufficient democratic checks on the
expanding power of the administrative state. 1 3 Perhaps in response to these
critiques of Congressional operations, or perhaps as an outgrowth of other
changes in the function of the legislature1i some of the more recent
research has given rise to speculation that we may be witnessing some
deviation from earlier trends.
It is the authorization Committees of the Congress which are the
predominant force in the legislative body in shaping the content of policy
47
legislation offered up to the House and Senate for passage, and it is these
Committees which bear the major responsibility for oversight of the manner
in which the bureaucracy implements the policies they have crafted. In
recent years, efforts have been initiated within some of these Committees
to strengthen their capacity to oversee activities of the executive branch.
In some instances hearings on agency activity have been found to be
scheduled with greater regularity; in others, tools to facilitate
Congressional control of administration such as legislative review and veto
of program regulations have been found to have been established with
greater frequency than in the past. Thus, though scholars continue to
adhere to the view that "Overall, Congressional attention to bureaucratic
agencies is haphazard" 1 5 , the presumption of Congressional disinterest in
the "details of administration" can no longer be made at the outset;
Congressional inactivity during program implementation stages can no longer
be automatically assumed.
All of this should lead us to expand the set of forces we examine in
an effort to understand guidelines and the process through which they come
to exist in the form that they do. In understanding the legal imperative
as a force in guideline development, we must look to the weighty influence
exerted by the language of the law, but we must view it as at least
potentially only one portion of a broader set of Congressionally-based
influences on guideline outcomes. As a supplement to this statutory
component, we must examine as well the influence exerted by the messages
contained in other non-statutory Committee documents. But more
importantly, we must examine the behavior of and pressures brought to bear
by Congressional actors during the post-policymaking period, especially
those of important Congressional Committee authorities engaged in the
Conduct of their legislative oversight role.
The Conciatory Politics of Guideline Development
Despite the greater complexity embodied in the Rein, Rabinovitz and
Pressman framework, there is nothing inherent in their model (even with the
modifications proposed here) that should lead us to expect guideline
development to be a particularly contentious, problematic, or unstable
exercise. In fact the logic of their argument leads to the counteropposite
view. Guideline authorities are presumed to approach their tasks as
fundamentally non-partisan actors -- serving as a kind of blank slate on
which the interests of Congressional, administrative, and interest group
forces will be etched. In exercising discretion in setting rules and
regulations, they are held to be guided first and foremost by a desire to
eradicate tensions among competing interests in the triad, in order to
allow the bureaucratic enterprise of implementation to proceed unimpeded by
political conflict or dissent. Guideline authorities are cast in their
model as agents of conciliation and compromise who manifest in the
guideline products they produce, a stabilizing fulcrum or balance point
among the diverse constitutional preferences held by the three sets of
interests being influence in guideline forums. Guideline decisionmaking,
in the authors words, involves the "integration of competing views"16
arising from Congressional bureaucratic, and interest group corners of post
policymaking arenas.
Moreover, the political maneuvering which marks the manner in which
these triadic forces are held to interact during the post-policymaking stage
is suggested at one point in their writings to be a "politics of
accommodation" 17 - a politics of negotiation, concession, and coming into
accord which begins during the crafting of legislation and extends into the
crafting of guidelines where policies are refined and effectuated. The
tasks of reconciliation of Congressional, administrative and interest group
wishes are presumed to be eased by the fact that "in large part the same
persons or interests involved in the legislative process (whether inside
government or outside) are equally involved in the implementation
process."18  "Here we find competing interests at play," the authors note
"within an atmosphere of give and take and conciliation."1 9
Policy Subsystems and Guideline Development
This image of a relatively tranquil and ordered set of relationships
which structure the exercise of administrative discretion during guideline
development is striking in the degree to which it parallels the literature
on policy subsystems activity in American government. Analogous to the
triad of forces which Rein, Rabinovitz and Pressman detail, policy
subsystems (or iron triangles or subgovernments) are said to refer to
the existence of a triangular relationship between (sic) three
elements in American national politics: bureaucratic agencies,
interest groups and Congressional Committees.20
Most of the work on policy subsystems has highlighted their
predominance in shaping the content of legislatively enacted policy (later
passed to guideline forums) over which they are said to exert near
complete, comprehensive control. "It is in a subsystem...." one recent
study proclaims, "that much legislation in a particular policy area will be
proposed, debated, drafted and ratified." 2 1 By implication, Rein,
Rabinovitz and Pressman lead us to believe that it is within these same
policy subsystems that guideline content will ultimately be negotiated and
settled upon as well.
Again reinforcing the vision manifest by Rein, Rabinovitz and Pressman,
the relationships among subsystem actors are in this parallel literature,
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near universally held to be tranquil rather than tumultuous, stable rather
than vacillating, concordant rather than discordant. The logic of
harmonious interaction in subsystem relationships is held to reside in the
inducements each corner of the triad has for seeking conciliation with their
counterparts views
"Congressman look [to bureaucrats and interest groups] for
political support and campaign contributions. Agency
administrators want to protect their budgets and otherwise enhance
their programs. Finally, client groups want to make sure their
interests are furthered by government policies. Over time, close
working relationships develop ... policies are formulated with the
needs of all partners in mind." 2 2
Thus despite the inherently competitive nature of these triadic
forces, during the legislative process on which the subsystems literature
has focused "policymaking in a subsystem is held to be consensual. Each
side of the triangle can be helped by working with the other two."23
Though research on subsystem activity has not been directed toward the
guideline development stage per se, findings that "the typical policy
subsystem (is) stable ... policymaking (is) carried out in a cooperative
consensual manner,n24 lend credence to the assertions of Rein, Rabinovitz
and Pressman. Especially since the issues dealt with in guideline forums
are presumed to be less weighty, less open-ended and more technical than
those addressed in legislative forums, we should expect to find accord on
rules and regulations reached at a relatively early point in a program's
history; guidelines should remain relatively stable and enduring over time.
But such was not the case with the program selected for examination in
this empirical study. Established via legislation enacted in 1974, the
Community Development Block Grant program was designed to provide grants-
in-aid to local governments to be used for the remediation of a variety of
urban ills. For more than a decade, this program has served as the
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cornerstone of the nation's urban policy. Having been in existence now
through three Presidential Administrations, the program continues to enjoy
widespread political support. At a time when other major domestic programs
have faced elimination, or found their budgets trimmed to the bone, the
CDBG program remains in existence; and though the dollar amounts provided
to sustain the operation have fallen in recent years (from a high of $3.8
billion per year in 1980 to a level of approximately $3.0 billion for fy
'87) these levels have not fallen to a degree commensurate with those of
other domestic initiatives for comparable purposes.
Yet despite the continued flow of funds under this programmatic aegis,
the rules and regulations governing the implementation effort have proven
notoriously unstable. Between 1974 and 1984, guidelines related to key
aspects of the program's operation were reformulated on five occasions.
Moreover, these guideline changes did not represent only marginal
incremental adjustments in the administrative enterprise. Rather, they had
the effect of substantively altering the central character of CDBG policy
in a manner which represented a virtual 1800 turnabout in the basic thrust
of the program three, separate times.
Where such instability is found in guidelines, a number of questions
regarding the administrative behavior of guideline authorities should be
raised. What were the motivating factors which induced the shifts in
guidelines that were observed? To what extent did concerns with
bureaucratic efficacy (the bureaucratic imperative) and interest group
pressures (the consensual imperative) play a role in shaping the guideline
products that were produced at each stage? What was the nature of the
legal imperative (the directives contained in the law) and of the
influences exerted by Congressional overseers? Did bureaucratic agents
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seek to play the mediating role they are presumed to play, and if so, why
was accord on guideline issues so difficult to reach?
The chapters which follow seek to provide answers to these questions.
Chapter 3 describes the events leading up to the passage of the 1974
enabling legislation, and the origins of the confusing legislative
directives contained in the original CDBG law. Chapter 4 examines how
these directives were transformed into the initial programmatic guidelines
during the Ford Administration's tenure at the helm of the programmatic
effort (1974-76). Chapters 5 and 6 provide an account of attempts on the
part of Carter Administration officials to recast administrative guide-
lines; forces and considerations which shaped their administrative actions
and the outcomes of their attempts (in the 1977-80 period) at programmatic
reform. Chapters 7 and 8 provide a parallel accounting of the guideline-
crafting activities which occurred during the Reagan era (1980-83), leading
up to the final legislative actions taken in 1983 and aimed at seeking
final resolution of the protracted guideline controversies through
recasting of the CDBG law.
The final chapter is devoted to a discussion of the findings and
implications which emanate from an examination of guideline-setting
activity in the CDBG case. Employing the Rein, Rabinovitz and Pressman
framework as modified here, it seeks to analyze the role of law, congres-
sional pressures, administrative considerations, and interest group
politics as they affected bureaucratic action, as well as to assess what
the findings of the case contribute to our understanding of bureaucratic
policymaking as it occurs during the execution of guideline development
tasks.
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CHAPTER 3: FROM IDEA TO LAW TO BUREAUCRATIC FORUMS:
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANTS AS AN EMPIRICAL CASE
Ultimately, the difficulties bureaucratic guideline developers
confronted in attempting to set stable rules and guidelines governing CDBG
administrative operations had their origin in the conditions surrounding
the passage of the law which brought the program into being. Both the
nature of the political deliberations which marked the 3 1/2 year
legislative struggle to enact an urban block grant program, and the
ideological atmosphere of grant reform within which the law was initially
cast were later to shape the guideline setting process in important ways.
In introducing the empirical case around which this study of guideline
development is focused, then, this chapter will describe the legislative
machinations which propelled the program into existence, as well as the
basic contours of the CDBG program as it was set forth in the law passed by
Congress in 1974. The final portions of this chapter will highlight the
particular set of programmatic issues which guideline authorities were left
to contend with as they moved to operationalize the CDBG program - issues
which form the basis for an exploration of the guideline setting process in
action.
Dissatisfaction with Categorical Grant Functioning
The impulse which lead to the creation of the CDBG program had its
roots in dissatisfaction with the categorical grant-in-aid system. Prior
to 1974, virtually all federal grants dispensed to urban areas took the
form of categorical grants-in-aid. Categorical grants were provided for
narrowly specified purposes which Congress had dictated, and came attached
with a panoply of attendant administrative strings.
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Local officials were required, under categorical grant stipulations,
to apply for federal funds via complex and elaborate application processes.
Once a grant was approved by the national bureaucracy administering the
categorical program, local officials were told, with extraordinary
specificity, exactly how and in what manner funds could be expended.
Moreover release of federal funds was often premised on localities adhering
to a series of additional administrative requirements such as requirements
that local officials undertake an extensive planning process; that they
substantiate that their activities would have no adverse impact on the
functioning of other federal grants received within their jurisdiction; or
that they secure the participation of disadvantaged citizens in the process
of electing projects upon which the funds would be expended.
Administratively, local officials were subject to intense scrutiny by
national bureaucratic overseers regarding their intentions for use of
categorical grant monies. During the execution of federally-funded cate-
gorical projects they were dictated to by national agency administrators
checked and double-checked along the way. In all, for local officials, the
federal grant-in-aid system came to resemble both a maze and a prison.
For the nation's urban officials, confronted with the tasks of solving
the problems of severe physical deterioration within their borders and the
manifestations of urban poverty that gave host to a whole panoply of social
ills, the categorical forms that urban aid took proved particularly
troublesome. Mayors complained that the effectiveness of their efforts to
solve urban problems was being severely diminished by their need to devote
time to master the intricacies contained in the voluminous programmatic
regulations to which they were required to adhere. Moreover, they held
that the weighty role granted national bureaucratic overseers of
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categorical programs was stripping them of prerogatives to exercise local
administrative discretion, leaving them unable to respond to local
constituency preferences, and the particularities of their own city's urban
needs. Indeed, the history of this categorical grant period is replete
with references to the excesses of the categorical framework within which
urban aid was provided. Regulations for the Urban Renewal Program, CDBG's
chief predecessor program, for example, filled more than four notebook-
sized volumes. 1 And a report on a second CDBG precursor, the Model Cities
program, charged national officials with "overregulation" which too tightly
bound local officials hands. 2
The Cry for Categorical Reform
The specific concerns felt by mayors and other urban officials regard-
ing the functioning of urban programs fed into a wave of broader and more
widespread discontent with the operations of the federal system during the
categorical era. Critics charged that the effectiveness of federal grant-
in-aid programs was being inhibited by several features inherent in
reliance on categorical initiatives as the near exclusive route for federal
provision of local aid. The existence of a multitude of highly specified
categorical grant programs (each operating autonomously from one another)
was rendering coordination of categorical initiatives at the local level
problematic. Moreover, the competitive nature of the grant-awards process
produced excessive financial uncertainty, making it difficult for
localities to predict, in any given year, the level of resources that would
be available for addressing local needs. But most importantly, the federal
system during the categorical era was felt to have become excessively
rule-bound, leaving little room for the tailoring of programs to the needs
of individual localities; leaving local officials drowning in a sea of
bureaucratic red-tape.
By the late 1960's, criticism of the intergovernmental grant-in-aid
system had reached a high point. In Washington, a new consensus was
emerging regarding the need for modification in federal grant-in-aid
operations. During the 1968 Presidential election, the platforms of both
political parties contained planks calling for simplification of the grant-
in-aid system, streamlining of the intergovernmental aid process, and
reduction in the volume of red tape to which local authorities were
subject. Soon after assuming office in 1968, the Nixon Administration
began to tackle the tasks of intergovernmental grant-in-aid reform.
The Nixon New Federalism Initiative
The principles which guided Nixon Administration efforts to reform the
grant-in-aid system were derived in part from the predominant critique
regarding the inefficiencies of categorical operations. But the overriding
influence on the reforms they were to propose stemmed from a more
philosophically rooted set of beliefs regarding the proper role of federal,
state and local authorities in the federal system.
To Nixon Administration officials, the chief flaw in the categorical
grant-in-aid system lay not in the fact that it had proven unwieldy and
inefficient, but in the fact that it had produced, in their eyes, a
fundamental imbalance of power in the federal system. Under categorical
arrangements, they asserted, state and local government had been wrongfully
subjugated to national government control.
In a system tightly bound by programmatic aims, rules and procedures
forged at the national level, they believed locally-determined priorities
were being trammeled. National judgments were routinely supplanting local
ones, and in the process, local officials' prerogatives to govern in a
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manner responsive to their local constituencies were being quashed under
the federal government's heavy hand. Thus, in the eyes of the Nixon
Administration, reform of the intergovernmental grant system was to involve
not only streamlining of federal administrative procedures and the
reduction of red tape (which had proven burdensome to both federal and
local authorities) but the decentralization of power and authority over
program operations from federal to local officials' hands.
Few statements capsulize the philosophical predispositions which
guided the Nixon Administration's reform efforts as well as the statement
made by President Nixon in his radio address to the nation in October 1972.
In the broadcast, Nixon stated:
"The central question which goes to the heart of American
government ... [is] do we want to turn more power over to
bureaucrats in Washington in the hope that they will do what
is best for all the people? Or do we want to return more power
to the people and to their state and local governments, so that
the people can decide what is best for themselves? 3
To the President and his advisors, the answer was clear. "The most
important way of getting better government," he continued, "is to place
more emphasis on local control."4
Consonant with these philosophical inclinations, the Nixon reform
proposals passed on to the Congress for consideration in 1971 called for a
massive restructuring of federal intergovernmental arrangements. Appropri-
ately dubbed the "New Federalism" initiative, the package contained two
parts. First it proposed the establishment of a General Revenue Sharing
program, under which federal funds were to be provided to local governments
virtually without federal restriction on how and in what manner the funds
were to be used. Monetary allocation was to be automatic; the amount a
locality was to receive was set by formula. Federal officials were granted
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virtually no role in the conduct of the program. All power and discretion
regarding the expenditure of GRS monies was ceded to local officials hands.
Second, it contained plans for the consolidation of 129 major categor-
ical programs into a series of six broad-purpose federal-local grants. 5
Emulating the features of General Revenue Sharing, these consolidated grant
funds were to be provided to local governments untethered from the
categorical restrictions which accompanied the grants which preceded them.
They were to constitute a new form of "special revenue sharing" under which
federal funds were to be made available to local government for a wide
range of uses within each of the six functionally circumscribed areas into
which the grants had been grouped. For the purposes of this study, these
special revenue sharing proposals have special relevance. Among the
programs slated for consolidation into a special revenue sharing initiative
were the nation's chief urban aid categoricals. And while the urban
special revenue sharing program did not survive in its original form, the
Nixon proposal formed the raw material from which the later CDBG program
would be cast.
Special Revenue Sharing for Urban Development: The Nixon Plan
On April 22, 1971, the Nixon administration forwarded to the Congress
its plan for Urban Development Special Revenue Sharing. 6 The legislation
proposed that four major urban aid programs administered by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development -- urban renewal, model cities, rehabili-
tation loans, and neighborhood facilities grants -- be consolidated into a
single federal-local grant initiative. Under the new initiative, federal
dollars were to be made available to urban areas for a broad set of
community development uses. But the revenue sharing approach inherent in
the proposal led the administrative arrangements under which grants were to
be provided to cities was to differ markedly from those which had been
employed under the predecessor categorical grants. Major new features of
the special revenue sharing initiative included the following.
1) GRANT ENTITLEMENT, ELIMINATION OF APPLICATION PROCESSES AND THE
FORMULA ALLOCATION SYSTEM
Under existing urban programs, grants had been awarded on a
discretionary basis. Localities were required to submit applications
itemizing the particular uses to which funds would be put - applications
that were either approved or denied by HUD officials at their discretion.
Though in theory decisions regarding grant awards and amounts were to be
based on local need and the merits of the applications, in practice the
categorical grant awards process had been subject to misuse. Localities
had charged that decisions were often made on the basis of political
considerations, and that funds were often disproportionately awarded to
those localities with skilled grantsmen at the expense of other areas with
more stringent needs. As a result, under the special revenue sharing
initiative, localities were to be awarded funds on an automatic, non-
discretionary basis. Requirements for submission of a local application
for grant funds were eliminated. Instead, all localities which met basic
criteria regarding eligibility for participation in special revenue sharing
(based on city size and other demographic criteria) were automatically
"entitled" to receive grant allotments. The amount they were to receive
was not subject to discretionary judgment by federal program officials, but
was in contrast dictated by a formula set by statute.
2) ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED
Under categorical initiatives, localities had been required to conform
to a multitude of both substantive and procedural administrative require-
ments attached to the federal grant. (As noted earlier, these included
such things as requirements regarding local planning for use of grant
funds, citizen participation in local project efforts, etc., as well as
requirements for routine reporting to federal officials on the progress and
effectiveness of local activities for which federal grant-in-aid monies had
been provided). In an effort to eliminate the red tape which had
accompanied categorical grant operations, virtually all administrative
requirements were to be lifted under special revenue sharing arrangements.
Under the legislative proposal, localities were required only to present a
broad outline of their plans for use of special revenue sharing funds.
Beyond this, there were virtually no restrictions which accompanied the
special revenue sharing grants.
3) ELIMINATION OF FEDERAL SUPERVISION OF LOCAL EFFORT
Under urban categorical arrangements, federal program managers in the
Department of Housing and Urban Development held a wide range of responsi-
bilities for oversight of local utilization of federal grant funds. Their
role included granting prior approval to local plans for use of grant
monies, as well as providing supervision and oversight of the conduct of
local authorities as these plans were being executed. Under special
revenue sharing, the role of HUD program managers was restricted to com-
menting on, but not granting approval to, local plans for the expenditure
of special revenue sharing monies. Beyond that, they were afforded no role
in overseeing local grant operations. Their role was limited, in essence,
to serving as a non-discretionary disburser of grant funds.
4) MAXIMIZATION OF LOCAL DECISIONMAKING DISCRETION
Under categorical initiatives, local officials had been required to
direct grant-funded activities toward attainment of national policy goals
set forth in legislation. Moreover, local discretion had been circum-
scribed as well by requirements that localities pursue nationally-specified
strategies deemed consistent with the attainment of these national aims.
Under SRS arrangements neither national goals nor strategies were to be
outlined. Local discretion was to be limited only by requirements that
grant-funded activities fall within the broad functional areas specified in
legislation. Beyond that, all decisions regarding the purposes and
strategies for which federal grant-in-aid dollars were to be expended, were
to be ceded to local officials' hands.
Congressional Reaction to the SRS proposals
While the 92nd Congress (1971-72) had reacted favorably to Nixon's
General Revenue Sharing proposal (it was enacted into law in 1972), the
Urban Special Revenue Sharing proposal was far less well-received. The SRS
initiative encountered great resistance in the halls of the Congress,
despite fundamental Congressional agreement with the Administration on the
need for urban grant-in-aid reform.
Both the Administration and the Congress agreed that consolidation and
decategorization of urban grant programs was desirable; and both agreed
upon the need to reduce bureaucratic red tape, to streamline the adminis-
trative process, and to grant localities greater discretion in deciding how
federal funds were to be spent. Yet there was substantial disagreement
between the two institutions regarding the degree to which control over
grant operations was to be decentralized under new grant arrangements.
Members of the 92nd Congress expressed concern that the SRS proposal
vested too much decisionmaking authority at the local level while providing
inadequate federal checks to avert the potential for local waste, fraud and
abuse. Moreover, many members feared that national urban programs would
lose focus without a greater federal presence to assure local adherence to
traditional national urban policy aims. Bound up in disputes over the
decentralization issue, the SRS measure failed to secure the approval of
the Congress by its adjournment date in fall of 1972.
The Better Communities Act: Special Revenue Sharing - Round Two
Undaunted by initial Congressional resistance to the measure, the
Administration revived its special revenue sharing proposals in the form of
legislation entitled "The Better Communities Act of 1973" (BCA).7 The
renamed bill differed from the original SRS proposal only in that it
expanded the number of urban aid programs to be folded into the initiative
(three categorical programs were added - open space grants, water and sewer
grants, and the public facilities loan program); and in that it broadened
eligibility requirements to entitle urban counties to receive funds under
the program. All other features of the SRS proposal remained intact.
As in the original SRS proposal, no national goals were specified in
the BCA legislation - only a listing of the broad set of eligible community
development uses was included. Localities were free to elect community
development priorities on which grant funds were to be expended solely as
they saw fit. Consistent with this strong emphasis on local discretion, no
formal application was to be required of localities. In lieu of an appli-
cation, localities were required only to file with HUD a general statement
outlining their own local community development objectives and their
projected uses for grant monies in the coming year. Federal agents were
afforded no role in approving local plans for grant expenditure. Once a
local statement had been received by HUD, grant approval was to be
automatic. Having been introduced into the legislature in early 1973, the
fate of the BCA measure was ceded to the hands of the 93rd Congress.
Senate Reaction to the BCA Proposal
The BCA proposal was met with particularly harsh criticism in Senate
chambers, where there was little support in any sector for the Administra-
tion's decentralization aims. Though the Senate contingent agreed with the
basic ideas of consolidating urban categorical programs, increasing local
flexibility, and reducing bureaucratic red tape, they differed sharply with
the Administration regarding the need for retention of a strong federal
role in defining the basic character of, and priorities for, the
consolidated program, and in overseeing the conduct of localities who were
to receive the federal grant.
The degree of autonomy to be afforded localities in setting priorities
for the SRS program greatly troubled Senatorial critics. They charged that
acceptance of a major grant initiative in which no national goals were
specified would be tantamount to abdication of Congressional "responsibil-
ities to the taxpayer to promote the use of their funds in as productive a
manner as possible." 8 Failure to delineate the national goals toward which
local grant funded CD efforts were to be directed was seen as eroding the
essential national character of urban grant-in-aid programs, which, in the
eyes of the Senate, provided justification for expenditure of scarce federal
funds. "With the advent of General Revenue Sharing," one Senator asserted,
"there is no reason to create another fund transfer program which simply
provides localities with more federal money to use virtually as they see
fit."9
Moreover, other Senators expressed concerns that without strong
national directives and purposes, and a federal administrative presence to
assure local adherence to those aims, localities would spend federal monies
on priorities that deviated sharply from the national policy commitments to
the eradication of urban slum conditions that had guided national urban
revitalization efforts for nearly 30 years. Left to their own devices,
localities might choose to spend SRS funds for more frivolous urban
projects, they contended, undermining the accomplishments that had been made
toward remediating conditions in the nations worst urban slum areas and
necessitating even greater federal expenditures to reverse urban decline in
future years.
But perhaps the most important set of strong Senatorial objections to
the SRS legislation had its roots in concerns with how the poor would fare
under the proposed SRS arrangements. While some of the smaller categorical
programs to be merged into the special revenue sharing initiative had never
been tethered to aims of serving urban low income residents, two of the
largest categorical programs slated for consolidation - Model Cities and
Urban Renewal, which together accounted for 86% of the funds to be pooled -
had had, at least in theory, some concern with the poor at heart. Model
Cities had been expressly designed to aid low income neighborhoods, and
grant funds had been accompanied by weighty federal requirements that
benefits be directed to meet low income needs. To a large extent the
program had reached its low income targets, but Urban Renewal, in contrast,
proved a different story.
Though it had initially been presumed that low income "slum dwellers"
would benefit from local renewal projects funded via the categorical grant
mechanism, during the 1950's and 60's it became clear that such was not the
case. What the experience of the program had graphically demonstrated was
that, rather than directing funds toward amelioration of conditions facing
impoverished slum dwellers, localities overwhelmingly preferred using
federal renewal funds to develop middle and upper income housing and to
67
revitalize their downtown commercial areas. In the process the poor had
been repeatedly not only neglected but harmed by renewal efforts, routinely
being evicted and displaced. In light of the history of the urban renewal
effort, the Senate pondered, was the removal of all federal strings under a
special revenue sharing arrangement justified? Left to their own devices
could the cities be trusted in any way to serve the needs of the urban poor?
In the minds of the vast majority of Senators, the answer to this
question was "no." Using General Revenue Sharing experiences as an example
of what might be expected to happen under the SRS initiative, Senator Taft
asserted
"Many observers, I'd say perhaps even an increasing number, feel
that the experience of General Revenue Sharing thus far indicates
that the money isn't going ... to address the needs of citizens who
most need help." 10
Acceptance of the Administration's proposal, then, was seen by the
Senate as inimical to the interests of low income groups for whom they
manifest great concern. In the absence of federal directives mandating a
redistributive approach be applied under grant operations, the Senate
feared, localities would prove unresponsive to the needs of the poor.
As a result of these objections, the Senate repudiated the Administra-
tions Special Revenue Sharing bill and offered up its own legislative plan
for consolidation several urban categoricals into a single Urban Development
"Block Grant."11 Unlike the Administration's SRS initiative, the chief
character of the legislation was not driven by the impulse to free
localities of federal intervention. Rather it had as its chief intention
the provision of a simplified urban grant to localities to be used for the
benefit of low income constituencies, incorporating the degree of federal
direction and supervision that the Senate felt would be required in order to
bring that end about.
The block grant program advocated in the Senate's legislation, then,
different from the SRS initiative in significant ways.
1) NATIONAL GOALS AND REQUIREMENTS AIMED AT DIRECTING PROGRAM BENEFITS
TO THE URBAN POOR
Unlike the SRS measure, the Senate bill contained a detailed set of
national purposes for which block grant aid to the cities was to be
provided. [These included such things as the elimination of urban slums and
blight, improvement of essential urban public services, revitalization of
urban neighborhoods, and improvement of the urban housing stock]. Each of
these purposes was to be suborned in importance to the overarching national
goal of the program -- providing federal dollars for urban
development projects which would ultimately benefit the poor. The Senate
bill declared, in no uncertain terms, "the primary objective of this title
is the development of viable urban communities by providing decent housing,
and a suitable living environment and expanding economic opportunities
principally for persons of low and moderate income. w12
To underscore the importance of this redistributive aim of the program,
the Senate included in the legislation a legal requirement that localities
devote at least 80% of their grant allotment to projects designed to be "of
direct and significant benefit to families of low or moderate income, or to
areas which are blighted or deteriorating." 13
2) RESTORATION OF AN APPLICATION PROCESS SUBJECT TO FEDERAL REVIEW
While the SRS initiative had sought to eliminate requirements that
localities submit applications in order to receive funding, under the Senate
measure application requirements were restored. Localities were required to
submit applications for block grant funding which contained detailed local
plans for the use of federal monies, and explained how the national aims of
the legislation would be furthered by the projects localities proposed to
undertake.
3) RETENTION OF A STRONG FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE IN PROGRAM
OPERATIONS
Though mindful of the need to avert "unnecessary second guessing by
Washington", the Senate eschewed the "hands off" approach to federal
involvement the SRS initiative had implied. The Senate manifest great
skepticism regarding the competence of local authorities, the degree of
their commitment to the national aims of the legislation, and their
willingness to provide assistance to the low income constituencies the
legislation sought to assist. As a result, the Senate sought to provide, in
legislation, a major role for federal bureaucrats in the operation of the
block grant program.
Under the Senate bill, federal bureaucratic authorities were charged
with major responsibilities for both reviewing and approving local
applications for block grant funding. Though their review was to be less
extensive than under prior categorical arrangements, their review was to be
substantive, not pro forma. Acceptance of a local application was to be
predicated on federal bureaucratic assessments of the soundness and compre-
hensiveness of the locality's community development strategy, as well as its
consistency with federal requirements and nationally specified aims,
particularly those directing attention to the needs of the poor. (Federal
bureaucrats were also charged with responsibilities for monitoring local
programmatic execution, to assure the national aims of the legislation were
reflected in local activities every step of the way.)
House Reactions to the BCA Proposal
Like the Senate, the House objected to certain aspects of the Special
Revenue Sharing approach contained in the BCA legislation. But in contrast
to the Senate, the grant-in-aid features the House elected to incorporate
into the version of grant consolidation they offered up in 1973 proved
considerably more closely aligned to the Administration's decentralization
aims.14
Representatives, in general, disliked the fully automatic nature of
grant distribution specified in SRS arrangements, preferring instead that
some federal role in the grant-in-aid process be retained. Thus, like the
Senate, they opted for a "block grant" approach in the program they
proposed to establish, in which local applications for grant funds would
have to be submitted, and in which some federal role in overseeing grant
operations would be maintained.
Yet at the same time, the House shared the Administration's disdain for
for a strong federal presence in urban grant-in-aid operations.
Prerogatives to set specific policy priorities under the new block grant
program, the House believed, appropriately belonged to local, not national
authorities. Within the framework of a set of diffuse national goals toward
which the program was to be directed (goals broadly writ, such as "providing
a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family")
local discretion to elect priorities and strategies for urban revitalization
was to be maximized. In the House view then, the federal bureaucratic role
in block grant operations was to be of a minimalist nature, sufficient only
to serve as "a safety valve ... in case some community gets blatantly out of
line."15
The House Bill
In its form and content, the block grant program the House offered up
for consideration bore a much closer resemblance to the Administration's SRS
initiative than to the block grant program espoused by the Senate. Though
it required localities to submit an annual application for block grant
assistance -- an application which was subject to federal review -- the
nature of the application process as specified in the House bill revealed it
to be more a device to "strengthen the ability of local elected officials to
determine their community development needs, set priorities, and allocate
resources" 1 6 than a tool through which federal officials could enforce local
adherence to set of nationally specified aims. Features of the House block
grant initiative were as follows:
1) THE APPLICATION PROCESS
In the applications they were to submit to HUD, localities were to
identify the housing and community development needs in their jurisdictions
which they believed to merit priority attention. They were then to set
forth the set of specific activities on which they proposed to send block
grant monies, activities which constituted their chosen strategy for
addressing these locally-determined needs. While local applications were
to be subject to review by federal bureaucratic agents, the House bill --
unlike the Senate's -- imposed severe limitations on HUD's application
review role.
2) PREFERENCES FOR A WEAK OVERSIGHT ROLE FOR FEDERAL AGENTS
Federal authorities were to be afforded only sixty days in which to
complete their review of local applications. Moreover, federal
administrative discretion in approving or disapproving local grant
applications was to be severely constrained. Unless the needs specified by
localities were found to be "plainly inconsistent" with data on local
housing and community development conditions or unless local projects
slated for grant expenditure were found to be "plainly inappropriate" to
meeting locally specified needs, localities were "entitled" to receipt of
funds; grant approval by HUD was to be automatic.
Federal agents were also afforded some minimal responsibilities for
monitoring local performance under the House block grant program, but again
deviating from the Senate measure federal oversight was subject to serious
strictures. Federal review was not to be substantive in nature. In
reviewing local conduct, federal authorities were to determine only whether
grant recipients had carried out their programs substantially as described
in its application and whether they demonstrated a continuing capacity to
carry out programmatic efforts in a timely manner.
3) NO FEDERAL REDISTRIBUTIVE PREFERENCES WERE INCORPORATED
In crafting the House bill, Representatives failed to reflect the
Senate's concern with the well-being of low income constituents. No legal
requirements reserving a share of block grant monies for the poor were
included, nor were national goals mandating priority attention to their
needs specified in the legislation. In the House's eyes, decentralization
aims were of paramount importance. Localities were to be free to elect
their own priorities for community development; decisions about who should
benefit from block grant expenditures, the House held, were properly left
to be arrived at in their local domain.
Crafting of the Final CD Legislation: Pressures for a Hasty Compromise
Having been accepted by their respective chambers, the House and Senate
versions of the block grant legislation were ceded to a joint Conference
Committee in the Spring of 1974. The marked differences between House and
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Senate versions of how the block grant was to operate promised to make the
Conference process a difficult undertaking. In fact, so far apart were
House and Senate positions on the issue of requirements for low income
targeting of funds vs. local discretion in priority setting, and on the
issue of affording federal agents a weak vs. strong role in overseeing
local efforts that the Conference fell into stalemate for a period of six
weeks. But weighty pressures were felt for legislative compromise that
session, and unforeseen events served to propel the CDBG program into
existence in the late summer of that year.
As the Committee deliberated provisions of the two measures before it,
it was subject to strong pressures to resolve House-Senate differences
regarding CD portions of the bill -- pressures rooted in deep Congressional
desire to secure enactment of other titles of the legislation. In 1972,
President Nixon had suspended the operation of the nation's major housing
subsidy programs, causing a lapse in the federal housing pipeline that had
extended by the time of Conference deliberations for a period of 18 months.
To the Congress, this lapse in federal housing activities was intolerable.
Since the Congress's .proposals for reformulation and reinstatement of
federal housing programs were contained in other titles of the CD
legislation, intense pressures came to bear on the Conference Committee to
produce compromise legislation that could be acted upon before the close of
the fall Congressional term.
Moreover, the time available to the Committee in which to craft a
compromise was foreshortened by a series of dramatic political events. By
mid-summer of 1974, the Nixon Administration was becoming evermore deeply
embroiled in the Watergate scandal. Nixon's reluctance to resign the
Presidency was producing calls for the initiation of impeachment
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proceedings. Committee members were aware that impeachment hearings could
well tie up legislative forums for the remainder of the legislative term.
If any action was to be taken on housing and CD legislation that session,
the Committee recognized, a bill would have to reach the floor by summer's
end. As a result of these pressures, the Congress reluctantly and hastily
crafted a compromise measure which the Committee ceded to the legislature
on August 9. On August 22, not two weeks after Nixon resigned from office,
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 was signed into law by
President Ford. 17
General Features of the CDBG Program as Set Forth in Legislation
With the passage of compromise legislation, a new major urban
development program was established. Seven major urban categorical
programs were folded into a single Community Development Block Grant.
Operational responsibilities for the new grant initiative were assigned to
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Funded to the tune
of $2.5 billion a year at the outset, CDBG was to constitute the largest
urban development program HUD had ever undertaken. The CDBG program was to
serve as the centerpiece of the nation's system of urban grants-in-aid.
The general features of the CDBG program as set forth in the legislation
were as follows:
Under the Act's provisions, CDBG aid was to be provided
to a much broader and more diverse set of localities than
had participated in CDBG's major predecessor programs like
Model Cities and Urban Renewal. Under the major subprogram
of the CDBG effort (the "entitlement program" for which 80%
of program funds were earmarked) metropolitan suburbs, mid-
sized cities and urban counties were to take their place
alongside the nation's big cities as eligible recipients of
the blocked grants.
Under the CDBG program, this diverse array of local
jurisdictions were each "entitled" to claim an annual share of
block grant funding, a share determined by a statutory formula
based on "objective" measures of need (the formula counted
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population,poverty-weighted twice, and local housing
overcrowding as factors).
* Funding could be used to undertake local projects which fell
within an expansive set of eligible community development
activities set forth in the law, including such things as
housing preservation and improvement, public works projects,
recreation facilities and programs and urban public and social
services.
* To receive federal funding, localities were required to submit
to HUD administrators a single broad application which
contained a three year plan for attack on local community
development conditions in need of remediation, an annual
activities plan specifying the projects to be undertaken with
grant monies in the coming year, and a housing assistance plan
in which housing needs of the locality's low income residents
were assessed.
* Localities were also required as a component of the
application process to make certain certifications or
assurances to federal administrators, eg. that they had
afforded local citizens an opportunity to participate in local
planning for the use of block grant funds; undertaken
appropriate federally-mandated environmental reviews; and
complied with the non-discrimination provisions of the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968. (Note: one additional
certification was the object of much confusion and will be
discussed in detail in ensuing pages.)
With respect to the features of the CDBG program cited thus far, the
provisions of the act reflected genuine consensus among House-Senate
Conferees on the basic principles which were to be incorporated into urban
grant-in-aid reform. Compared to earlier urban categorical programs, the
block grant program established by Conferees and authorized by the Congress
provided a more simplified urban grant structure, enhanced local
flexibility, and reduction in bureaucratic red tape -- features valued
uniformly by both the Senate and the House.
But with respect to other key features of the block grant program, the
Act failed to reflect any genuine House-Senate consensus on the policy
mandates which were to guide administration of the block grant program.
Instead, under provisions of the Act, fundamental issues related to the
appropriate balance of power between national and local authorities under
block grant arrangements, and the relative importance of the program's
redistributive vs. decentralist aims, were left unresolved in the
legislation. In their haste to craft a compromise measure, the House-
Senate conferees had simply grafted together the two contradictory pieces
of legislation, melding them only uneasily and inconsistently into one.
From the House Bill, a Weak Role for Federal Agents
In a concession to House preferences, the Congress had eschewed the
provisions of the Senate bill which sought to provide HUD with broad-
ranging powers to exercise federally authority in a manner which would give
them great control over the contents of local programs funded with block
grants. The Conferees had incorporated instead the legislative sections of
the House-authored bill which delineated a weak role for federal officials
in overseeing local use of the block grants. While HUD officials were
charged with responsibilities for both reviewing and approving local
applications, their role was severely circumscribed under these House
drafted portions of the CDBG Act. HUD officials were afforded only 75 days
in which to complete.their review of local grant applications; any
application which had not been acted upon by the close of that time period
was to be considered automatically approved. Moreover, reflecting the
House's preference for maximized local discretion (and a more revenue-
sharing-oriented approach to the provision of federal aid) the grounds upon
which HUD officials were authorized to deny grant funding were subject to
serious strictures.
Under Section 104(c) of the Act, language extracted directly from the
House bill was inserted - language specifying that the Secretary shall
approve a local grant application unless
"(1) on the basis of significant facts and data...the Secretary
determines that the applicant's description of [its community
development] needs and objectives is plainly inconsistent with
such facts and data; or
(2) ...the Secretary determines that the [local] activities to be
undertaken are plainly inappropriate to meeting the needs and
objectives identified by the applicant (emphasis added); or
(3) the Secretary determines that the application does not comply
with the requirements of this title."1 8
The basic thrust of these provisions was to sharply circumscribe HUD's
typically broad-ranging powers to pass judgement on the appropriateness of
the contents of proposed local programs. Implied in the specification of
the "plainly inconsistent" and "plainly inappropriate" criteria as the
predominant basis upon which denial of grant funds could legitimately be
made was a charge to HUD administrators that the substance of local plans
for the use of grant monies was not to be subject to federal assessments;
that (consistent with the decentralization mandate favored by the House)
localities should be afforded the opportunity to set priorities and plans
for the use of grant funds consistent with their own local vision of how
(and upon whom) federal funds were to be spent.
An Overarching Emphasis on Redistribution from the Senate
Such a strong emphasis on decentralized decisionmaking and a weak
constricted role for federal officials would have been fully consonant with
a block grant program in which no strong national purposes or priorities
were specified (as had been the case with the original SRS proposals). But
during the contentious Conference proceedings, the Senate had succeeded
(contrary to House wishes) in inserting the final legislation, sections
from its bill establishing a major overarching national programmatic goal.
With acceptance of this Senate-crafted language into the final Act, a
contradictory policy mandate to govern CDBG administrative operations was
also cast forth into law.
In a concession to Senatorial preferences for a strong national
emphasis on protecting the interests of the urban poor, the Congress had
accepted the Senate's version of national goals for the CDBG program.
The opening "Findings and Purposes" section of the CDBG title of the
Act, Section 101(c), contained language drawn directly from the Senate bill,
stipulating that
the primary objective of this [program] is the development
of viable urban communities by providing a decent home and
suitable living environment and expanding economic opportunities
principally for persons of low and moderate income (emphasis
added.)19
In contrast to the implication of the House-drafted portions of the Act,
then, the substance of a local application, at least with respect to how
program benefits were to be distributed by a locality, was implied by this
national goal statement to be not only a legitimate but an important object
of federal concern. In discharging its responsibilities to Congress for
stewardship of the CDBG program, HUD would be expected, in accordance with
this statement of the primary mission of the program, to find means to
assure that localities were targeting grant funds to their low income
populace; to assure that the block grant program overall would be
administered in a manner which furthered this national redistributive aim.
Maximum Feasible Priority, Maximum Possible Confusion
As if these contradictory portions of the CDBG legislation were not
sufficient to obscure the basic character of the block grant enterprise and
the nature of HUD's obligations under the Act, the final legislation
contained a major compromise provision that would become the object of much
confusion for HUD administrators.
In the version of the block grant legislation the Senate carried to
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Conference, the Senate had made clear what "principally for (the benefit
of) low and moderate income persons" (the language contained in the
national program goal) was to mean. Under the Senate version, HUD was
permitted to accept a local application only if the locality's program
earmarked at least 80% of its grant allotment for use on projects which
directly benefited the poor or ameliorated the slum and blighted conditions
in which they lived. This Senate provision had made clear that at least
80% of a locality's block grant funds were to be targeted to the poor, and
that HUD was required to assure this benefits standard has been met before
a local grant was released. Yet in Conference, this Senate requirement was
significantly modified from its original format. As this portion of the
legislation emerged fran the final House-Senate Conference, Section
104(b)(2) of the legislation mandated that a locality, as part of its
application responsibilities
"certify to the satisfaction of the Secretary (of HUD) that
its community development program has been developed so as
to give maximum feasible priority to activities which benefit
low or moderate income persons or aid in the prevention or
elimination of slums and blight. 2 0 (emphasis added)
Alternatively, localities were permitted in the latter portion of Section
104(b)(2) to certify (subject to approval by the Secretary) that their
programs had been designed "to meet other community development needs
having a particular urgency."
In the eyes of the Senate conferees, this final language of the
compromise clause was seen as reinforcing the emphasis established in the
national goal that the CDBG program serve "principally ... persons of low
and moderate income." The maximum feasible priority language of the
provision was seen as a reflection of the strong Senatorial intention that
a locality devote virtually all its programmatic efforts toward meeting the
Act's fundamental redistributive aim. While Senate members had been forced
in Conference to accede to House arguments against establishing a rigid 80%
low income benefit standard in law, they nonetheless viewed the maximum
feasible priority clause as having substantive programmatic meaning;
localities were not simply to give priority to eradicating slum housing, or
otherwise targeting aid in a manner which would improve the conditions in
which the poor lived, they were to give maximum feasible priority to these
specified areas.
Furthermore, in the eyes of Senate conferees, this application
requirement was to serve as the basic tool for assuring the redistributive
aim of the program would be met under block grant administrative
arrangements. 2 1 HUD's approval of each grant application was predicted on
the locality having certified their application met MFP requirements. ("Any
grant under this title shall be made only on condition that the applicant
certify," this section read.)22 In addition, the certification was required
to be "to the satisfaction of the Secretary," implying HUD bore some
programmatic responsibility for assuring that localities had, in fact given
maximum feasible priority to meeting low income needs in the plans they set
forth. But in this same language, the House read other contrary meanings.
In the House view, the certification procedure and the vagueness of the
maximum feasible priority language were intended to reflect the House
preference for a weak oversight role for HUD officials and for the
maximization of local freedom to craft a program consonant with their own
local constituents desires. While the Senate saw the section 104(b)(2)
clause as providing the basis upon which HUD was empowered to exert
stringent control over the distribution of benefits in local programmatic
proposals (in order to direct local efforts heavily toward attainment of
the program's redistributive aim), the House saw the certification
mechanism as a reflection of its desire to lend a revenue-sharing cast to
the program's administrative operations, and to preclude HUD from
exercising much control over the contents of local programs.
Furthermore, having succeeded in broadening the clause in Conference,
to allow localities to certify their programs had given maximum feasible
priority to preventing (as well as eliminating existing) slums and blight,
and to allow localities the option of certifying that their programs were
meeting other "urgent (community development) needs," the House believed
that it had succeeded in diluting in the Act's operational provisions the
Senate's stringent programmatic emphasis on targeting funds to the urban
poor. While serving the poor was an option localities might pursue in
establishing their proposals, it was the House's view that the clause
afforded localities a broader set of options (serving low and moderate
income persons, preventing or eliminating slums and blight, or responding
to other urgent needs) from which to choose in designing their local plans
for expenditure of grant funds. 2 3
Reconciling the Conflicting Provisions, the Guideline Developer's Role
In its haste to enact the CDBG program, the Congress had passed into
law a statute which raised more questions than it answered. What did
"maximum feasible priority" mean, and was the clause in which the phrase
was contained to be read restrictively (as a charge to localities to direct
the overriding majority of their grant allocation toward the Act's goal of
serving low and moderate income groups, as the Senate intended) or
expansively (so as to allow localities to choose relatively freely among a
broader array of program priority choices, as the House intended)? Did
national bureaucratic officials at HUD bear responsibility during
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performance of their application review and monitoring tasks for cross-
checking local programs for conformity with the primary national goal (as
the Senate intended) or were they to approach disbursal of federal funds in
a revenue sharing manner (favored by the House) which effectively put local
authorities in the driver's seat? Within CDBG programmatic operations how
were the divergent mandates sanctioned in the final legislation (for both
redistribution and decentralization) to be reconciled? Given the
irresolute nature of this hastily and poorly crafted piece of legislation
these issues were left to be clarified in guideline development forums.
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CHAPTER 4: CDBG GUIDELINES AND REGULATIONS OF THE FORD ADMINISTRATION ERA
Having received the signature of newly inaugurated President Ford, the
CDBG legislation was ceded to the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment for implementation. Within the HUD bureaucracy, programmatic
administrative responsibilities were assigned to the Office of Community
Planning and Development (CPD). One of the chief tasks that lay before
top-ranking CPD officials was the establishment of rules, guidelines and
operating procedures under which the CDBG program would function. Since
the actual administrative structure under which the program was to be
operated was premised on the two tier model (in which the CPD staff in
HUD's area offices would actually conduct local application reviews,
approve grants, and monitor local performance, while central office CPD
staff would oversee area office performance and set administrative policy),
the rules and guidelines crafted at the central CPD offices were expected
to serve to instruct Area Office and local authorities regarding the nature
of their responsibilities under the CDBG legislation.
The top ranking political appointees and civil service career staff who
held positions of high authority in the central CPD office acted quickly to
effectuate formal regulations for the program. The initial formal CDBG
rules had been drafted and sent to the Federal Register only three weeks
after passage of the legislation. Published as proposed rules in the
Federal Register on September 17, 1974, 1 the CPD draft regulations were
sanctioned as formal rules and operating procedures for the program less
than two months later on November 14, 1974.2
The initial formal regulations for the program were exceedingly brief
given the scope and complexities of the massive new CDBG effort. Compared
to the extensive programmatic detail provided by the 2,600 pages contained
in handbooks for the seven categorical programs folded in CDBG, the
program's new regulations now filled only about 20 pages of the Federal
Register. In part, their brevity was a function of the additional burdens
borne by the CPD office during the start-up phase, and the extremely short
period of time afforded CPD staff in which to get the program up and
running.
The legislation allowed little time for careful and reasoned
administrative planning for the management of the program. According to
the provisions of the law, the CDBG program was to assume operation on
January 1, 1975, only four months after the date of the law's enactment.
Moreover, the law stipulated that applications from the 1 ,344 eligible
entitlement grantees be received at HUD offices between January 1 and April
15, 1975, and that processing and approval of each grant application be
completed no more than 75 days after its date of arrival at HUD. In
practical terms, this meant that CPD officials had a period of only
eighteen weeks in which to carry out a whole panoply of administrative
start-up functions. In addition to issuing formal rules and regulations to
govern the effort, CPD officials were required to determine the formula
share of CDBG monies for which each locality was eligible, to develop and
issue application forms, to conduct briefings for local officials on the
new program, and to hold training sessions for HUD area office field staff.
Given the weighty nature of these start-up responsibilities, and the
truncated timetable in which they had to be carried out, it was not
surprising that the regulations were as spare as they were. But the
brevity of the federal administrative rules was only due in part to the
abbreviated timetable under which CPD officials were forced to operate. To
a much greater degree, the minimalist nature of the regulations (as well as
the interpretive determinations reflected in the regulations' content) was
attributable to two other forces. First, the programmatic biases the HUD
rulemaking authorities brought to their role in operationalizing the
program; and second the pressures emanating from interest groups
representing mayors and local officials who formed a key component of
CDBG's programmatic constituency.
The Anti-Federal-Government Biases of Guideline Authorities
Initial regulations, operating procedures and guidelines for the CDBG
program were crafted at the hands of a small cadre of senior officials in
the central CPD office. Chief among those involved in the guideline
deliberations were two political appointees, Assistant Secretary for CPD
David 0. Meeker, and his Deputy Assistant Secretary Warren Butler, both of
whom had originally been appointed to their posts by President Nixon and
who were subsequently retained in the administration of President Ford. In
setting the administrative groundrules for CDBG operations, they were
joined by a few of the most senior career staff at CPD. Each of the actors
engaged in setting guideline policy had been intimately involved during the
preceding four year period in framing and lobbying on behalf of the Nixon
Urban Development special revenue sharing in initiatives. Thus they
brought to their guideline development role a distinct bias toward an
extreme reduction in the degree of federal restrictions that rules and
regulations would impose on localities.
Pressures from the Mayors
Moreover, during the period in which regulations and administrative
policies were being set for the CDBG program, CPD officials were confronted
with intense and persistent pressures emanating from the interest groups
representing the mayors and local officials who were the intended
recipients of CDBG grant funds. During the Congressional deliberations
over the proposed block grant legislation, key interest groups such as the
U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCOM), the National League of Cities (NLC), and
the National Association of Counties (NaCo) had pressed hard for
legislation that would limit federal restrictions on their grant-funded
activities to as great an extent as possible. Their lobbying activities
carried over after passage of the CDBG legislation to HUD's administrative
forums. Time and again, they urged HUD officials to draft administrative
guidelines in a manner which would keep federal rules and regulations to an
absolute minimum.
The Biases Reflected in Program Rules: No Standards or Directives
Regarding Implementation of the Primary Objective
Although the formal rules issued in 1974 were exceedingly spare, their
contents nonetheless reflected some significant interpretations of the law
on the part of CPD regulatory draftsman. The language set forth in Section
101(c) of the Act suggested that the program was to be administered in a
manner which assured -grant benefits would be provided "principally for
persons of low and moderate income." Yet the regulatory provisions failed
to do more than pay lip service to the low and moderate income mandate of
the Act. While the regulations did define for administrative purposes who
"low and moderate income persons" were (those with incomes below 80% of the
local area's median income level), and while the regulations did mandate
that localities provide data in their applications specifying which income
groups would be expected to benefit from their planned CDBG activities,
they failed to direct HUD officials regarding how they were to make use of
this information in conducting their application reviews. No overall low-
income benefit standard for local CD programs was set forth in the
regulations; nor were HUD area office officials instructed as to how, or
even whether they were in any way to assess local programs for their
conformity with the national "primary objective" of the Act.
The reasons for these omissions in the regulations can be found in the
meaning HUD officials ascribed to the various provisions of the law. The
"primary objective", having been appended at the last stages of Conference
action to the main body of the predominantly House-authored version of the
final bill, was viewed as little more than symbolic, lofty rhetoric. In
the words of one high-ranking HUD official
[In setting administrative rules] we basically felt it
[Section 101(c)] was throw-away language. It had no real
substantive meaning for the day to day operation of the
program3
What did have "real meaning" for the day to day operation of the
program, in their eyes, was the latter Section 104(b)(2) provision in the
legislation, located in the main body of the 1974 Act. Thus, HUD officials
adopted the stance that the Section 104(b)(2) portion of the law (which
contained the maximum feasible priority) held the only legislative
reference to the low-income benefit issue that would be utilized in setting
substantive requirements for the program.
Interpreting Section 104(b)(2): Not Maximum Feasible Priority to the Poor,
but a Triad of Broad Local Options
The Section 104(b)(2) portion of the Act contained the ambiguous and
unclear language stipulating that a locality must (as a precondition of
receipt of CDBG aid) "certify to the satisfaction of then Secretary that
its community development program has been developed so as to give maximum
feasible priority to activities that will benefit low and moderate income
families, or aid in the prevention or elimination of slums and blight."
Yet the ensuing sentence in this Section also allowed HUD to approve
funding of local applications which "the applicant certifies and the
Secretary determines are designed to meet other community development needs
having a particular urgency."
In designing the 1974 program rules, HUD officials preference for
allowing maximum local discretion in setting expenditure priorities
prompted them to interpret this language in as broad and non-constraining a
manner as possible. HUD failed to define in its rules what "maximum
feasible priority" was to mean, and failed to direct field staff regarding
how local programs were to be reviewed for conformity with this clause.
Moreover, the rules also declined to specify the basis upon which area
offices were to make the alluded-to determination as to whether locally-
certified urgent needs were in fact truly urgent - of a sufficiently
critical nature to justify deflection of expenditures away from the other
two "maximum feasible priority" aims.
The effect of the regulations' silence in these areas was twofold.
First, to signal to HUD field staff that regardless how frivolous projects
claimed by localities to be serving "urgent needs" might appear in their
eyes, conditions of urgency were to be left for local officials to decide.
And second, to send the message to HUD field staff and local officials
alike that local programs designed to meet any one of the three aims
contained in the Section 104(b)(2) clause were to be considered equally
acceptable and legitimate CDBG programs under HUD's chosen strategy for
implementing the 1974 Act.
Regulations Regarding HUD's Administrative Role
The programmatic emphasis in HUD regulations on a broad, non-
redistributive interpretation of the Section 104(b)(2) provision, and on the
equal acceptability of local programs declared to be directed toward
meeting urgent needs (however a locality might define conditions of
urgency) with those declared to be directed toward giving maximum feasible
priority to aiding the poor or alleviating conditions of slums and blight,
had the effect of granting localities the broadest degree of discretion
possible in setting priorities for grant expenditure. Localities would be
free, under these administrative groundrules, to propose (and have
accepted) programs in which very little attention might be given to meeting
the needs of the poor. Moreover, this effect was reinforced by the
parameters set forth in the CDBG rules on the area offices' role in the
application review process.
While the legislation had established the basic format requiring that
localities certify they had given maximum feasible priority to activities
which would serve low and moderate income families or ameliorate the
conditions of slum and blight in which they lived, the certifications, by
law, were required to be "to the satisfaction of the Secretary" before the
grant funds were to be released. With respect to when these (or urgent
needs) certifications were to be deemed acceptable to HUD field staff, CPD
guideline developers adopted a policy mandating automatic HUD acceptance of
local certifications.
The wording of the regulations signaled HUD's intention to follow a
"hands off" administrative strategy by stating, before the first
application was even received, that "HUD will normally accept the
applicant's certifications."4 This message was reinforced in training
sessions for HUD field staff in which staff members were repeatedly
instructed to accept at the application stage, without probing, local
certifications that the application faithfully reflected the locality's
fulfillment of its obligations under the terms of Section 104(b)(2) to
which the certification provision was tied. And lest wayward HUD field
officials act contrary to this policy, local officials were informed during
briefing sessions of HUD's intention in this regard. "This is your
program," one senior HUD official told local administrators, "we are not
going to second guess you nor look beyond your certifications, and if we
get any citizen complaints ... we will simply refer them to you." 5
CPD officials further reinforced their policy of taking a "laissez-
faire" stance toward localities in directives regarding the scope of the
field staff's review of local applications. According to the legislation,
HUD officials were technically granted the authority to disapprove local
applications on any one of three grounds (1) that the needs and objectives
set forth in the application were plainly inconsistent with available facts
and data; (2) that activities listed in the application were plainly
inappropriate to meeting local needs or (3) that the applicant failed to
live up to the requirements of the Act. While some observers felt that
this third criterion afforded HUD the opportunity to reject local
applications that failed to reflect the spirit of the national goal of the
Act (indeed same felt the insertion of the redistributive national goal
even made it an obligation), HUD's administrative demeanor led CPD
officials to severely circumscribe the exercise of HUD's authority to
reject applications. With respect to HUD's application review and approval
powers, the original CDBG regulations stated "HUD will normally accept the
applicant's statements of facts and data and other programmatic
decisions."6
As a result of these constraints on HUD's application review powers,
the CDBG applications became less like applications and more like simple
reporting forms. Further, with respect to HUD's responsibilities for
application review, the role outlined for HUD field staff in the
regulations was little more than one of serving as a federal paperwork
monitor. The clear message was that HUD was to presume (during application
reviews) that localities were in compliance with the Act's provisions;
front-end controls on the grant process were to be kept to a minimum.
During the 75 day application review period, HUD field staff were to make
sure that the appropriate plans and applications had been submitted, that
certifications had been signed by local officials, and that the individual
activities proposed in the application were eligible -- no more.
At the pre-funding stage HUD officials were not to assess the substance
of local proposals, nor question the validity of local certifications; nor
were they to attempt to determine whether local programs were in conformity
with the spirit of the national program goal of aiding the poor. Given
these stringent constraints on HUD's application review responsibilities,
regulatory observers wondered, how then would HUD assure that the program
would accomplish its legally mandated goal of "developing viable urban
communities ... principally for persons of low and moderate income"?
HUD's Post-Award Monitoring Policies
While some critics charged that the "spartan" nature of HUD's
application review role (as sketched out in the 1974 regulations) reflected
the agency's wholesale abandonment of its responsibilities to the Congress
for assuring the program would further the Act's primary national goal,
others disagreed. Federal responsibilities for overseeing local efforts to
assure their conformity with the program's overarching objective had not
been abdicated, simply shifted to a later point in the grant-funding cycle
-- the post award performance review stage. They further maintained that
the legislatively-mandated constraints on the time period afforded HUD
officials in which to review local applications signaled the consistency of
a post-hoc review emphasis with Congressional preferences regarding the
conduct of HUD's role.
And, in fact, there is some support for the view that legislators (at
least on the House side) felt that the post-audit performance review period
was the proper point at which HUD was to exercise responsibilities for
substantive reviews regarding local compliance with the provisions of the
Act. In the Committee Report accompanying the House version of the
legislation, the House legislation draftsmen note
"The committee wishes to emphasize the importance of post-
audit and review procedures to be conducted by the Secretary.
Since federal application reviews are being simplified to
such a great extent, the post audit and review requirements
will serve as the basic assurance that block grant funds are
being properly used to achieve the bill's objectives." 7
[Note: It is necessary to point out here, however, that the House bill did
not contain the version of the primary national objective of aiding the
poor that eventually was incorporated into the final legislation.
Nonetheless, this House Report language was used by HUD officials during
this period to defend their guideline strategy of keeping application
reviews both brief and procedural in nature, holding out the prospect that
substantive analysis of local efforts was properly to be deferred to a
later point in time.]
But as was true of the legislative provisions regarding HUD's
application review powers, the poorly crafted final version of the
legislation contained in confusing mix of constraints on federal post-audit
review criteria, coupled with a broader, more nebulous set of review powers
and obligations. The Act, on the one hand, had included House language
which specified a fairly narrow scope for HUD's annual post hoc review of
local performance. The agency was to review local performance, first, "to
determine whether the grantee has carried out a program substantially as
described in the application," and second, "to determine whether the
applicant has a continuing capacity to carry out [its program] in a timely
manner." But as with its delineation of HUD's application review powers,
Congress included provisions here that granted HUD less circumscribed and
more broad ranging review authority to assess "whether [the applicant's]
program conformed to the requirements of this title ... ". This wording
again left HUD officials with discretion to define, based on its reading of
the Act, what these requirements would be.
In keeping with the strategy HUD officials elected in defining the
scope of the application review process, however, CPD officials elected to
interpret even HUD's post hoc performance review responsibilities under
this phrase in the most narrow and circumscribed fashion possible. In the
initial program regulations, CPD officials gave lip service to the notion
of reviewing local performance (in the post-hoc review period) for
adherence to national program goals, asserting that ["HUD's] review of
performance standards will serve as the basic assurance that grants are
being used properly to achieve the objectives of [the Act]". 8 But agency
officials failed to follow through in this area. They declined to
establish any monitoring review standards that would enable area offices to
test local programs (post-hoc) for their conformity with either the concept
of principally benefitting low and moderate income people or even with the
more vague and potentially permissive concept inherent in the maximum
feasible priority clause.
The rationale for this stance was presented in HUD's first annual
report to Congress on program operations. In the Section on Performance
Monitoring, the document states "[the Department] recognizes the importance
of assuring that recipients comply with statutory requirements..." "It
also recognizes the danger," the paragraph continues, "that monitoring
might lead to overdirectedness and the unwanted infusion (sic) of Federal
judgment which the 1974 Act seeks to prevent." 9
In response to HUD officials' fear of federal "meddling", HUD's
regulations and guidelines during the Ford Administration era failed to
provide sufficient guidance to field staff regarding how they might review
local performance for conformity with either the MFP clause or the primary
national objective of the CDBG Act. And though the regulations did specify
that localities were to include data on how program benefits had been
distributed in their annual performance report to HUD, they failed to
establish any performance standards or criteria that would enable area
office officials to make use of this information in the monitoring process.
Neither the principally benefits language of the primary objective, nor the
"maximum feasible priority" provisions of the Act were even mentioned in
the regulations' performance review sections. In fact, the only
performance standards the regulations directed area office officials to
apply were simple procedural standards related to very particularized
programmatic issues like local handling of relocation activities, property
acquisition, equal opportunity, and citizen participation.
HUD's failure to establish clear performance standards regarding the
broader and more central issues of programmatic substance (particularly
with respect to the important issue of benefits distribution) signaled to
field officials the central CPD office's preference for minimum feasible
oversight. As a result of these omissions in the regulations, HUD area
office officials were largely confined in their monitoring role to, once
again, assuring local compliance with recordkeeping requirements and with
the procedural requirements of the CDBG law.
Implications of the Ford Administration's Guidelines
Operating under these guideline parameters, the CDBG program was run,
in these early years, much like a special revenue sharing initiative. The
omission in the regulations of any grounds upon which Area Office HUD
officials might legitimately review and exert power to shape the substance
of local plans and priorities left virtually all decisionmaking authority
regarding programmatic content and the distribution of monetary benefits to
reside at the local level. With their hands bound by these early
guidelines, federal officials were relegated - at all stages in the grant
process - to playing a largely meaningless procedural monitoring role.
Power to determine the substantive achievements the CDBG program would
accomplish as well as whose interests they would serve was ceded virtually
entirely to local official's hands.
The most serious consequence of the guidelines and operating procedures
set forth by CPD officials during the Ford Administration tenure as stewards
of the program was the danger of neglect of the needs of low income
residents in the plans made by entitlement jurisdictions. While a national
goal had been set forth in the provisions of the final Act, reserving (at
least in the minds of the Senate and the low income constituencies who had
supported the Senate initiative) a special place for the poor as the
program's priority clientele, the regulations fashioned the administrative
machinery of the CDBG program in a manner which suggested no such priority
was to be afforded to the needs of low income groups. The legislation was
treated, for administrative purposes, as though no national goal had been
set forth for the program at all. Instead, the regulations reflected, in
toto, the House's revenue sharing vision of how the block grant was to
function. While the Senate's low-income-oriented addendums to the House
version of the legislation might well have warranted consideration by CPD
officials of how to carve out middle territory (balancing the divergent
decentralization and redistributive mandates reflected in the final bill)
CPD guideline developers opted instead to wholly ignore the Senate's
perspectives and to draft guidelines premised virtually entirely on the
House's original pre-conference version of the CDBG bill.
Accounting for Guideline Outcomes in the Program's Early Years
If the regulations operating procedures and guidelines sanctioned under
the Ford Administration era of management of the program lent a distinct
"revenue sharing" cast to program operations, it was no accident. Foremost
among the small circle of CPD officials engaged in the guideline enterprise
were two political appointees who brought to their guideline development
role distinct biases toward the application of a revenue-sharing approach to
the provision of federal urban aid.
Both Deputy Assistant Secretary for CPD David Meeker and his Assistant
Secretary Warren Butler, who played key roles in the crafting of CDBG
regulations, had been originally appointed to their posts by President
Nixon. During the four year period preceding enactment of the CDBG
legislation, they had been responsible for overseeing the development of
the urban special revenue sharing bills which Nixon Administration
officials had so forcefully and persistently advanced in the Congress -
bills which had proposed elimination of virtually all federal restrictions
on local use of grant funds, and which had lacked, by conscious design,
both substantive national goals for the grant program, and a meaningful
role for HUD officials in overseeing local grant efforts. Thus both Meeker
and Butler brought to bear, in their guideline development role, strong
philosophically-rooted biases against the insertion of any but the most
minimal role for federal agents in the conduct of the program, and against
any meaningful endorsement of the primary national objective which had been
written into the final CDBG Act. To these officials, who wielded great
power over CDBG guideline content, the implementation effort was to
reflect, to the greatest degree possible, the anti-federal-government
decentralization aims of the Nixon New Federalism platform. CPD staff with
whom they worked in crafting CDBG guidelines were repeatedly instructed
that the tone of the regulations was to reflect a stance of "no second
guessing of local officials and a minimum of red tape."lC They were to
eschew, in the guidelines set forth for the CDBG program, pursuit of any
national aims or strategies which would have the effect of infringing on
local prerogatives to set programmatic priorities; they were to approach
strategies for disbursal of federal aid funds in a manner which relegated
federal officials to a simple "check-writing" role. Management of HUD's
administrative effort was to reflect, above all, a "hands off" approach to
the provision of urban aid.
While a few of the civil service staff at CPD took issue with the
extreme "hands off" stance taken in regulatory issuances for the program,
opposition to the approach advanced by Meeker and Butler was ill-defended
and weak. The vagueness and ambiguity of the provisions of the CDBG
legislation gave dissenters little solid ground on which to argue HUD's
stance was inappropriate. Moreover, dissent in the ranks of CPD staff
members was further undermined by the political pressures placed on the
agency by mayors and local officials who formed a key component of HUD's
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bureaucratic constituency.
Interest groups representing mayors and other urban officials (who were
the intended recipients of federal CDBG funds) continued to press, as
they had during the legislative process, for an approach to grant
administration which afforded them the greatest degree of latitude possible
in deciding how federal funds would be spent. Thus in the initial years of
the program's operation they were supportive of the administrative
preferences set forth in the guidelines Ford Administration CPD officials
had provided for implementation of the program.
Dissatisfaction on the Part of Interest Groups Representing the Poor
Yet at the same time that interest groups representing mayors were
applauding HUD's stance on guidelines for the program, interest groups
representing the poor grew increasingly alarmed. Many low income advocacy
organizations had pushed strongly for adoption of language emphasizing a
special place for the poor in the program. To these groups, the absence of
specification of low income benefit standards to which local grant
recipients would be expected to adhere, in tandem with the weak role HUD
had defined for itself in overseeing local CDBG efforts, signaled they were
losing a battle over policy they thought they had won.
Several wrote letters to CPD officials urging that guidelines on low
inocme dimensions of the program and on HUD's role in the pre and post hoc
review processes be strengthened. The National Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights took issue with HUD's generous delegation of discretion to
localities, arguing that the regulations "rely too heavily on the
understanding and words of the applicant." 1 1 And a number of groups wrote
letters warning that without stronger directions from Washington, the
social goals of the CDBG program would remain unmet. The Urban Affairs
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Office of the AFL-CIO reflected the sentiments of these low income advocacy
organizations when they stated in a letter to HUD that "the proposed
regulations give no indication that HUD's review process will assure that
local recipients have fulfilled all statutory requirements of the Act ...
National objectives are unlikely to be fulfilled unless HUD's guidelines to
applicants [on benefiting low income residents] are very explicit, and
HUD's monitoring and enforcement policies are implemented aggressively." 12
But these attempts to exert influence over HUD's guideline policies
proved unsuccessful. CPD officials resisted these early efforts on the
part of low income groups to secure guideline change. As HUD continued to
pursue its "hands off" special revenue sharing strategy, interest groups
representing the poor turned their attention to conducting various studies
assessing how the poor were faring under the guideline strategies being
followed during the early years of implementation of the Act.
Congress and HUD's Implementation Strategies
While Congress is generally believed to practice "pass it and forget it
lawmaking", Congressional concern over how the Act would be implemented was
high in the case of CDBG. Interest in HUD policies regarding the 16w
income benefits issue was particularly acute in the Senate where the
redistributive language mandating priority attention to the needs of the
poor had emerged. Signs of this unusually strong Congressional concern
surfaced only a few months after the Act's passage. In January 1975, just
as the Act was going into effect, Senator William Proxmire, who had served
on the final Conference committee for the legislation, forwarded a letter
to HUD Secretary James Lynn. With respect to HUD's implementation actions,
Proxmire asked to be advised of, first "the steps HUD had taken to inform
staff members and [grant] recipients that community development
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applications must show a priority for activities benefiting lower income
groups or renewing deteriorated areas of the city"; and second, of "the
procedures HUD will follow to monitor the extent to which grantees are
living up to the low and moderate income requirements." 1 3
Inherent in the wording of Proxmire's questions was the perspective set
forth by the Senate that (a) the maximum feasible priority clause in which
low income and slum/blight priorities were stipulated was to be construed in
a restrictive manner, as a mandate that localities focus their greatest
degree of attention on meeting the needs of the poor, and (b) that HUD bore
some substantive responsibility for assuring that local funds were expended
in that manner. And while HUD officials had already opted to construe the
provisions of the legislation in an entirely different way, interpreting the
maximum feasible priority clause in a broad, non-redistributive manner and
approaching HUD's oversight responsibilities in a more lax fashion, the
response to Proxmire's letter (signed by HUD Undersecretary James Mitchell)
failed to make HUD's interpretive preferences clear.
In his letter, the Undersecretary assured Proxmire that item 15A of
HUD's funding approval forms contained provisions for a specific "finding"
on the part of HUD field staff that an approved local program had been
developed so as to give maximum feasible priority to activities benefiting
low and moderate income persons, or aiding in preventing and eliminating
slums and blight. With respect to HUD's post-funding monitoring procedures,
the Undersecretary assured Proxmire that though HUD's monitoring procedures
had not yet been fully devised, the monitoring system currently being
developed would include "compliance monitoring" that would
ensure local programs had met the standards specified in law and
regulations, including those related to the "maximum feasible priority"
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clause.14 Proxmire, though remaining skeptical about the sufficiency of
HUD's evolving administrative policies, was temporarily assuaged by the
contents of Mitchell's letter. He opted to adopt a "wait and see"
attitude, reserving the right to pursue guideline issues at a later point
in his capacity as Chairman of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Committee which handled HUD legislation.
Another Senate actor also manifest skepticism about the potential
efficacy of HUD's administrative strategies regarding treatment of the
Act's redistributive aims. Senator John Sparkman, like Proxmire, had
participated in the Conference Committee which drew up the final bill, and
had also helped to assure that the Act's language contained Senate
provisions directing the program toward meeting the needs of low and
moderate income people.
In his capacity as head of the Senate subcommittee on Housing and Urban
Affairs (the subcommittee vested with direct oversight responsibilities for
the program) Sparkman enlisted the aid of the Congressional evaluation arm -
the U.S. General Accounting Office - in reviewing HUD's implementation
activities. In a June 1975 letter, Sparkman made a formal request for a GAO
review of HUD's management of the program. In the letter, he asserted the
basic Senate view that the legislation's wording linked HUD's application
review responsibilities to the "primary objective" language. "The
application and review requirements," he asserted, "are contained in Section
104 of the Act and are intended to establish basic tests for approving
grants consistent with the objectives of the Act set forth in Section 101"
(emphasis added).15 In reviewing the program, he requested that GAO give
special attention to how HUD was implementing "Section 104(b)(2), which
requires the locality to certify to the satisfaction of the Secretary that
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maximum feasible priority has been given to activities which will benefit
low and moderate income families, or will aid in preventing or eliminating
slums and blight." 1 6
Interest in the House
As with the Senate, the House members showed an unusually high degree
of interest early on in the HUD's implementation of the program. But while
Senate actors were concerned with HUD's efforts to assure the flow of
benefits to low and moderate income families, House actors deviated
markedly from the Senate view. In oversight hearings held during this same
period by the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development,
House members stressed entirely different aspects of program
implementation. Not a single question was raised regarding actions related
to the low income aims of the program. Instead House members (many of whom
had, like Proxmire and Sparkman, participated in the Conference shaping the
final bill) urged HUD to reduce paperwork requirements and to constrain any
impulses to second-guess local determinations of their priority needs.
In response to an assertion by HUD Assistant Secretary Meeker that the
length of local applications under the CDBG programs had been reduced to
about one-fifteenth the length of those used in urban programs in prior
years, Congressman Thomas "Lud" Ashley (chairman of the House Subcommittee
responsible for program oversight) praised that achievement. "[In]
Conference," he said, "I think we spent something like 10 days on that
issue [of reducing local paperwork requirements], and its nice to know that
the 10 days of discussion resulted in that kind of compaction." 17
In discussing with officials the agency's role in overseeing the
program, another Conference committee participant, Representative Garry
Brown (ranking minority member of the House Subcommittee) used the
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opportunity to stress the House's preferences for a minimal federal role.
He reminded HUD Secretary Carla Hills "[one] thing we hit very hard in the
adoption of this legislation was that with respect to the community
development funds, the Department will not substitute [its] judgment [for
the localities] ... in many of these things the Secretary can accept
certifications. When issues are raised - I suppose they can go back and
look behind the certifications ... But I just don't want to get [HUD] back
into the business of determining community development needs." 17
Interest Group Evaluations
The concern low income advocacy groups had expressed in 1974 regarding
the potential inadequacies of the regulations in safeguarding a priority
place for the poor in the program escalated into alarm as results of their
monitoring efforts trickled in. First to be made public was a study
conducted by the National Urban League. Having examined the experiences of
17 cities with the first year of the program, the study report reached an
ominous conclusion. Despite the Act's injunction to deliver the principal
program benefits to the poor, the report concluded "Expenditures under the
Act have been largely diverted from the intended low and moderate income
beneficiaries." 1 9
Individual accounts of blatant disregard for the needs of the poor in
the program soon became legion. An NAACP study found a community using its
funds to construct a marina. A study of 26 Southern cities, carried out by
the Southern Regional Council read like a litany of low income neglect:
Little Rock, Arkansas allocated $150,000 for construction of
a tennis complex in an affluent neighborhood. Asked how the
expenditure could be justified, one official told an SRC
researcher, "We must remember the needs of the people who
vote ... poor people don't vote."
Chattanooga, Tennessee alloted $50,000 for tennis courts in
a well-to-do section of the city.
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New Bern, North Carolina dedicated funds to upgrading a stretch
of road leading to a country club.
Charlottesville, Virginia pledged $135,000 to construct bicycle
paths serving the University of Virginia area on the grounds that
students could legitimately be considered low income persons. 2 0
Although HUD's response was to assert that these constituted isolated
instances of non-responsiveness to the needs of the poor, the SRC staff at
its March 31 press conference dismissed that allegation, asserting instead
that their study found "local diversions from the national purpose are not
just occasional abuses but rather form a pattern inherent in the
implementation of the Act." 21
While these reports contained the kind of sensationalized case accounts
favored by the media (which rapidly publicized them) equally damaging
accounts were emerging from the drier but more systematic and quantitative
analyses of the program.
During the first year of program operations, the National Association
of Housing and Redevelopment Officials attempted to assess the share of
funds being devoted to low and moderate income needs. Examining a broader
set of 86 communities, they approached the evaluation by breaking down the
local program expenditures by census tract and aggregating the shares of
program allotments according to the median incomes of the tracts. Using this
approach, NAHRO reported that during the program's first year of operations,
only 51% of cities' allocations were being spent in low and moderate income
tracts.22
If this amount sharply diverged from earlier Senatorial preferences
(dropped as a requirement from the final act) that 80% of the funds reach
poor people or areas, it also proved significantly lower than HUD's claim
(made in its annual report to Congress only months earlier) that 71% of the
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funds had been directed to meeting low and moderate income needs. 2 3
Overlooking minor variations tied to choice of methodology, the NAHRO
figures were generally supported by the findings of other studies conducted
by the National Urban League, the Southern California Association of
Governments and, later, the Brookings Institution. 2 4
These findings provoked a flurry of activity on the part of advocates
of the poor. Extensive media attention carried these reports to a wider
audience, provoking a more generalized public outrage at the expenditure of
CDBG funds on frivolous projects while the poor remained in need. And if
the findings served to activate renewed Senatorial interest in oversight of
the program, a second event of this period enabled the failures to be
directly tied to serious deficiencies in HUD management of the grant
effort.
GAO Study
As the evaluation arm of Congressional support operations, the efforts
of the General Accounting Office are frequently used by Congressional
members to uncover deficiencies in program operations and to identify items
in need of further oversight attention by legislators. Coming on the heels
of the damaging evaluations reported by interest groups, the release of the
GAO study (requested by Senator Sparkman a year earlier) further heightened
Senatorial distress over implementation of the CDBG program. Basing its
report on the experiences of local officials and HUD field staff in 23
communities, GAO findings were particularly critical of HUD management of
the program.
Reviewing HUD's exercise of its responsibilities for local application
review, GAO found serious deficiencies, especially with respect to the
handling of the "maximum feasible priority" requirements. GAO charged that
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HUD' s failure to issue instructions to either applicants or its field staff
clarifying what the term "maximum feasible priority" was to mean had
generated considerable confusion. It found more than half the officials
surveyed believed the term as contained in the regulations was undefinable
or had little meaning. Among the other half, interpretations varied
widely. The report asserted HUD's failure to establish a clear definition
of the term - or to set standards enabling a clear determination of when
the maximum feasible priority requirement had been met - had rendered the
certification process a meaningless exercise. GAO found Area office
personnel simply accepting the certification or conducting cursory
reviews. 2 5
Further, in reviewing the assurances HUD Undersecretary Mitchell had
given to Senator Proxmire about the Department's plans to address the
maximum feasible priority issue, GAO found instances of misrepresentation
of HUD's policies. The Undersecretary had assuaged Proxmire's concern
about maximum feasible priority reviews during the application review stage
by maintaining that item 15A of HUD's application review documents
contained a specific -Departmental finding that the application conformed to
the maximum feasible priority mandate. But in place of any substantive
review of the issue, GAO found the item cited constituted a simple HUD
check off, signifying only that the proper local officials had signed the
certification required by HUD. 2 6
Even more damaging to HUD were GAO's findings regarding the execution
of its role in post-audit reviews. While the HUD Undersecretary had assured
Senator Proxmire that the maximum feasible priority issue would be
carefully addressed in HUD's compliance monitoring process, GAO found that
even by the middle of the second year of program operations, HUD had not
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taken the necessary steps to see that these compliance reviews were carried
out. The report notes:
"[HUD] did not provide any criteria for determining compliance
with the maximum feasible priority requirement ... had not
defined maximum feasible priority, nor had it established a
policy concerning actions or sanctions to be considered if an
applicant was not found in compliance with its certification." 27
What is more, GAO unveiled evidence that these lapses were not
attributable simply to benign neglect of this administrative area.
Researchers found HUD not only failing to provide guidance that could
facilitate area office post-audit reviews for maximum feasible priority
compliance, but also actively constraining area office attempts to
undertake such reviews. As evidence, GAO cited a case in which the San
Francisco Area Office had submitted to Central Office staff its specific
plans to conduct post-audit reviews on the maximum feasible priority (low
income benefit) issue. Assistant Secretary Meeker had responded by
prohibiting area office officials from activating these plans. Meeker had
informed the area office that the issue had been sufficiently addressed in
application review procedures, thus only reprogrammed activities (those not
contained in the locality's original applications) were to be subjected to
post-audit maximum feasible priority reviews. But GAO pointed out the flaw
in Meeker's argument. Since HUD's review of the maximum feasible priority
issue at the application stage constituted no more than a verification that
the locality had signed the relevant certification, GAO noted, "it appears
the only time HUD plans to [substantively] view an applicants program in
terms of maximum feasible priority is when changes are made in the
community's program" 2 8
To correct these deficiencies in HUD's management of the program, GAO
urged HUD to not only clarify the maximum feasible priority language
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contained in the regulations, but to also establish a quantitative standard
that could be used for determining local compliance with the law's low
income benefits mandate intimated in the maximum feasible priority
provision. While HUD officials countered that such standards would be both
impossible to apply nationwide and too constraining upon localities, GAO
maintained "Quantitative criteria can be established as a general guide
and need not be unduly restrictive ... [localities] not meeting the
criteria could be provided the opportunity, on a case-by-case basis, to
justify their deviation from the general rule." 2 9
GAO further recommended not only greater emphasis on "maximum feasible
priority" determinations during the monitoring process but also a
strengthened review for conformity with MFP requirements before
applications were approved. HUD responded to this recommendation by
arguing that the Act specifically prohibited these interventions during the
application review process. But according to its reading of the Act's
language, GAO disagreed. "The Secretary does not appear to be precluded
from determining, during application review, whether the applicant's
program has been developed so as to give maximum feasible priority to
activities benefiting low and modern income families or aiding in ...
eliminating slums and blight."30
While GAO made some recommendations regarding legislative actions to
correct the deficiencies it unveiled, it did not urge legislative
clarification of the Act's low income benefit/maximum feasible priority
provisions. Implicit in its silence on the issue was GAO's position that
the revisions it sought in HUD policies fell well within the boundaries of
the then-current law.
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Senate Oversight Hearings
With the public release of interest group evaluations of the CDBG
program, the groups' concerns with the program's failings attracted
considerable Congressional attention. Coupled with GAO findings
highlighting HUD's unresponsiveness to Senatorial directives, these reports
prompted Proxmire to schedule oversight hearings in August of 1976. The
four days of testimony centered almost exclusively on the issue of the
Act's failure to serve its proclaimed low and moderate income
benef iciaries. 3 1
Particularly prominent among the witnesses were spokesmen fran civil
rights and advocacy groups representing the urban poor. Citing their
findings of "misappropriation" of CDBG funds for tennis courts and
amenities for localities' more well-to-do residents, they uniformly
condemned the program, characterizing it as "a flagrant misuse if millions
of tax dollars intended to fight blight and improve the living conditions
of poor city dwellers." 3 2
Especially harsh criticism was directed at HUD officials for adopting a
"hands off" stance in administering the program. Echoing the GAO report
findings, these groups charged HUD with abrogating its statutory
responsibilities for protecting the poor from local indifference and
neglect, citing its failure to set program standards implementing the
redistributive goals of the program, and its lax approach to oversight of
local CDBG efforts. Alleging HUD was willfully defying Senatorial wishes,
one critic charged "The program is being administered just as if Congress
had enacted the Special Review sharing proposals you had rejected." 3 3
These groups strongly urged Senatorial actors to exert pressures on HUD to
tighten the program's regulations.
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The almost universal condemnation the program received during the
hearings led Senator Proxmire to launch a stinging attack on Assistant
Secretary Meeker as he testified before the Committee. Referring to the
interest groups' testimony as "about as powerful as indictment of an
administering agency [as] I have ever heard," Senator Proxmire castigated
Meeker. "HUD has clearly gotten this program underway" Proxmire stated
"What isn't clear is whether the program you are administering is the
program Congress passed." 3 4
Meeker attempted to defend HUD actions, reminding Proxmire that
Congress "put into law ... some elements which allow this situation to be
the way it is." He voiced HUD's view that the oversight stance HUD had
adopted was defensible in light of the Act's vague language, arguing "the
statutory certification requirement is less simple and straightforward than
may first appear ... After all, what does maximum feasible priority mean and
in whose eyes?"35
Yet Proxmire remained unwaivering in his criticism, holding firmly to
his view (voiced earlier in the year to HUD officials) that the primary
objective language left no doubt as to Congressional redistributive intent.
All other objectives contained in the Act, he reminded HUD Secretary Carla
Hills "are all subordinate to the initial statement that 'the', not 'a' but
'the' primary objective of this title is the development of viable
communities ... principally for persons of low and moderate income."3 6
Proxmire cautioned Assistant Secretary Meeker that his review of the
program led him to conclude "We are not doing the kind of job we should to
help low and moderate income people in this country with this program ...
it takes a very forceful, very advanced position ... on the part of this
government in order to achieve it for them. I would hope that you ...
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would keep that in mind and will work as hard for the poor and the low
income people and the minority groups as you can." 3 7
Meeker's response to the hearing was to prove remarkably prophetic, as
he asserted "I expect that maximum feasible priority will continue as an
issue for some time in the future.n38
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CHAPTER 5: ALTERING PROGRAM DIRECTIONS:
BLOCK GRANT REGULATORY REFORM DURING THE CARTER TERM
In the face of both public pressures stemming from the airing of HUD
neglect of the Act's low and moderate income provisions and the intensity
of Senatorial objections to HUD's practices in implementing the CDBG
program, senior HUD officials began to discuss how they might respond to
these concerns without impairing the local flexibility they so valued. But
before discussions could progress very far, two unforeseen events served to
put potential change in HUD policies on temporary hold. In September,
Assistant Secretary David Meeker, who headed the division of Community
Planning and Development (the organizational home of the program) resigned
his post for health reasons, leaving a leadership vacuum in the uppermost
ranks of the program staff. And less than six weeks later, President
Ford's electoral defeat signaled the impending rise to power of a new set
of administrators who would chart the program's future directions.
To head up the Department of Housing and Urban Development, newly-
elected President Jimmy Carter selected Washington lawyer Patricia Roberts
Harris. It was a nomination that, at the outset, was viewed with disfavor
by urban interest groups and several Senators, including Senator Proxmire.
Concerned with her lack of experience in housing and urban development,
Proxmire used the nomination hearings as an occasion for tough questioning
of the Secretary-designate regarding the directions she would chart for the
agency, and in particular the emphasis she would place in administering HUD
programs on serving the needs of the poor. Harris repeatedly assured
Proxmire that she shared his concerns and pledged to use her role as
Secretary to serve as "spokesperson for the poor, the ill-housed and the
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cities."l Harris was confirmed by the Senate, as were three Assistant
Secretaries who would later play key roles in shaping the block grant
program: Robert Embry, Assistant Secretary of Community Planning and
Development (key overseer of the CDBG program), a well-respected community
development administrator from Baltimore; Father Geno Baroni, Assistant
Secretary of Neighborhoods, Voluntary Associations and Consumer Protection,
a community activist who had worked with advocacy groups for the poor; and
Donna Shalala, Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Research, an
academic and a member of the board charged with oversight of New York
City's fiscal affairs.
Harris and several members of the new administration brought to HUD a
special concern regarding lax administration of the CDBG program and HUD's
apparent failure to target aid to the neediest populations. The future
actions they would take to alter CDBG policies, and the new interpretations
of the Act's low income benefit provisions they would apply were presaged
in Harris's statements before the House Housing Subcommittee just one month
after assuming her office. Discussing her intentions with respect to block
grant program management, Harris firmly asserted "We will expect
communities to direct development and housing programs toward low and
moderate income citizens. I do not consider this to be just an objective
of the block grant program -- it is the highest priority of the program and
we in the federal government must see to it that the thrust of the program
serves that objective." 2
Strengthening HUD's Role in Application Review
As a first step in tightening HUD's lax administration of the program,
Assistant Secretary Embry issued a memo to the field staff in April of 1977
instructing them to undertake more stringent pre-funding reviews of local
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applications. While Ford officials had confined area offices to conducting
simple assessments of local conformity to the program's procedural
requirements, area offices were now being directed to examine the substance
of what localities were proposing to do with their funds and assess "how it
serves [the program's] statutory objectives." 3
The directive noted that this change in policy was part of a general
reorientation of "HUD's [CDBG] efforts toward the achievement of statutory
objectives, particularly those that speak to the interests of low and
moderate income people."4 But while this and other portions of the memo
stressed the priority afforded low income persons in the Act by citing
wording of the primary objective clause, the detailed review standards set
forth in the directive fell back instead on the three priority areas cited
in the maximum feasible priority clause.
Field offices were instructed to review each activity proposed by the
locality to assure that it served one of the three purposes described in
Section 104 - delivering benefits to low and moderate income persons, or
aiding in the prevention or elimination of slums and blight, or meeting
urgent community development needs. Although the memo for the first time
supplied constraining criteria that must be met in order for an activity to
qualify under "urgent needs" or "slum and blight" provisions, and although
it for the first time established a method for assessing whether an
activity could qualify as one benefiting low and moderate income persons,
it stopped short of making specific provisions guaranteeing that lower
income benefit activities as a class would be given preferential treatment
over activities serving the other two aims expressed in Section 104.
Further, though significant for its tone of concern with program
responsiveness to the poor, the directive failed to establish concrete
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benchmarks which would enable area offices to know whether the share of
local program funds being directed toward low income beneficiaries was
consistent with HUD's preference for an emphasis on serving the poor.
Because of these omissions, the April 15 directive did not represent a
marked departure from either the legislative interpretations or the
targeting policies instituted by Ford officials.
The reasons for this outcome can be found in the fact that the new
program administrator, Robert Embry, having been confirmed as Assistant
Secretary only one month earlier, had relied heavily upon the advice of HUD
staff who earlier had framed the regulatory issuances under Ford. Few out-
siders had been consulted in the drafting of the directive. But before
long two forces served to push HUD officials to enact more significant
guideline change. The first arose in the findings of monitoring studies
covering the program's second year of operations; the second in the
emergence of a potent interest group committed to revamping CDBG
administration.
CDBG Evaluations: The Poor in Year 2
While the extensive costs involved in monitoring the CDBG program has
led most interest groups to abandon any plans to replicate the first year
studies which had brought considerable public attention to local government
neglect of the poor, the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment
Officials proved an exception. One of the most systematic and credible of
the independent study efforts, the NAHRO project continued its assessment
of low and moderate income benefit under the CDBG program into the second
program year. With the release of NAHR's second year findings in early
1977, HUD guidelines for administering the CDBG program again became the
object of sharp criticism as the NAHRO study revealed a marked decline in
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benefits directed to the poor. 5 In comparison to the 51% share of program
resources low and moderate income groups had attained in the program's
first year of operation, the second year report found only 44% of local
grant allotments devoted to the needs of this beneficiary class. The 7%
drop proved even more alarming in light of HUD's earlier arguments that the
low level of benefits NAHRO had found in its initial study was attributable
to heavy earmarking of local grant allotments for completion of local urban
renewal projects, and in light of its voiced expectations that low and
moderate income benefit levels would rise in later years of the program.
Even more damaging to the case for continuation of a "hands off"
stance at HUD was the confirmation of this downward trend by the Depart-
ment's own evaluation team. Though the method employed by HUD research
staff yielded a higher overall incidence of low income benefits than NAHRO
had reported, HUD's second annual report to Congress, released during this
same period, affirmed the severe drop in aid to the poor. According to the
HUD study, low and moderate income constituencies were now receiving only a
57.3% share of program funding. 6 In the face of this damning evidence,
interest groups intersified pressures on the new HUD administration to
institute much stronger administrative measures to insure local government
attention to the needs of the poor.
Shifts in the Political Field
In the aftermath of the August 1976 hearings before the Senate,
several of the groups representing the poor had grown increasingly restive.
While their studies and critical testimony had served to heighten the
visibility of the plight of the poor under the program, and had provoked
sharp rebukes to HUD officials by sympathetic Senators, they had made no
direct and significant inroads in forcing change in HUD's bureaucratic
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policies. Amid rising speculation that the second year studies would
demonstrate that the poor were losing ground in their efforts to exert a
claim over CDBG resources, several of the most active and vocal groups came
together to devise a new political strategy. What was needed, they
concluded, was for them to unify their political forces - to create a new
organization which could serve as the standard-bearer in the movement to
reform the program. Buoyed in particular by the prospect for new
directions under the incoming Carter Administration, ten civil rights and
low income advocacy organizations banded together in late 1976 to form the
Working Group for Community Development Reform. (Initial member
organizations included the Center for Community Change, the National Urban
League, the Southern Regional Council, National People's Action, Suburban
Action Institute, the National Center for Policy Review, the Center for the
Study of Responsive Law, the Coalition for Block Grant Compliance, Rural
America, and the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate.)
The Working Group immediately mounted a large scale effort to prepare
a report for the incoming Carter Administration; a report pinpointing the
failures of past program efforts and making specific recommendations for
administrative reform. By following this strategy, the group hoped to
reserve a place for itself in deliberations over the new administration's
programmatic agenda. Delivered to the new officials in January, the
resulting sixty page report was an impressive document, carefully
researched and containing a well-articulated case for the revisions they
recommended. The report covered a wide-ranging set of administrative areas
related to citizen participation, housing assistance plans, equal oppor-
tunity and other areas they deemed needy of reform. But a major part of
the report was devoted to changes that would tighten program requirements
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to assure a larger share of local funds would be targeted to meeting the
needs of the poor.
Highly critical of the Ford Administration's "no-strings, revenue-
sharing" approach to program management, the report charged that CDBG
regulations and procedures had "undermined many of the national priorities
and standards established by Congress ... led to abuses in several
jurisdictions and ... undercut the statutory priority on programs benefit-
ing low and moderate income families."7 To rectify these deficiencies, the
group set forth detailed recommendations for change in HUD regulations,
even going so far as to propose new regulatory wording.
With respect to the elements of the maximum feasible priority clause,
they proposed specific language tightening the criteria under which
individual activities could qualify as meeting "slum and blight" provisions
or qualify as a legitimate response to "urgent needs." But of greater
importance to the future directions of the program, the Working Group pro-
posed an administrative strategy to implement for the first time the
neglected statutory language of the primary objective - that activities
funded under the program be directed toward the creation of "viable urban
communities ... principally for persons of low and moderate income."
Borrowing this language, the Working Group report recommended that:
"Each application should be reviewed by HUD Area Office staff to determine
if the dollar benefits of [each locality's] proposed CD program are
'principally persons of low and moderate income' ... [this phrase] should be
interpreted to mean that three-fourths of the persons directly benefiting
are low and moderate income persons." (emphasis added) 8 More than any
other recommendation, this bold proposal represented a significant depar-
ture from any previous suggestions for change. Not only did it transform
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the primary objective's "principally benefits" language into an active
program requirement, but the proposal also put forth a specific benchmark,
a minimum percentage standard, by which HUD could assess whether a local
program, as a whole, was in compliance with the primary objective of the
Act.
Outside the HUD bureaucracy, the Working Group report garnered a great
deal of support among interest groups representing the poor. The general
thrust of its recommendations secured the endorsement of several other
advocacy groups active in the urban policy sphere, such as the Potomac
Institute, the NAACP, the National Commission against Discrimination on
Housing and the National Low Income Housing Coalition, as well as more
generalized interest groups like the AFL-CIO, the League of Women Voters
and the Presbyterian Church.
In the early months of its existence, the Working Group had, through
its actions, taken a significant step in shaping the future agenda for
programmatic reform. Further, it had succeeded in securing a principal
place for itself in the impending debates over the program's future in both
administrative and legislative forums.
Internal Politics of Regulatory Revision
Following the issuance of HUD's April 15 directive to the field, the
agency embarked on the task of overhauling CDBG regulations to more
accurately reflect the Department's proclaimed new emphasis on low and
moderate income constituencies. While in normal instances the bulk of
responsibilities for regulatory revision are passed down into the hands of
lower level federal bureaucrats, who argue about the relatively mundane
issues of the nuances of alternative wording, the case of CDBG rule
revisions proved markedly atypical. Soon after their initiation, delibera-
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tions over regulatory reform would come to encompass some of the most
fundamental issues in intergovernmental policy, and would engage the
vigorous involvement of the highest level actors in the HUD bureaucracy.
Primary responsibility for management of the rulemaking process was
vested with Assistant Secretary Robert Embry, who headed the division with
jurisdiction over the program, the division of Community Planning and
Development (CPD). Although Embry had initially been dependent for advice
regarding programmatic issues upon division staff who had helped launch the
program in the Ford era, this dependence fell away with the emergence of
the Working Group for CD Reform.
Embry had been impressed by the voluminous document they had prepared
on CDBG, and persuaded by their arguments asserting need for an expanded
federal role in overseeing the program. As the new rules were being
drafted, the group soon became a primary source of information and advice
to Embry. The Group's leadership was granted ready access to his office,
and about 40 meetings were held during the first six months of the Carter
era, in which Embry or his staff consulted Working Group members. Embry
even brought one of the Group's founding members onto the payroll as his
special assistant (Joseph Guggenheim, head of the Coalition for Block Grant
Compliance).
Several dimensions of the CD regulations were debated within the
agency - how to transform citizen participation into a more meaningful
process, and how to strengthen Housing Assistance Plan requirements, among
others. But the foremost issue, also the most controversial, revolved
around how to implement the maximum feasible priority provisions of the Act
in such a way as to assure that the bulk of local funds would be spent to
assist lower income persons. While there was widespread consensus among
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senior officials on the principle of elevating low and moderate income
benefits to priority status in the program, the consensus dissolved as
discussions moved to how that might best be accomplished.
Many of the newer members of Embry's staff were inclined to accept the
Working Group's assertion that an overall low-income benefits standard
needed to be established and enforced by the agency in order to assure
localities would target CDBG grant monies to meeting disadvantaged resi-
dent's needs. Moreover, their examination of the Senate's pre-conference
version of the legislation that would (if passed) have required localities
to devote 80% of their grant to low income projects, served to convince
them that a standard of 75% low income benefit would be an appropriate
level of distribution to require. As a result, they urged Embry to include
the 75% standard the Working Group has recommended in HUD's new programma-
tic rules. In light of Embry's belief that HUD needed in some way to
significantly strengthen the low income emphasis of the program, and his
conviction that the primary objective language of the Act afforded HUD a
legitimate legislative basis upon which to institute such a standard, he
encouraged his staff.to develop new draft guidelines incorporating the 75%
standard, and to circulate them widely within the agency for an informal
internal review. Under the guidelines they developed, any locality
applying for grant monies would be required to earmark 75% of its grant
allotment to projects that benefit low income residents. If it failed to
do so, its application was to be automatically disapproved.
An Agency Divided
The new guideline proposal spawned major controversy within the agency
during the internal review process that ensued. The proposal found the
agency severely divided on the wisdom of applying the new administrative
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approach. So deeply held and intensely argued were positions both in
defense of and in opposition to the proposal that one long-time CPD career
official was prompted to remark "Never in my 10 years at HUD have I seen
such a difficult and tortuous issue [debated in the agency]." 9
Internal Support for the Measure
Nowhere did the new proposal receive as vigorous an endorsement as it
received from the staff of the newly created division of Neighborhoods,
Voluntary Associations and Consumer Protection (NVACP), and from the
division's head Assistant Secretary Father Geno Baroni. Many of the
political appointees and civil service staff in the division had, like
Baroni, emerged from backgrounds as community organizers in inner-city
neighborhoods and as long-time advocates on behalf of the interests of the
poor. Their experiences had led them to conclude that local officials
could not be counted upon to respond to the needs of low income constituen-
cies if left free to make their own choices regarding how urban resources
should be spent. It was a view shared by Baroni himself -- one which
prompted him to take a strong personal interest in advocating on behalf of
incorporation of the 75% standard into HUD's formal programmatic rules. It
was incumbent upon federal officials charged with stewardship of the CDBG
program, Baroni and his allies were to repeatedly assert during the
internal debates, to exercise federal authority in a manner which assured
that the vast majority of scarce programmatic resources would serve the
constituencies in greatest need. The use of a 75% low-income targeting
standard was not only a permissible course of administrative action, he
held, it was an essential component of HUD's fulfillment of its obligations
to the Congress to enforce the primary objective of the Act.
Baroni's perspective found strong support from several corners of the
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agency where there was grave concern over the damage allegations of
programmatic abuse was inflicting on the agency's reputation. But those in
other quarters stood vehemently opposed to the measure. Many objected to
the idea of imposing a 75% floor on low income benefits and more broadly to
the establishment of any uniform benefits standard at all. Some of the CPD
civil service corp adhered to this contrary perspective, but the staunchest
opposition to the use of a standard emerged from those representing another
HUD official holding a rank comparable to that of Father Baroni -- Assistant
Secretary Donna Shalala, head of the division of Policy Development and
Research, a division which had conducted several evaluations of localities'
CDBG efforts.
Though Shalala's agents and their supporters in other corners of the
agency largely concurred with the need for HUD to initiate some type of
substantive review of applicants' local programs for their fealty to the
low and moderate income aim of the program, they held that use of a single
low income benefits standard was simply not the way to go. Given the
nature and the mechanics of the block grant process, they argued, a final
determination as to whether a locality was being sufficiently attentive to
the needs of its low income populace was best left to the qualitative
judgment of Area Office staff who would review the contents of local
applications.
Philosophical Issues
Opponents within the agency, headed by Shalala's Deputy Assistant
Secretary and others on her staff, argued against the use of a standard on
two basic grounds: one philosophical, the other pragmatic. With respect to
the first, these critics maintained that such a move would run counter to
the basic tenets of the New Federalism. They argued that the block grant
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program had had as its principal rationale a desire to eradicate the
detailed restraints and rigidity that had characterized intergovernmental
aid under the earlier categorical era. The imposition of a binding
standard constraining how block grant funds might be spent, they felt,
would result in the serious erosion of local flexibility which had been the
hallmark of block grant policies. Furthermore, it was feared, such an
action would set a dangerous precedent, paving the way for other federal
attempts to strip away local authority over, and responsibility for, local
community development policy.
Relatedly, they asserted that the establishment of one uniform
national standard ignored variability in recipients' local conditions.
Whereas categorical programs like urban renewal had been directed toward a
smaller set of jurisdictions who shared similar local conditions, block
grants, they argued, were designed to address a more diverse set of devel-
opment needs manifest within a much larger and more heterogeneous class of
grant recipients. For some recipient governments, adherence to a
nationally-set beneficiaries standard might not prove burdensome. The
larger and more deteriorated older cities of the Frostbelt, for example,
shared a common need for funds to support renovation of housing and
infrastructure for lower income groups who constituted their majority
populations. But, they reminded standard advocates, other jurisdictions
with legitimate claims to program funds faced differing circumstances.
Suburban communities and growing cities of the Sunbelt, for example, had
both smaller, more scattered low income populations and other pressing
development needs linked to growth in their non-low-income neighborhoods.
For these recipients, critics argued, a requirement that 75% of their annual
grants be expended on the poor would result in the serious misallocation of
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resources and local neglect of burgeoning growth-related development
problems. It was this very form of federal-aid-induced distortion in local
priorities, they contended, that the New Federalism had been designed to
prevent.
Technical Infeasibility
For those left unpersuaded by the philosophical arguments against set-
ting a beneficiaries standard, backers of what became identified as the PDR
division's hostatory language alternative (stressing the new low income
benefit orientation but leaving Area Offices room to determine what was
appropriate case-by-case) stance mounted a second line of attack, this time
rooted in more pragmatic bureaucratic concerns. Because of CDBG's nature as
a predominantly physical development program, they argued, any methodology
employed to demarcate program beneficiaries would be fraught with
difficulties. The technical dilemmas involved in implementing quantitative
targeting standards, they warned, would ultimately prove so problematic as
to render the regulation at best irrational, at worst, unworkable. Their
line of argument can be capsulized in the following manner.
Since the program confined social service project expenditures to no
more than 20% of a local grant, the vast majority of locally funded projects
had physical redevelopment aims--renovation of housing, upgrading of
community facilities, and public works improvements such as better street
lighting, repair of roads, reconstruction of water and sewer facilities,
etc. Of the physical development projects undertaken by localities, only a
small portion had been designed in ways that provided direct and specific
benefits to individuals -- through housing loans and grants to individual
homeowners for example. In these cases, as with CD funded social services,
project beneficiaries could be readily identified.
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But the greatest proportion of local project activities were of a very
different character - as physical improvement efforts they provided far more
nebulous and indirect benefits to the geographic area surrounding the
project site. Street repair projects, for example, might enhance the
environmental quality of an area, thus benefiting in a more indirect fashion
the entire set of residents occupying the area surrounding the project
location. Because of this "area benefit" quality of most projects, the
critics maintained, it would be difficult to arrive at a sensible
methodology for measuring "who benefits" from these activities.
Measuring Who Benefits
The regulations drafted by Embry staff had handled the question of
determining "who benefits" from physical development projects by employing
the census tract as the proxy measure for the geographic area affected by a
project. If a project was located in a particular census tract, the
collection of residents living in that census tract were assumed to be the
beneficiaries of the project. If the residents of the census tracts were
predominantly those meeting the definition of low and moderate income
families (as provided in the Ford Administration's rules) the cost of that
project could be applied toward meeting the 75% benefit standard. Shalala's
agents and others were sharply critical of this approach, pointing to four
administrative problems that would result from the use of this methodology.
Their first criticism focused on the irrationality of the use of the
census tract as the unit of analysis. Small projects, such as the repair of
a short section of a street, they argued, would impact on no more than a
small subsection of a census tract. To use the entire tract as a basis for
assigning benefits (in other words to claim all residents of the tract as
project beneficiaries) would result in the serious misrepresentation of the
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true beneficiaries pool. This methodology would prove especially problem-
atic when applied to suburban communities and Sunbelt cities, where the poor
resided in "pockets of poverty" within higher income census tracts. Even if
these local governments sited projects within the low income enclaves of the
tract, they argued, the wealth of the tract's majority population would make
it appear the project was not serving low and moderate income needs.
Their second objection to the methodology was linked to the approach's
heavy reliance on location as an indicator of a project's intent. They
argued that even where census tracts were relatively homogeneous, their use
as the basis for imputing benefits was subject to distortion. A project
located in a largely lower income census tract, for example, might be
designed to support the immigration of higher income groups. Thus while
actually benefiting more well--to-do individuals, the project would be
counted (using the census tract basis) as benefiting the poor. Conversely,
activities designed to induce a commercial establishment to locate in a
high income tract would be counted as benefiting the tract's wealthier
populace, even though the jobs created by the firm might be filled by low
income workers. The potential for distortion in benefits attribution, they
claimed, was considerable.
Their third criticism revolved around the dependence of the methodol-
ogy on census data. Because the data was updated only once every ten
years, it could not reflect the demographic changes which had occurred
between census years. Thus a local government attempting to meet needs in
recently formed low income enclaves, might be subject to allegations they
were serving the wealthier populace who had resided there nearly 10 years
ago.
As a final overarching criticism, they argued that the kind of
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detailed and extensive HUD analysis that would be required by this approach
(i.e. a line by line, project by project benefit review) would prove unduly
burdensome to HUD field staff. Given that a single local application might
contain hundreds of discrete project activities, the complexities involved
in applying a "bean counting" type of review of benefits derived from local
expenditures would severely tax HUD's administrative resources, they
warned, impairing the efficiency of bureaucratic operations.
But supporters were largely unmoved by these "technical" objections to
the measure. They countered that any errors in attributing benefits to the
"wrong class" of beneficiaries would ultimately be expected to cancel one
another out, rendering the methodology valid over the long run. And though
conceding that the methodology had its limitations, they contended that use
of a standard was necessary to provide field staff with a concrete authori-
tative basis upon which to judge whether localities were sufficiently
addressing the redistributive aim of the Act. Furthermore, any administra-
tive burdens that would accompany utilization of the approach, they argued,
were the rightful burdens the agency was charged with assuming in order to
faithfully execute its responsibilities for stewardship of the program.
Disputes in the Highest Tier
With both pro and con positions on the targeting strategy now being
taken by both Baroni's agents and Shalala's, internal debates over the
content of new guidelines were by summer's end being argued at the highest
levels of the agency. In a series of meetings held in early fall,
representatives of four of HUD's Assistant Secretaries - Baroni, Shalala,
Embry and McGuire (head of the division of Fair Housing and Equal
Opportunity) attempted to hammer out a concensus position on the
guidelines. But so sharp were their differences of opinion on the issue,
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and so firm their stances both in support of and opposition to a standard
that consensus proved elusive.
Spokesmen for the PDR division (Shalala's wing of the agency)
continued to press their case for omitting a specific beneficiaries
standard, though increasingly they stood alone in that position. McGuire's
agents (whose division represented minority interests in the agency) came
down in support of the 75% standard, as did those of Embry, who was himself
firmly convinced, after hearing all the attendant arguments, that a
standard should be imposed. In response to PDR's philosophical objections
to the measure, supporters of the standard asserted that the program's
mandate for local discretion and flexibility was overridden by a higher
bureaucratic charge - to guarantee that federal funds would be used to
accomplish the redistributive aim Congress had specified, and which at
present was not being met. And though willing to concede that some
irrationalities might surface as a result of imposition of the standard,
they saw no effective substitute for use of a standard-based approach.
Concern was expressed that the alternative Shalala's staff favored of
relying on area office promotion of low income projects would prove
ineffective, and moreover, that the level of area office discretion
inherent in a non-standard-based strategy would open the agency to local
allegations of unfairness and arbitrary action in the handling of any
particular case. One important function of regulations, as they saw it,
was to protect the agency from such charges by providing both clarity and
consistency in the treatment of those receiving federal grants. Yet such
arguments left opponents of the standard unmoved.
With disagreement still very much in evidence among the Assistant
Secretaries involved in the internal regulatory process, the issue passed
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upward to the supreme authority in the agency for resolution. Summaries of
the diverging perspectives and regulatory alternatives were compiled in an
internal options paper forwarded to the agency's Secretary in October 1977.
The final verdict regarding the fate of the new CDBG regulations thus came
to rest in Secretary Harris's hands.
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1977
During the same period that Harris' administrators were deliberating
the next step they should take to advance the low and moderate income
emphasis contained in Embry's April 1977 directive, Congress was fashioning
legislation to reauthorize the program for another 3 year period. The
process of reauthorization, however threatened to give rise to a herculean
legislative struggle. Sharp House-Senate disagreements over the contours
of the legislation had nearly scuttled the program's enactment in 1974.
Three years later, several of the members who had engaged in the original
battles over the program still retained places of authority in the
Congressional committees with jurisdiction over the program. To the extent
that their original positions had not softened, the compromises required to
secure passage of a new act would prove difficult to forge. It promised to
be a long hard battle over legislative issues, with the low and moderate
income targeting question one of the major skirmishes.
Senate Action on the Targeting Issue
At the outset of the legislative process, it was clear that there was
sentiment within the Senate to resurrect its original stance on some pro-
grammatic issues. At a meeting of the National Association of Counties in
November 1976, the Senate Committee staff director Robert Malakoff
expressed his expectation that the Committee would attempt to sharpen the
program's focus on low and moderate income constituencies, and to strength-
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en the program's front-end application reviews, "bringing [provisions] more
in line with the intent of the program as originally thought of by the
Senate." 1 0 None of the Senatorial actors would prove to a more avidly
pursue this course than Senator William Proxmire.
As head of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee,
Proxmire occupied a key position of authority in the legislative process.
He had been distressed at the allegations made in his Committee's 1976
oversight hearings of the program's neglect of low and moderate income
needs. The findings of the NAHRO report in early 1977 that the poor's
share of program resources was eroding further heightened his concern. As
the reauthorization questions moved into the legislative forum, Proxmire
asserted he would oppose approval of any CDBG legislation lacking low and
moderate income targeting provisions.
To Proxmire, the reauthorization process represented an opportunity to
accomplish two aims: to correct legislative deficiencies that were permit-
ting local neglect of groups and areas in greatest need, and to assure that
bureaucratic policies at HUD could not ignore the low and moderate income
intentions already contained in the Act. Proxmire had been irked at
Secretary Meeker's intransigence in the face of his criticisms, and though
he appreciated the new tone set by Meeker's successor, Harris, he wanted to
assure such a situation would not arise again.
In regard to the drafting of reauthorizing legislation, the fledgling
organization, the Working Group for CD Reform was again to assume a key
role. Testifying before Proxmire's Committee in April 1977, four represen-
tatives of its member organizations put forth specific proposals for
legislative reform. 11 As with the recommendations they had made to HUD,
the members offered up detailed and specific legislative wording to be
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inserted into the original act's subsections.
The major thrust of the Working Group's legislative proposals was to
alter the Act's programmatic requirements in ways that would enforce the
Act's avowed emphasis on low and moderate income benefit. The first target
for revision was the Act's "maximum feasible priority" certification.
According to the original 1974 legislation, local recipients were
required to certify, as a precondition of aid, that their programs had been
"designed so as to give maximum feasible priority to activities which will
benefit low or moderate income families, or aid in the prevention or
elimination of slums and blight"; as an alternative, activities were
allowed if they addressed "urgent community development needs." In place
of this very loose language, the Working Group proposed new wording that
would legislatively narrow the criteria for project eligibility under both
"slums and blight" and "urgent needs" certifications. Their proposed
legislative language stipulated that projects or activities, in order to
meet the slum and blight certification, "must respond to the priority needs
of low and moderate income families, and must be designed to eradicate
severe physical decay, dilapidation and abandonment, or to ward off
imminent danger of decline." 12
To qualify under the certification that an activity would meet "urgent
needs," their amendments proposed, an activity would have to "respond to
present conditions [which] pose a serious threat to health, safety or
public welfare, require immediate treatment, [are unable to] be addressed
through the use of other financial resources, and outweigh in severity the
needs of low and moderate income persons and the need for projects which
prevent or eliminate slums and blight."13
The insertion of these additional provisos into the maximum feasible
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priority clause, the Working Group argued, would have a dampening effect on
the misuse of "slums and blight" and "urgent needs" criteria as justifica-
tions for frivolous urban projects. In addition, by reducing the ease with
which these alternative justifications could be claimed, the changes would
have the effect of enhancing the flow of funds into projects producing
clear low and moderate income benefit.
As a second target, the Working Group sought revision in HUD's
authority to disapprove applications. Under Section 104(c) of the original
Act, the Secretary's power to disapprove local applications was legisla-
tively constrained. The section required the Secretary to approve an
application for block grant funds unless she found evidence that the
application's description of local needs and objectives was "plainly
inconsistent" with local facts and data; unless the applicant's proposed
program was found "plainly inappropriate" to the locally defined needs; or
unless "the Secretary determines that the application does not comply with
the requirements of this title ... " The Working Group proposed grafting
onto this third provision, language which would legislatively grant HUD the
unquestionable authority and responsibility to consider in application
reviews the degree of attention given to low and moderate income needs. As
they amended it, the provision would require approval for applications
passing the "plainly inconsistent" and "plainly inappropriate" tests unless
"the Secretary determines that the application does not comply with the
requirements of this title with specific regard to the primary purpose of
principally benefiting persons of low and moderate income."14 (emphasis
added).
Given the disposition of the Senatorial actors on the Banking
Committee, these legislative proposals found favor within the Committee as
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the reauthorization bill was being drafted. The Working Group's prepared-
ness once again yielded some victories as the Senate bill (sponsored by
Proxmire) borrowed liberally from the amendments they had proposed.
Although the final version that emerged from Committee mark-up lacked
the "slum and blight" revisions to the maximum feasible priority language,
it did retain a somewhat softened rendition of the more stringent criteria
for project certification as an "urgent need." But more importantly, the
Senate bill incorporated the proposed language granting the Secretary the
express authority and responsibility to reject any local application on the
basis that it failed to give "specific regard to the primary purpose of
principally benefiting persons of low and moderate income."15
Lest there be any doubt as to the Senate's perspective on the target-
ing question, the Committee Report language stressed that the bill's new
provisions represented an attempt to emphasize the responsibilities of
block grant recipients to conform with "the statute's intent that maximum
feasible priority be given to ... activities which benefit low and moderate
income persons and the neighborhoods in which they reside."16 Where oppo-
sition arose against .these provisions in the Committee, it did not reflect
disagreement with the low and moderate income thrust of the provisions, but
instead, merely the means to be employed to enforce it. In the only minor-
ity report addressing these provisions, the Senate bill's chief opponent
Senator John Tower conceded that "no one an argue that [low and moderate
income] areas are the areas that are to benefit from the program." "But to
accomplish this", he argued, "we do not need to write regulations into the
law. HUD has the responsibility to implement the program. If they find
non-compliance with the law, then the law states they are to terminate
funding for the particular community. To write more laws is not the an-
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swer. Better oversight by this Committee and HUD is the best approach."17
But the overwhelming majority of Senators disagreed with Tower's view and
accepted the insertion of new and stronger targeting language. In June of
1977, a bill containing these provisions was adopted by the full Senate by
a vote of 79-7.
The House Version of the Legislation
The reauthorizing legislation in the House, meanwhile, was proceeding
along a very different track. Although the Working Group's legislative
reform package had been presented to the House Housing Subcommittee during
its March 1, 1977 oversight hearings, the package had received a notably
cooler reception. Like key members on the Senate side, many of the House
Subcommittee members were veterans of the 1974 battles over the new block
grant's form. Foremost among these influentials was Representative Thomas
Ashley, who now served as Subcommittee Chairman. Ashley and several other
Representatives who had earlier promoted a true "revenue sharing" approach
to CD policy still adhered to their original view that the overriding aim
of block grant legislation was to provide greater local discretion in
selecting uses for CD funds. The supremacy of the local discretion
principle led them to reject the Working Group's proposals, despite the
findings of their own subcommittee staff report that "the low and moderate
income objectives of the Act are not being met." 1 8 None of the low and
moderate income targeting provisions were incorporated into the House bill.
With the passage of this version by a full House vote of 369-20, resolution
of the targeting question shifted into the hands of a House-Senate
Conference Committee.
Forging the 1977 Act
The Conference Committee convened for the first time in June of 1977.
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The composition of the body nearly guaranteed that the original legislative
issues would be rehashed during the reauthorization debate. Of the nine
Senate Conferees, seven had served on the Senate Committee which drafted
that chamber's original CD bill; six were veterans of the 1974 Conference
which had produced the final Act. On the House side, nine of the thirteen
Conferees had held places on the Banking Committee which had produced the
House version of the 1974 Act; here, too, six had been Conferees for the
original legislation. As the 1977 Conference opened, each House predicta-
bly began to assert its historical position on the true nature of the CDBG
program.
Ashley, taking the lead among House members, objected to the new
Senate provisions. Inherent in the institution of a block grant approach,
he maintained, was acceptance of the principle of expanded local authority
over programmatic choice. In order to remain faithful to that principle,
the grounds for federal rejection of an application must be kept to a
minimum, he argued, to avert the natural impulse of federal bureaucrats to
expand their role at the expense of localities.
Furthermore, he claimed, the programmatic requirements written into
the maximum feasible priority certification reflected Congress's intent
that localities be free to direct their resources toward any one of three
community development objectives - alleviating or preventing slums and
blight, responding to urgent local needs, or addressing the needs of their
low and moderate income residents. On the House side, Ashley maintained,
"we like to think of these as coequal requirements. "1 9 These views led him
to oppose the new "urgent needs" criteria supported by the Senate, on the
grounds that the new provisions would amount to an unjustified "second
guessing" of local judgement regarding what constituted emergency condi-
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tions in their own jurisdictions, and would serve to hamper local pursuit
of this legitimate. goal. Moreover, he argued, acceptance of new grounds
for application disapproval (failing to give "specific regard to ...
principally benefiting low and moderate income persons") would force
redirection of local resources toward low and moderate income objectives,
at the expense of the other two Congressionally sanctioned CD aims.
Proxmire, on the other hand, asserted that the voluminous evidence of
local neglect of low income needs dictated that Congress act "to strengthen
every provision of the Act we can" 2 0 to increase benefits to lower income
groups. And he reminded House members that they had accepted legislative
language making low and moderate income benefit the primary objective of
the 1974 Act. In the face of local shortcomings in this area, he warned,
failure to reinforce the importance of this provision would be tantamount
to Congressional endorsement of existing social and economic inequities.
Due to the intensity of differing House-Senate sentiments on the
targeting question and on other major issues in the legislation (such as
revision in the formula for allocating CD funds among localities, and the
shape of a new categorical program of Urban Development Action Grants) the
conference soon dissolved into a state of deadlock. Stalemate on the
targeting provisions persisted for nearly four months. Under severe pres-
sures to ratify new legislation before Congressional adjournment, the
Congress finally reached agreement on reauthorization language which was
adopted by both chambers in October of that year.
Once again the legislative provisions reflected the kind of uneasy
compromises over the federal role and the Act's objectives which had
plagued the block grant legislation throughout its history. With respect
to constraints on local discretion regarding urgent needs provisions, the
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Senate's view prevailed. In order to qualify as meeting urgent needs
requirements, local projects were required to rectify "existing conditions
posing a serious threat to the health or welfare of the community [for
which) other financial resources are not available." 2 1 But the Senate
amendments fared less well with respect to specifying new grounds for
application disapproval. The 1977 Act retained Senate language mandating a
more thorough HUD application review, but in deference to the House posi-
tion, compliance review criteria were expanded to cover "specific regard
[given] to the primary purposes (plural) of principally benefiting persons
of low and moderate income or aiding in the prevention or elimination of
slums and blight, or meeting other community development needs having a
particular urgency." 2 2 Thus the language regarding programmatic require-
ments supported the notion that localities could choose among three
optional programmatic aims. But while this language suggested Congress did
not prefer any one of three "purposes" over the others, the legislation
failed to alter the "primary objective" language which purportedly lent
supremacy to activities designed "principally for persons of low and
moderate income." Thus the contradictions in the provisions of the Act
were essentially left intact.
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CHAPTER 6: LEGISLATIVE/BUREAUCRATIC CONFLICT OVER LOW INCOME
TARGETING REGULATIONS, 1978-81.
The Bureaucratic Outcome: New Carter Administration Rules
As Harris deliberated what to do with the proposals before her for
regulatory change in CDBG operations, she found herself mired in a
perplexing and convoluted political environment. Not only was she required
to contend with the serious cleavages within her own agency, but she was
also required to be heedful of the divisions within the Congress. Even
prior to the convening of the 1977 House-Senate Conference Committee,
Harris had been subject to confusing and contradictory pressures placed
directly upon her by key members of the Congress. The pressures took the
form of Congressional reactions to Embry's April 15 directive and to her
own proclaimed intent to make the agency more responsive to its low and
moderate income constituency.
Proxmire had publicly lauded the new management directions initiated by
Harris. During the April 1977 HUD oversight hearings he told the
Secretary, "I am delighted to see that you emphasize the fact that HUD.
is now ready for substantive action to see that (CDBG) funds ... are being
used primarily to benefit low and moderate income people."l Moreover,
Harris received broader and more formal Senatorial support with the
acceptance of Committee Report language (on the Senate bill) stating "The
Committee is cognizant of the new management initiatives instituted by HUD
in April of this year, and subscribes to the thrust of those initiatives." 2
But the signals arising from the House side were as critical as the
Senate's were laudatory. While majority (Democratic) members of the House
neither applauded nor objected to HUD's April initiatives, minority members
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exhibited no such neutrality. In a Minority Report appended to the House
version of the reauthorization bill, the nine Republican members of the
Housing Subcommittee rebuked Harris for the April memorandum imposing more
rigorous application reviews, stating "It is disappointing to see the new
administration at HUD retreating on the decentralization and local
initiatives of the original program ... Although this situation does not
lend itself to legislative correction, this Committee should make the
Department aware of its concern over excessive administrative burdens ...
upon local communities." 3
In one sense, the inconsistency among both bureaucrats and legislators
proved an asset to Secretary Harris in that it afforded her the freedom to
pursue the programmatic preferences she favored. The continuing disputes
in Congress and the ambivalence reflected by retention of conflicting low
and moderate income provisions in the 1977 Act assured her of a modicum of
support regardless of the path she chose. At the same time, though, these
very conditions virtually assured the new guideline provisions would
provoke political controversy. In the midst of this highly charged
political milieu, Harris rendered her final verdict on HUD's new
administrative strategies and the targeting question. On October 25, 1977,
her stance was made public with the issuance of a new set of proposed rules
governing the CDBG program.
Proposals for Regulatory Change
The formal rules proposal sanctioned for public release in October
1977 reflected two fundamental convictions that Harris held - first, that
some form of stronger federal role was necessary to protect the program
from damaging allegations of low income neglect, and second, that the
legislative language of the Act provided sufficient grounds to justify
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concentration of program efforts on servicing the Act's low and moderate
income aims.
For the first time in the program's history, the proposed rules
mandated that the Act's primary objective language be implemented as a
specific programmatic requirement. Incorporating the advice of her pro-
targeting advisors, Harris proposed the establishment of a national
benefits standard in the programmatic rules. Such an action was justified,
HUD reasoned, in order to compel local recipients "to assure that low and
moderate income persons are the principal beneficiaries"4 of their CDBG
expenditures.
The proposed rules mandated that localities devote no less than 75% of
their grant allotment to activities which principally benefit their low and
moderate income residents. With the establishment of this 75% standard,
HUD's administrative interpretation of the maximum feasible priority
requirements had been significantly changed. Under the new policy, low and
moderate income objectives of the program were granted weighty precedence
over "slums and blight" and "urgent needs" aims.
Although "slums and blight" and "urgent needs" projects were still
permitted under the new regulations, the criteria for federal acceptance of
these projects was substantially tightened. Most importantly, however, no
more than 25% of local block grant resources could be spent for those two
purposes. Under the new rules, these options were clearly relegated to
secondary status in the program.
To assure fairness in the way the new standard would be administered by
field staff, the regulations adopted a uniform method for counting costs
which could be applied toward meeting the 75% threshold.
With respect to "direct benefit" activities, the rules stated,
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localities could count toward the 75% standard that share of project costs
which would actually fall into low and moderate income residents' hands.
With respect to the thornier issue of "area benefit" projects, the total
cost of the project could be applied toward the 75% threshold if it met the
dual criteria of location and intent. To meet the first criteria the rules
specified that a project must be located in a census tract with a majority
low and moderate income population. To meet the second criteria, the
project must be designed to need the "specific needs of low and moderate
income persons."
To legitimize HUD's expanded role in enforcing the 75% standard, the
proposed rules grafted onto the statutorily restricted grounds for
application disapproval, the Act's primary objective language. If the
applicants "proposed program does not principally benefit low and moderate
income persons"6 (as measured by the 75% standard) the application could be
disapproved on the statutory basis that it proved "plainly inappropriate"
to meeting local needs.
While the proposed rules, on the whole were quite rigid, especially in
light of the hundreds of grantees who would be required to meet them,
Harris did insert a clause to accommodate any irrationalities their
application might create. In deference to opponent's arguments, a broad
waiver provision was inserted enabling the Secretary, at her discretion, to
waive these requirements "where the applicant ... demonstrates that such a
waiver is necessary."7
The Post-Regulatory Period
The period which followed publication of the proposed rules proved
politically one of the most turbulent the Department had ever experienced.
While the most intense political battles were played out during the five
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months immediately following the rules issuance, the conflicts ignited by
the new regulatory emphases would continue to dog HUD officials for a year
and beyond.
Although HUD officials had been certain the proposed rules would not
meet with universal approval, they were nonetheless unprepared for the
fierceness of the political storm they would create. HUD found itself
buffeted by strong cross pressures arising from both contending interest
groups and feuding legislators. The only thing on which there was
agreement, it seemed, was the salience of the issues being debated. During
the required public comment period, the proposed rules evoked 1,327 formal
comments - the largest number ever received for a single package of
regulations in the history of HUD.
Interest Group Pressures
The rules galvanized a broad network of interest groups who voiced
differing perspectives on the propriety of their contents. The most
hostile opponents were, predictably, local officials. Aggressive attacks
on the new proposals were launched by the national organizations charged
with protecting their interests. Included were such powerful interest
groups as the National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and
the National Association of Counties, as well as those of lesser prominence
such as the National Community Development Association and the National
Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials. Each lodged vigorous
protests against the new proposals, and along with their member
jurisdictions brought considerable pressure to bear on the Department. In
attempting to persuade HUD it should abandon the 75% rule, these opponents
marshalled three basic lines of attack.
First, they charged HUD officials with violating the most sacred tenet
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of the block grant mechanism - the supremacy of local prerogatives over
federal aims. "Imposition of percentage (benefit) requirements is clearly
inconsistent with the intent of the block grant concept," 8 the NCDA
asserted. The National League of Cities leadership concurred. The
infringement on local discretion represented by the new provisions amounted
to a kind of "creeping categoricalism" 9 which if adopted, they warned,
would negate whole notion of a block grant as a form of local aid.
A second set of criticisms evident in these groups' responses centered
on the new administrative burdens of compliance with federal provisions.
Many argued that a reduction in paperwork and grant-related red tape had
been promised by the legislation. The USCOM voiced the prevailing senti-
ment that the new rule would "unduly complicate, restrict and undermine
successful programs in scores of cities." 10
Both of these sets of criticisms were near-universally expressed by
local government opponents of the rules. But the third set of criticisms
was unique in that it highlighted the cleavages present within this
otherwise unified set of organizations. Given the method HUD had
prescribed for measuring local adherence to the 75% standard, the
compliance burdens would weigh disproportionately heavily on the sunbelt
cities, the smaller jurisdictions and the urban counties participating in
the program. In the light of the smaller size of their poor populations
and their scatteration, many of these localities voiced fears that the 75%
standard would prove near impossible for them to meet. The National League
of Cities (which unlike the USCOM counted many smaller jurisdictions among
its members) blasted HUD's insensitivity "to diverse local and regional
considerations." 1 1  And NaCo warned the move would disenfranchise urban
counties. Collectively, this subgroup of localities charged HUD with
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violation of the program's principle of "entitlement" to federal funds by
effecting rules which effectively disqualified a legitimate class of
entitlement grantees.
But while the 75% rule drew heavy fire from those governmental
interest groups, a second set of organizations simultaneously rose to HUD's
defense. Civil rights organizations, community associations, and advocacy
groups for the poor from throughout the country lent the new rules their
enthusiastic support. Such prominent national organizations as the NAACP,
the National Urban League, member organizations of the Working Group and
others registered strong approval of the new federal protections afforded
the poor under the program, labeling the provisions as long overdue.
The only dissent voiced in this interest group contingent came from
those who felt the rules did not go far enough. The Center for Community
Change balked at the exclusion of the broad waiver provision and called
upon HUD to close this "loophole" in the final CD rules. But the vast
majority of the low income advocacy groups were satisfied with the rules
proposals and concerned more with protecting the guideline provisions HUD
had now pledged it would pursue. Cognizant of the intense lobbying
campaign underway to kill the proposed regulations, the National Urban
League and others urged Harris to resist the mounting pressures to back
down.12
Congressional Reaction to the New Rules
While the interest group reactions gained the attention of HUD
officials, some of the most important responses were emerging from Capitol
Hill. In a jointly authored letter to Secretary Harris, Senators Proxmire
and Brooke, the ranking majority and minority members of the Banking
Committee voiced their intention "to strongly support [enactment] of the
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HUD draft regulations."13 The expanded federal presence reflected in the
proposals was fully justified, they argued, since "federal resources under
the program are simply too meager to allow them to be spent frivolously."14
In particular, the letter stressed their solid backing of the 75%
benefits standard and their firm belief that the language of the 1977 Act
rendered the proposed standard both fitting and legally defensible. "It is
entirely appropriate that the Department issue regulations requiring this
specific numerical figure," they asserted, and moreover "the 75% standard
would have been appropriate under the original 1974 Act." 1 5 Similar
letters of endorsement were received from House members Bingham, Fraser,
Stark and most notably Parren Mitchell, who like Proxmire had participated
in the 1977 Conference Committee.
But the Proxmire/Brooke counterparts on the House side of the Congress
strenuously disagreed. Ranking majority and minority members of the House
Housing Subcommittee, Thomas Ashley and Garry Brown, fired off a letter
charging Harris with writing rules contrary to the intent of Congress.
Drawing reference to the tripartite purposes contained in the maximum
feasible priority clause, they argued "we do not concur in the requirement
for a set percentage of funds at minimum to be spent for the single purpose
of benefiting low and moderate income persons ... the placement of one
purpose as more primary than another is neither consistent with the
language of the statute, nor with the legislative history."16 As a result,
they insisted, the 75% standard must be dropped.
Several other Congressional members also registered their dissent.
Five Senators and more than a dozen Representatives wrote Harris urging
elimination of that provision. 17 Three House members claiming to represent
a newly formed Suburban Caucus even threatened to take Harris to court to
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block the action. And lest the intensity of these legislator's objections
to the 75% rule be misread by the Secretary, Ashley followed up with a
second letter to Harris warning her that failure to delete the 75% standard
would lead him to conclude that the Department "believes it can legislate
on its own. This is a very grave situation," he cautioned, "and one that I
and many of my colleagues on the subcommittee will feel forced to explore
with you."18
While HUD had intended to put the regulations into effect by year's
end (1977), these plans were scuttled by the political controversy the
rules had provoked. As HUD officials reopened internal debate on the
issues, their attempts to reformulate the provisions were required to
contend with a perilous political environment. Since the civil rights/
poverty coalition was no less a part of the bureaucratic constituency than
were local officials, neither set of interests could be wholly ignored.
Further, among Congressional interests activated by the proposals, many who
argued both for and against HUD's stance held positions which afforded them
control over the agency's programs and resources. In this contentious
environment, officials recognized the political controversies would prove
difficult to lay to rest.
Revisions in the Final Regulations
In the final version of these regulations, published 4 months later on
March 1, 1978,19 HUD failed to fully retract its administrative emphasis on
low and moderate income provisions of the Act, reaffirming in the
document's preface, "Our intention is to carry out the statutory objective
of benefiting low and moderate income persons in a strong and committed
fashion." 2 0 In response to allegations made by Ashley and others that HUD
lacked legal authority to give greater weight to any one of the three
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programmatic purposes, HUD remained adamant. "While this view has been
fully considered," the regulations state, "it was concluded that a low and
moderate income requirement is statutorily permissible." 21
But while HUD was unyielding on its right to grant precedence to the
low and moderate income aim of the program, and on its right to test local
programs for their fealty to the primary objective of the Act, HUD was
prompted by the weight of political opposition to back down from its
insistence that each local program must in each year meet the 75% low
income benefit standard if its grant application was to be approved. In
order to temper political opposition to its low income targeting strategy,
HUD was forced to withdraw the 75% standard as an absolute enforceable
legal requirement, and to opt instead to employ a system of administrative
incentives to prod localities to meet the 75% low income benefit goal. The
administrative strategy HUD elected to adopt in its final rules worked in
the following way.
Before any annual grant allocation could be released to a locality,
the locality's annual program of planned expenditures (submitted as part of
its application packet) was to be subject for the first time in the
program's history to a substantive "program as a whole" benefits test. HUD
area offices were instructed as part of their application review
responsibilities to conduct a detailed line by line, project by project
analysis to determine who would benefit from each of the activities slated
for local action that coming year. Having done so, they were to sum up the
share of grant benefits that would be directed to low and moderate income
persons and adjudge whether the annual local program, taken as a whole,
could be considered to "principally benefit" low and moderate income
persons as specified in the primary objective of the Act. If the
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locality's annual plan for the use of the grant failed to pass the "program
as a whole" "principally benefits" test, its annual grant allotment was not
to be released. In effect this "principally benefits" test amounted to a
general imposition of a 50% floor on the level of benefits to be directed
annually to lower income groups if a locality's application was to be
approved. Thus HUD had, as an absolute enforceable program requirement,
effectively reduced the minimum degree of targeting it would accept from 75
to 50%.
But HUD persisted in its efforts to induce localities to attain a
higher level of redistribution by using its administrative powers in a
different way. In the final rules, HUD did institute a system of
administrative incentives specifically designed to prod localities to reach
the higher 75% low income benefit level HUD officials favored. If, in the
3 year CD plan which accompanied its annual proposed program for use of CD
funds, a locality could, in a general sense, demonstrate its intention to
meet the higher 75% low income benefit level over the course of the three
year period, it would be presumed to have met the "program as a whole"
benefit test, and thus would be spared the necessity to undergo (during
that time span) the detailed in depth annual benefits review.
The incentive being offered to localities meeting the higher benefit
standard was the promise of an abbreviated, less time consuming front-end
grant review. Given that HUD's "program as a whole" benefits analysis was
to involve interviews with local project officials, close scrutiny of each
project or activities' files and documents, and an assessment of the extent
to which localities were responding to the requests made by low income
constituents in drafting their annual plan, adherence to the 75% low-
income-benefit target would serve both to significantly reduce the
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grantee's paperwork burden and to expedite the flow of funds from federal
to local hands. Under these new administrative arrangements then, what had
earlier been slated as an absolute compliance standard of 75% had now been
converted to an administrative review standard - a benchmark that would be
used as a threshold, triggering (for those falling below it) the imposition
of a more intrusive, and in a sense more punitive, federal application
review.
In its final regulations, HUD also modified its prescribed method for
counting low income benefits, in an effort to make it easier for
jurisdictions with "scattered poor" to comply with the targeting standards
set forth in the new rules. In a significant concession to suburbs,
sunbelt cities, and urban counties, the revised regulations permitted the
costs of "area benefit" projects to be applied toward meeting both the
"principally benefits" standard (construed as the 50% benefit floor) and
the 75% benefits threshold, even if the projects were sited in census
tracts lacking a majority low income populace. However this exemption from
the normal low-income benefit counting rule was still treated as a special
exception; its utilization tightly restricted to only those instances in
which certain criteria applied: the locality making use of this exception
must have few or no census tracts in which the poor constituted a majority
populations, the project must still be sited in those census tracts where
the highest concentrations of low income constituents resided, and the
project still had to be designed so as to truly serve the low income
residents' needs.
By making these modifications in the regulations, HUD sought to
advance its goal of inducing localities to devote 75% of their grant funds
to the poor while at the same time tempering political opposition rooted in
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the contention that the original 75% requirement was too stringent and too
rigid. Provided localities could demonstrate that their distribution of
grant funds did "principally benefit" the poor (by meeting the implied 50%
benefit floor), grantees could earmark less than 75% of their funds to the
poor and still have their grants approved, though they would have to accept
the "penalty" of greater federal scrutiny and questioning of the propriety
of project activities that would ensue. In altering the regulations in
this way, and providing the "exception" category for smaller grantee
jurisdictions, HUD sought to retain the basic thrust of its original
targeting strategy while allowing "a reasonable measure of flexibility and
responsiveness to varied local circumstances." 2 2
Response to the Revised Regulations
The modifications reflected in the final rules delighted local
officials, who, in general, felt the changes rendered the low and moderate
income provisions flexible enough for them to accept. Predictably, those on
the other side of the issue were not so content. Proxmire and the civil
rights/poverty coalition notified Harris of their disappointment with the
conversion of the 75% standard, but they felt, nonetheless, they had scored
a partial victory. The program would now place a significantly greater
degree of emphasis on the needs of the poor than was evident under the old
Ford Administration policies. Initially it appeared that through the
compromises instituted in the final rules, Harris and HUD officials had
succeeded in mollifying the contending parties and in laying the targeting
controversies to rest. But less than two months after the revisions had
been made public, intransigent opponents in the House of Representatives
initiated legislative actions that provoked yet another round of
programmatic disputes.
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In the Spring of 1978, it had been expected that the housing
legislation introduced that year in the House and Senate would not address
any substantive issues regarding CDBG program, nor attempt to alter the
compromises in the legislative language of the 1977 Act forged in the
Conference Committee just a few months before. But in April of 1978, only
a month after HUD's revised regulations had been issued, Representative
Garry Brown proposed a set of changes in the House Subcommittee draft of
its housing bill which drastically altered these expectations and
transformed the 1978 legislative process into a virtual rerun of the 1977
debates.
House Actions on the 1978 Act
Brown was absolutely unyielding in his opposition to Harris's
continued emphasis on low and moderate income aim of the program. In an
attempt to force HUD into an even greater retreat on the low and moderate
income benefit issue than that which had already occurred, he proposed
amendments to the 1978 bill that would effectively preempt HUD efforts to
put the new targeting regulations into effect. Specifically, Brown urged
the Subcommittee to accept new language stipulating that the three purposes
of the program set forth in Section 104(c) of the Act - benefiting low and
moderate income persons, preventing or eliminating slums and blight, and
meeting other urgent needs - were to be treated as "primary and coequal
purposes" (emphasis added). 2 3 Moreover, Brown sought to cripple HUD's
strategy of employing its application disapproval powers as a means of
enforcing local low-income targeting by mandating the "the Secretary may
not disapprove an application on the basis that such application addresses
any of the [three] primary purposes to a greater or lesser degree than any
other".24
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With the assent of the vast majority of the Housing Subcommittee
members, the Brown proposals were incorporated into the official text of
the 1978 legislative draft. In the full Committee Report on the House
bill, even formerly neutral members of the committee joined Brown in
expressing opposition to the administrative approach inherent in the new
regulations. "The basic thrust of the amendments," the report states "is
to assure that the Secretary make a determination to disapprove an
application based on the community's individual circumstances, not against
an artificial standard of how best to use CD funds." 2 5 Reiterating the
House's original contention that the Act's overriding aim was to shift
programmatic control from federal to local hands, the report notes, "The
statute leaves the responsibility for determining which of these [three]
priorities should be emphasized to the [local] community." 2 6 These
legislative changes were given the full weight of the House when they were
adopted by that body mid-summer of that year by a vote of 170-26. (Yet
ironically while these amendments effectively touted a new position of
coequality among three purposes, the "primary objective" language of
Section 101 of the Act was left untouched.)
House Actions to Rein in the Bureaucracy
As the substantive programmatic changes Brown was promoting were
advancing through the legislative steps toward adoption by the House, it
was clear that this new CDBG language constituted a threat to HUD's ability
to administer the program as the final rules had proposed. But at the same
time a far more powerful and broad-ranging threat to the agency was
evolving as a result of a second set of amendments to the bill which Brown
had also proposed. As a direct consequence of the House's CDBG disputes
with HUD, Brown has authored a proposal to drastically alter the normal
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process by which program rules and regulations were made.
Typically, the bureaucracy is the preeminent power in rulemaking.
Through the constitutionally-supported principle of "delegation of
(legislative) authority" Congress grants the bureaucracy the authority to
promulgate formal administrative rules (rules having the full force of the
law) which fill in the gaps left by the legislation and which implement the
legislation's (therefore Congress's) intent. The only formal congressional
checks on bureaucratic authority in this regard come via Congressional
efforts to nullify rules by securing changes in the legislative statue for
which the rules were drawn. (Informally, of course, Congress has other
channels of influence over bureaucratic activities.) At the same time
Brown was acting to force revision in the content of the new CDBG rules
through the enactment of formal legislative changes, he was also proposing
a new system of Congressional rulemaking restraints, specifically aimed at
HUD, in an attempt to rein in the agency's broad regulatory powers.
As the 1978 legislation was being considered on the floor of the House,
Brown offered up an amendment to the legislation aimed at granting the
Congress broad new authority to exercise direct veto power over the content
of HUD's programmatic rules. Known as a "one-house legislative veto,"
provision, this amendment sought to endow either chamber of Congress with
the authority to act unilaterally to block implementation of HUD
regulations, which it believed ran contrary to Congressional intent. Under
the one-house legislative veto provision, HUD would be required to directly
submit to the relevant Committees in both the House and the Senate any
formal rules it issued in the Federal Register at the same time they were
published. Furthermore, HUD would automatically be prohibited from putting
the rules into effect. The rules were to be held up for a period of 90
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days of continuous Congressional session to enable Congress to review the
appropriateness of their content. During this review period, either
Chamber of the legislature would be empowered to permanently veto the
regulations by enacting a simple resolution of disapproval backed by a
majority of that Chamber's votes. The one-house regulatory veto process
had been adopted by Congress before, to strengthen its hand in dealing with
other agencies, but only rarely. Brown's proposal to apply it to HUD
agency actions, and to force its utilization in all of HUD's program areas,
was a sign of just how grave a matter House agency disputes over CDBG
regulations had become.
During the floor debate on the amendment, Brown accused HUD of making
"legislation by regulation" and charged the agency with enacting
regulations which persistently defied the intent of Congress. Drawing
reference to his other set of legislative proposals to substantially change
the CDBG legislation in order to nullify the new CD rules, Brown argued
"Congress should not be forced to reenact the same legislation year after
year simply because the administration does not like the law the way it is
written."28
While several powerful members of the Housing Subcommittee had joined
with Brown in his attempt to make specific legislative changes which would
block HUD's new regulations, some, like Subcommittee Chairman Ashley,
opposed him on this broad rulemaking reform. Ashley called the one house
veto provision a "classical case of overkill"29 and asserted there were
other ways to correct what they saw as HUD's defiance. Ashley warned of
the serious burdens the veto would place on members of Congress who would
be required to oversee innumerable details of the agency's operations.
Another who had backed Brown's substantive language revisions in the CD
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legislation, John Sieberling, argued that one house veto would pose another
kind of danger. He warned that the unilateral action allowed each chamber
under the veto provision would prompt each chamber to revert to its
original stance on a disputed legislative provision, thereby nullifying the
effect of any successful Conference Committee compromises.
While these arguments were persuasive to some members, in the end,
Brown prevailed. Too many House members had been angered by the original
Harris rules proposals, and inattentive to the significant concessions made
in the final version which had followed their rebukes. By an astonishingly
wide margin of 244-140, the House voted to add the one-house veto to its
1978 bill.
Senate Actions on the 1978 Legislation
Key Senate actors, in the meantime, were notably incensed by the
unexpected actions in the House. In light of the House's acceptance of the
1977 Conference Report language and the significant concessions contained
in HUD's revisions of the CDBG rules, many Senators had falsely believed
the targeting disputes had finally been quelled. But as Brown's amendments
to the 1978 House bill gained momentum, the Senate actors prepared once
again to assert their contrary visions of the Act's true legislative
intent.
As the chamber's Banking Committee drafted the Senate version of the
1978 bill, Proxmire proposed revisions in the CDBG legislation to even more
tightly constrain the eligibility of slums and blight projects. By further
impairing local use of "slums and blight" rationale for projects, Proxmire
hoped to induce greater local expenditures on projects meeting low and
moderate income needs. His proposals were a direct attempt to counteract
Brown's "coequality" language, but they were ultimately dropped from the
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bill during mark-up because of confusion over their meaning.
While this particular attempt to counter the Brown-authored changes
proved unsuccessful, the Senate Committee did, nevertheless, repudiate the
coequality language and the restrictions on HUD's application-disapproval
powers by consciously omitting counterpart provisions from the text of the
1978 bill.
As the Senate Bill moved from the Committee to the full chamber in
late July, the second issue of imposing a one-house veto on HUD-set
regulations came to the fore. Senator Harrison Schmitt, a minority member
of the Banking Committee lay before the full Senate a one-house veto
amendment to the HUD legislation similar to that which Brown had proposed
in the House. But Senate members exhibited far grater confidence in HUD's
capacity to accurately implement their legislative intent by roundly
defeating the amendment.
With the Senate version now lacking both the substantive changes in
the CDBG purposes, and the more stringent one-house veto provision which
had been accepted by the House, the full text of the 1978 Senate bill
received the overwhelming endorsement of that body as it was adopted by the
Senate 81-3. Once again, the major issues regarding CD policies were
thrown into a House-Senate Conference Committee for resolution.
Conference Action on the 1978 Legislation
The Conference committee that convened in mid-August was profuse with
members of both the House and the Senate who were veterans of past attempts
to resolve CE disputes. Of the 20 conferees, all but two had sat on the
Conference Committee responsible for the language of the 1977 Act.
Moreover, more than half of the conferees (and all of the most senior
participants) had taken part in the 1974 Conference which shaped the
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original CDBG Act. Once again, the stage was set for reenactment of the
earlier CD debates.
Though the Conference was required to reach agreement on a sizeable
number of non-CD issues in contention, the CD disputes proved the toughest
for the Conference to resolve. The arguments traded over CD questions were
now familiar ones. Proxmire, representing the Senate view, held firm
against acceptance of the "coequality" language on the grounds that it
would transform the program into little more than a general revenue sharing
bill. And Brown, as a standard-bearer of the House perspective, continued
to adhere to the view that local discretion was the true cornerstone of the
program, and that HUD intervention into local priority-setting activities
must be condemned as an unwarranted intrusion, impairing the program's
adaptation to varied local needs. The disputes over the substantive
program revisions and the one-house veto amendment continued to block
finalization of Conference Report language for two full months. As
occurred in both 1974 and 77, the CD portions of the legislation fell
victim to stalemate until the waning days of the Congressional session.
Mirroring the circumstances which broke stalemates in the earlier CD
legislation, strong pressures began to be placed on the Committee to reach
compromises enabling passage of the legislation before the Congress
adjourned. Forced into a marathon round-the-clock session just three days
prior to the close of the Congressional term, the Committee emerged with a
final compromise report. The resulting bill, the "Housing and Community
Development Amendments of 1978," was voted into law by both the House and
the Senate during the last two days of the 95th Congress. 3 0
The Institution of Legislative Review and Veto Mechanism
In the final version of the legislation, the legislative veto
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provision had found acceptance, although in a format far less threatening
to HUD than that which had originally been accepted by the House. In place
of the legislative veto provision that Brown had advocated, an alternative
arrangement for a two-house legislative veto had been enacted into law.
Under the 1978 Act's provisions, the two house regulatory review and veto
process (known as the 7(o)-procedure) was to operate in the following way.
Where the Authorization Committee of either chamber of the Congress
expressed interest in scrutinizing the formal administrative rules HUD
intended to propose, the agency was required to submit the full text of the
rules to each Committee for Congressional review. Once submitted, HUD was
then permitted to publish the rules in the Federal Register, but was
automatically precluded from putting the rules into effect before a
specified Congressional review period had passed. Unless waivers to the
delay period were granted by the Chairs of both House and Senate
Authorization Committees, the rules would be held in suspension for a
period of 35 days of continuous Congressional session to afford the
Committees time in which to weigh their appropriateness and to initiate
veto action if they were deemed contrary to Congressional intent.
But unlike the House version of the legislative veto provision, neither
Chamber would be empowered to act unilaterally to permanently veto the
proposed rules. In order to block HUD's rule proposal, a resolution of
disapproval would have to find acceptance in both the Senate and the House.
In this sense, the 7(o) legislative veto provision enacted into law fell
short of granting the Congress the sweeping powers to dominate agency
rulemaking to the degree the House had earlier sought. Given the
requirement for joint House-Senate action, legislative veto of HUD
regulations would only be prone to succeed in those instances where dissent
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from HUD's interpretation of the law was widely shared.
But neither was the 7(o) procedure a toothless mechanism. While
legislative veto required joint action, each Committee of the Congress was
still afforded greater leverage over the contents of HUD rules via their
unilateral power to prolong the process of regulatory review. Unless
waivers were granted by both Committee chairs, the rules would
automatically be held in suspension for a period of 35 days of continuous
Congressional session; a period which, given Congressional recesses and
adjournments could extend in calendar time for several weeks or months.
The 7(o) procedures thus promised to cause greater headaches for HUD
rulemakers. Requirements for direct submission of HUD rules to legislative
overseers would assuredly produce closer Congressional scrutiny of their
implementation efforts. Moreover, HUD would be compelled (at least in
theory) to be more attentive to Committee preferences if they were to avoid
significant administrative delays.
Compromises on the Substantive Provisions of the 1978 Act
While these final compromises on the legislative veto issue were quite
clear and straightforward, the final compromises on the substantive issues
of CD policy were far less lucid and direct. As had been the case with the
1974 and 77 legislation, the difficulties inherent in resolving hotly
contested issues under intense time pressures had taken their toll on the
1978 Act.
The compromises forged in this difficult political environment were so
muddled as to be nearly unintelligible. The only clear outcome was that
the "coequality" language Brown had sought to inject into the legislation
had been dropped. But the legislative wording accepted in lieu of the
"coequality" provision only compounded the confusion surrounding the true
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purposes of the CD program and their relative importance in HUD's
administration of the CDBG Act.
The final legislative text in Section 104 carried over the new
reference first made in the 1977 legislation to the three "primary
purposes" (plural) of the program -- benefiting low and moderate income
persons, preventing or eliminating slums and blight, and meeting other
urgent community development needs (needs which in the 1977 law were now
more stringently defined). Inherent in this reference to the program's
"primary purposes" was the notion that, coequality aside, there were three
legitimate national purposes which local grants could be used to address.
Yet at the same time the legislative reference to a singular "primary
objective" of the program -- "the development of viable urban communities
... principally for persons of low and moderate income" was left intact in
Section 101.
And as if these divergent provisions alone were not perplexing enough
for HUD to use as a guide to administrative policy, the remainder of
Section 104 added new and muddled directives regarding HUD's use of its
application disapproval powers. Nowhere is the indeterminant nature of the
1978 CD compromises more clearly apparent than in the text of this new
legislative clause:
The Secretary may not disapprove an application on the
basis that such application addresses any one of the
primary purposes ... to a greater degree than any other,
except that such application may be disapproved if the
Secretary determines that the extent to which a primary
purpose is addressed is plainly inappropriate to meeting
the needs and objectives which are consistent with the
community's efforts to achieve the primary objective of
this title. 3 1
The first portion of the clause is a direct descendant of the House
stance that there were three national objectives of the CD program among
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which localities should be free to choose --- low and moderate income
benefit was only one of the three options. But the second portion of the
clause represents the antithetical perspective held by the Senate. In this
view, the primary objective of principally benefiting low and moderate
income persons remained the supreme purpose of the program, and HUD was to
assess whether local programs were clearly in conformance with this
overriding programmatic intent.
While in normal cases the Conference report which accompanies
compromise legislation serves to clarify ambiguous elements in its
companion law, the 1978 Conference Report did little to illuminate the true
meaning of the convoluted provisions the Act contained.
On the one hand the conferees asserted in the report that each
applicant community was responsible for developing a program "which over a
three year period meets [its identified CD] needs while principally
benefiting low and moderate income persons." Moreover it stressed HUD's
statutory responsibility to assure that this occurred. "The Secretary's
review of each application," the language notes "is a review to determine
whether the activities designated by the community in its 3 year plan are
designed to achieve the overall objective [primary objective] of the
program." (emphasis added) 3 2
On the other hand, the report at the same time seemed to adopt a
counterpoising view. "The amendment is designed to make clear" the
conferees claimed, "that a [HUD] determination to disapprove [an
application] cannot be made simply because an application gives greater
weight to one spending priority [of the three cited] in relation to the
others."33 And in a further attempt to hold HUD to this non-preferential
view, the report prohibited use of a national benefits standard -- "any
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percentage limit on the level of funds to be allocated shall be strictly
avoided." But in an addendum which would generate additional confusion
over HUD's role, the ban contained a qualifier. Use of a percentage limit
was to be avoided the report notes, "except for review purposes."
HUD's Response to the New Legislation
Soon after the 1978 legislation was signed into law by President Carter
on October 31, top HUD officials began to assess the implications of the
legislation for the administrative operations of the CD program. While the
original House position had posed a serious threat to the way Secretary
Harris had proposed to run the program, the compromise forced by the Senate
served to shelter the agency from the most potentially damaging changes to
the CD Act.
Despite the Act's language prohibiting HUD from disapproving
applications for simply favoring one CD purpose over another, HUD staff
felt the basic legitimacy of their emphasis on low and moderate income
beneficiaries had been upheld. As evidence they pointed to the Senate's
success in securing both the deletion of coequality language and a
reaffirmation of the importance of the primary objective of the Act.
Furthermore, while duly noting the House's success in banning the use
of percentage limits as strict compliance standards, they observed that in
writing their March 1978 regulations, they had not imposed any strict
percentage compliance standards in the rules. The 50% floor on the level
of low income benefits was not written into the regulations, only implied
in the nature of the "program as a whole" "principally benefits" test.
Moreover, the precise 75% standard they had set forth in the regulations
was not a "compliance standard" but an administrative review standard which
according to the Conference language would be allowed. Thus they believed
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that in creating the new rules for implementation of the new 1978 Act, it
would be possible for them to proceed with the administrative targeting
strategy fundamentally as they had proposed to do in their old revised
rules issued in March of 1978.
Creation of An Application Review Handbook
Having carefully reviewed the October 1978 legislation, HUD officials
were now convinced that as a result of the paradoxical language, the
legislation would not prove a major impediment to their pursuit of their
chosen targeting strategy. As a consequence, they temporarily deflected
their attention from submitting regulations designed to implement the new
1978 Act to other administrative tasks.
HUD officials were eager to put in place the internal administrative
mechanisms through which Area Offices would clearly be informed of the
nature of their new application review responsibilities, and to have the
new internal procedures finalized before the bulk of local applications
arrived in April 1979. They therefore turned their attention in the period
from November 1978 to March 1979 to the tasks of compiling, for the first
time in the program's history, a comprehensive handbook specifying how
application reviews were to be carried out.
The handbook issued on March 29, 1979, set forth the strategy Area
Offices were to use in analyzing local programs for their conformity with
the primary objective of the Act. It contained the counting rules on
project benefits that had been specified in the March 1978 regulations, and
the review standards that were to be applied in conducting the "program as
a whole" "principally benefits" reviews.
If the locality had earmarked at least 75% of its 3 year grant
allocation for low-income benefit projects, the Area Office was to presume
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the locality had met the "principally benefits" test, and was to exempt the
locality from more stringent, project by project, front-end benefits
reviews. If either the locality's annual or 3 year plan earmarked between
50 and 75% of funds for low income benefit, more lengthy front-end reviews
would be triggered. If a locality in either its annual or 3 year plan
proposed to spend less than 50% of its grant funds on low income benefit
projects, the application was to be neither approved nor disapproved at the
Area Office level. Instead it was to be forwarded to the Central Office
where even more intensive reviews for local fealty to the primary objective
mandate would be undertaken. The final judgment regarding these grant
applications could only be rendered by central headquarters staff.
There was little outcry when HUD issued its application review
handbook, but when HUD attempted to make very minor revisions in the CD
regulations to bring them into conformity with the handbook contents, the
CD disputes heated up once again. On April 23, 1979, Harris sent copies of
the new draft regulations to the House and Senate committees, both of which
had formally notified HUD under the new 7(o) procedures of their intent to
review the provisions. While the Senate committee gave the nod of approval
to the draft regulations, the House quickly registered its dissent.
House committee staff members charged HUD with devising regulations
which once again defied the true Congressional intent. The Committee staff
argued that the 1978 Conference Report was explicit in its prohibition of
the use of percentage standards in CD application reviews. HUD staff, on
the other hand countered that the prohibition applied only to standards
which determine automatic non-compliance, not to review guidelines which
HUD had proposed. While HUD officials were convinced that the provisions
were legally defensible, they did not relish the thought of another round
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of battles with the House. As a result, HUD officials decided to
temporarily withdraw the regulations (to halt original plans to formally
publish them) while they decided upon their next move.
During the next two months, agency officials explored their regulatory
options. None proved very attractive. One option, publishing the draft
intact as a proposed rule, would in all likelihood trigger another round of
Congressional activity similar to that which had yielded threats to HUD's
autonomy in 1978. Another option was to undertake yet another lengthy
process of redrafting the regulations to accommodate House critics.
Pursuing this course, however, would consume a significant share of the
agency's time and attention with no real promise that such an effort would
succeed. HUD's final option was to circumvent the regulatory process
altogether by withholding the regulations and relying on internal
directives (in the form of the handbook and memos to the field) to continue
to implement their preferred targeting policies.
By default, this final course of action came to be the one HUD
officials pursued. While a final decision regarding what to do about House
objections was expected from the Secretary in July of 1979, before the
month drew to a close Harris had resigned her post to accept an appointment
as Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Two more
months passed before Harris's successor, Mayor Moon Landrieu, was confirmed
as head of the agency. By that time, other important CDBG policy issues
had begun to eclipse the low income targeting issue as an object of primary
concern in the House.
A recent GAO study had revealed that the rate at which localities were
actually drawing down the funds they had been allotted under the CDBG
program was alarmingly low, indicating the existence of a sizeable backlog
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of local projects that were failing to get off the ground. Moreover, GAO
was severely critical of the HUD agency for failing to adequately monitor
the speed and effectiveness with which localities were executing the
projects they had planned, and to apply penalties where deficiencies were
unveiled. Concerned that continued poor local performance in implementing
grant activities would undermine support for the block grant program, the
House left the issue of low income targeting in the background, and
concentrated instead on efforts to prompt HUD to improve its oversight of
local grant recipients in this important area.
As a result, HUD made no attempt to issue new regulations related to
targeting. Throughout 1979 and 1980, HUD continued to make use of its
application review handbook to enforce local adherence to the
redistributive aim of the Act, and localities responded by realigning their
priorities to more heavily direct grant resources to low income groups.
During this period, more than 2/3 of all entitlement grant recipients opted
to meet the 75% benefit threshold. In the absence of further Congressional
pressures, low-income targeting of program became a non-issue, but only
until the rise to power of the Reagan Administration in 1981.
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CHAPTER 7: POLITICAL REALIGNMENTS AND POLICY CHANGE:
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S MOVE TOWARD REVENUE SHARING
From mid 1979 to 1981 these disputes over guidelines for the CDBG
program appeared to have been quelled. In the absence of persistent open
challenges to the softened low income targeting policies instituted by
Embry and Harris in 1979, the program entered, at least with respect to
that central issue, a period of relative calm. But political events
centered around the 1980 elections conspired to shatter the uneasy
settlements reached in that earlier era. The 1980 elections brought
changes in the set of key political actors holding prime responsibilities
for programmatic policies both in the Administration and in Congress. With
the landslide election of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency, and concurrent
changes in House and Senate composition, the stage was set for a reopening
of past disputes over CDBG guidelines - disputes which again came to center
around the persisting conflict in the legislation. Did the legislation
mandate priority emphasis on serving the needs of the nation's poor, or did
it grant localities free rein to choose among the three elements of the
maximum feasible priority clause.
Changes in Key Actors in the Senate
In the aftermath of the 1980 elections, Republicans supplanted
Democrats as the controlling party in the Senate. Having wrested 33 Senate
seats from Democratic hands, the Republicans assumed majority status on
that body for the first time since 1955. The realignment brought about
significant changes in Committee and Subcommittee leadership, as well
shifts in the relative power wielded by various political factions involved
in CDBG disputes. Democrats lost their controlling interest over Committee
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and Subcommittee matters. Moreover, chairmanship of Senate Committees and
Subcommittees passed into Republican hands. Chairmanship of the
Subcommittee responsible for community development issues was assumed by
Richard Lugar, former mayor of Indianapolis and a well-known conservative
with close ties to the new Reagan Administration. Second in rank in the
Republican subcommittee was Senator Jake Garn, a close ally of Lugar's,
whose new position as head of the full Banking Committee lent his views
particular weight in subcommittee deliberations. Like Lugar, Garn had held
office as mayor (of Salt Lake City), an experience which had left the two
with similar perspectives on CDBG issues.
Gone from the Senate Republican contingent was the more liberal
influence of senior Senator Ed Brooke, whose alliance with ranking Democrat
William Proxmire had lent their shared view of the CDBG program's
"rightful" emphasis on the poor such strong weight in the 1977-78 round of
policy disputes. With Brooke's defeat in 1978, the Senate subcommittee of
the new Congress lacked the bipartisan leadership alliance on CDBG issues
which had solidly shaped the Senate's position on CDBG issues in both the
Carter and Ford years. In the absence of Senator Brooke, the new
subcommittee now retained only a single Republican Senator who had
participated in the original passage of the CD Act in 1974, though four of
the six Republican subcommittee members had engaged in CDBG deliberations
during the 1977 and 1978 legislation sessions.
Among Senate Democrats, leadership on CD issues changed very little.
While Senator Harrison Williams replaced Proxmire as titular head of both
the Subcommittee and full Committee, his preoccupation with issues
regarding his involvement in the Abscam scandal left Proxmire (the second-
most senior minority member) in a position to continue wielding significant
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power over Democratic positions on the CDBG program in the ensuing period.
Moreover, three of the five remaining subcommittee members had held sub-
committee positions at the time of the Act's original passage. All had
been involved in subcommittee work on the 1977 and 1978 bills. On the
Democratic side of the aisle in the Senate, then, continuity in their
positions on CDBG issues was fairly well assured.
House Subcommittee Changes
While the Democrats did not suffer a comparable loss of their majority
status in the House chamber, electoral instability had by 1981 produced
changes in Subcommittee composition nonetheless -- changes which had
significant impact in altering the cast of CD-linked activists on both
Republican and Democratic sides. Now gone from the Congress were both key
members of the strong alliance which had so vigorously opposed the low
income emphasis in the CDBG program during the Carter term. Democratic
Subcommittee Chairman Lud Ashley, and ranking Republican minority member
Garry Brown, each of whom had played major roles in the forging of the
original 1974 Act and in the policy disputes of subsequent years, had
suffered loss of their seats -- Ashley in 1980, Brown in late 1978. As a
result, the key positions of authority in the House Subcommittee now passed
into new hands.
On the Democratic side, Chairmanship of the Subcommittee was assumed
by Representative Henry Gonzalez of Texas. Like Ashley who had preceded
him, Gonzalez shared a history of Subcommittee involvement in CDBG
legislation dating back to its original passage in 1974. But Gonzalez, as
would later become quite clear, held a view of that program more akin to
that of Proxmire/Brooke than to that espoused by Ashley and Brown. Though
his personal views of the mandates contained in the CDBG legislation had
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been stifled by Ashley's strong control over Democratic Subcommittee
members (in the words of one Subcommittee staff member, "Ashley's view was
the Committee's view... Ashley was a very powerful chairman").1 Gonzalez's
new position as head of the Subcommittee would grant him latitude to
rechart the Houses's former policy course.
The position of second in rank on the Democratic side of the Subcom-
mittee fell to Fernand St. Germain, who also now held the Chairmanship of
the full Banking Committee. Like Gonzalez, St. Germain had deferred to
Ashley's interpretations of CDBG legislation. But in the newly inaugurated
Congress, he was to prove a strong supporter of Gonzalez's CDBG views. Of
the 19 person Democratic Subcommittee contingent, only Gonzalez and St.
Germain were veterans of the original 1974 legislative deliberations,
though the majority had become familiar with key issues through
deliberations over program amendments in 1977 and 78.
On the minority side of the House Subcommittee, Congressional
instability yielded significant change as well. The defeat of Garry Brown
in 1978 had left a major leadership void on the Republican side of the
aisle. Representative William Stanton now held Brown's former post as
ranking minority member. Like Brown, Stanton's involvement with the CD
legislation dated back to its original passage in 1974. But while Stanton
shared Brown's perspectives on the program, he lacked the intensity of
conviction and strong impulse toward programmatic stewardship (aimed in the
direction of revenue sharing) which Brown had persistently manifest. 2 of
the remaining 12 subcommittee Republicans, none had held their positions in
1974, and only three -- Wylie, McKinney and Evans, had even served on the
Subcommittee in 1977 and 78. In short, their lack of familiarity with the
program's history, and a slackening in the depth of interest in
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programmatic affairs rendered Subcommittee Republicans a lesser force in
the events following the 1980 elections.
While the changes the 1980 election wrought within the Congress would
prove to have great significance for the dispute over CDBG rules and
regulations which was to ensue, none of the changes in the Congress even
approached in significance the impact on program directions felt as a
result of the ascendance of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency. Campaigning
on a platform of a diminished role for the federal government in societal
affairs, Reagan won a landslide victory over the incumbent Carter
Administration in 1980. The general theme Reagan had adopted of
deregulation of national programs began to leave its impact on the
Department of Housing and Urban Development even before key personnel
appointments within the agency had been made.
Forces of Influence on the New Administration: New Voices or Old?
While the new Administration took no action to revise CDBG guidelines
until May of 1981, the seeds of a shift in administrative policy had been
sown even before new staffing appointments for the Department of Housing
and Urban Development had been made. In preparation for the transition to
a new Republican Administration, the Heritage Foundation, a conservative
think tank in Washington, had prepared a voluminous document entitled "A
Mandate for Leadership."3 Designed to serve as a blueprint for the new
Administration, the document set forth proposals for implementing a new
conservative domestic policy agenda. Devoting a chapter to each federal
agency, the report contained specific recommendations for policy change in
each of the major domestic programs that agency administered. Included in
the chapter on HUD programs were proposals to alter the programmatic
orientation of CDBG.
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The segments devoted to CDBG policy were highly critical of the
reforms the Carter Administration had put in place, reiterating in near
verbatim terms the arguments made in opposition to those efforts in earlier
years. Echoing in the language employed in the passages were vestiges of
the prior policy disputes over two central program issues -- priority to
assuring overall benefit to low and moderate income people vs. free local
choice, and a mandate for a strong national role in overseeing program
operations vs. a "hands off" revenue sharing approach. There was little
question as to where the report stood on these issues.
"Unfortunately, over the last 3 1/2 years," the report maintains, "the
[CDBG] program has been altered drastically through administrative actions
which would not have been acceptable to the Congress" (emphasis added).4
"its stated purpose ... was to provide local governments with a stable flow
of funds based on ... the principle of general revenue sharing. CDBG was
intended to enhance local government's flexibility and reduce federal
intervention."5
If this language bore a striking resemblance to rhetoric voiced during
the acrimonious debates over guideline policies during the Ford and Carter
eras it was no accident. Among the handful of individuals responsible for
the section's contents were two key figures from the program's past:
Warren Butler, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the program's division
under Ford, who had framed the initial guidelines for the CDBG program, and
former Representative Garry Brown, the most vociferous opponent of the
Carter policies in the Congress. Arguing that "the principal deficiency of
existing policies ... (is) excessive federal control and intervention," 6
the report urged immediate action to restore local flexibility through
"deregulation of the Community Development Block Grant."7
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The report had great influence on those ascending to power in the
White House. Among Reagan's key advisors the document assumed the status
of a kind of Bible to guide the transition teams for federal agencies.
Within weeks of the inauguration, copies were forwarded by Reagan staff to
the Community Planning and Development division at HUD, with indications
that these were the new directions to be charted for the program in the
post-inaugural period. Soon after Samuel Pierce was appointed as the new
Secretary of the Department, efforts to prepare for a shift in CDBG policy
were underway. Following the suggestions contained in the report, HUD
efforts focused on securing changes in the program via two independent
routes: through new legislation and through revision in administrative
guidelines governing program operations.
A Shift in Administrative Guidelines
Paralleling the efforts of the Carter Administration officials which
had preceded them, Reagan Administration appointees within the agency moved
swiftly to lay the groundwork for revising the guidelines under which the
CDBG program was being administered. But despite this similarity in the
timing of the courseof events, the guideline revision process under Reagan
differed markedly from that under Carter in its proximate cause. During
the Carter Administration, the early clamor for revision in program
directions had stemmed in part from concern that the critical studies of
program administration and the revelations of program abuse which had been
the focus of Senate hearings in 1976 were creating an atmosphere of scandal
around the program -- one which officials feared could threaten its
continued existence. A comparable atmosphere of impending crisis was
notably absent at the outset of Reagan's term.
Moreover, as Carter Administration officials were assuming their
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posts, they faced intense pressure to alter the program's directions from
interest groups who formed a key segment of the program's constituency.
The organizations which banded together to form the Working Group for CD
Reform had manifest strong opposition to the way the program had been
administered during the Ford years -- opposition which led them very early
in Carter's term to mount an intense lobbying campaign to tighten program
requirements particularly those aimed at targeting benefits to low and
moderate income residents. In contrast, as Reagan officials were taking
office, interest group dissatisfaction with existing Carter Administration
guidelines in this area was minimal. Though interest groups representing
city officials such as the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National League
of Cities and the National Association of Counties had taken a strong
stance against Carter's targeting policies when they were first advanced,
by 1981 their opposition to the more moderate approach ultimately employed
under the Carter administration had in large part fallen away. As one
local government interest group lobbyist explained
Prior to the Administration offering the deregulation proposals,
there was no great outcry from our membership about problems [with
operating under the current system]. There were some who felt HUD
held them up a little bit but we generally found that most did not
have a great deal of difficulty complying [with the Carter
requirements]8
In contrast to the impulses which induced guideline change during the
Carter era, the Reagan Administration efforts to recast guidelines for the
program had their root in a much simpler set of forces -- the philosophy
espoused by the President regarding the proper role of federal and local
officials in the federal system. While philosophical perspectives on the
proper balance in a block grant between enforcement of national program
aims and grants of local discretion and flexibility did play a role in
prompted guideline change during the Carter years, other forces (such as
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direct interest group pressures and bureaucratic concern with the atmosphere
of scandal which it was feared would erode political support for the
program) appeared equally significant. But during the Reagan term, initial
efforts to reformulate guidelines stemmed almost exclusively from a desire
to bring the program in line with Presidential philosophies. In the words
of one HUD official
We had had a number of complaints from mayors [about HUD's policies
under Carter] but it was not in a volume or intensity that in my
mind would generate a rule change on its own ... this was guided by
philosophy, very much so.9
Moreover, unlike the guideline changes during the Carter years, which
had had their origin within the substantive program division at HUD, the
new directions charted by the Reagan Administration were more closely
orchestrated from the White House. Even before the appointment of Stephen
Bollinger as a successor to Robert Embry as Assistant Secretary for CPD,
actions were taken by Secretary Pierce's office, at the behest of White
House actors, to forge new policies for the program's administration --
policies that would stress the themes of deregulation and maximum local
choice.
Consonant with the Heritage Foundation report, Piece instructed CPD
staff to prepare an analysis of deregulation options for the program. With
an eye toward stripping the program down to its barest essentials, they
were asked to identify areas where current administrative requirements
could be lifted (via changes in the review handbooks, notices to the field,
etc.) without attempting to amend the formal program regulations on the
books -- a process which (under the new legislative oversight provisions
added to the law in 1978) would induce a formal Congressional review of HUD
actions. As a secondary task, the staff was also asked to identify where
deregulation might take place by formally proposing new regulations without
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seeking change in the present legislation.
At the same time, Pierce's office hired Heritage Foundation report
contributor Warren Butler (former Deputy Assistant Secretary under Ford) to
serve as a consultant on program deregulation. His assignment was to
identify those revisions in handbooks, notices, and regulations made by the
previous Administration which deviated from the administrative path charted
during the Ford Administration's years. Moreover, he was charged with the
task of identifying all administrative policies in the CDBG program which
were, in his view, not unquestionably mandated by the existing statute.
Given the approach Butler had followed during his term at the agency,
and the strength of his conviction that the primary objective language in
the legislation regarding low and moderate income benefit had no
substantive meaning as an operational requirement for the program, it was
not surprising that the very first issue area addressed in his report
touched on the low and moderate income benefit guidelines. Voicing the
position held by administrators during the Ford Administration's era,
Butler concluded, in his report, that "There is no statutory requirement
that an applicant community's program, taken as a whole ... must provide a
majority of benefits to low income persons." 10
Moreover, Butler's report argued, the current system of reliance upon
low and moderate income benefit standards (of 50 and 75%) as benchmarks in
the review of local programs had led HUD field staff to make presumptive
judgements about the legitimacy of the programs localities had constructed
-judgements rooted solely in the degree to which localities directed
benefits to the poor. Not only were these presumptive judgments not
mandated by the statute, Butlers report asserted, they "may themselves be
plainly inappropriate" under the directives of the Act. 1 1 As evidence he
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cited the clause inserted in the 1978 statute which prohibited the
Secretary from disapproving an application on the basis that it gave
greater weight to anyone of the three "primary purposes" than any other,
although he failed to add the Senate crafted caveat that was appended to
that clause.
Implicit in Butler's analysis was the view that the Carter targeting
strategy not only legally could be, but appropriately should be rescinded.
As the legality of such a move to lift the targeting directives was not
contradicted by the CPD staff report, sentiment began to emerge within the
secretary's office that a change in guideline policy should be made.
As these reports were being completed, a new Assistant Secretary for
the program office was assuming his post. Reagan appointee Stephen
Bollinger, a former community development official from Columbus, Ohio
entered his position of authority holding a philosophy toward federal
programs consonant with that espoused in the Heritage Foundation report.
The consistency of Bollinger's views with those espoused in the White House
was no accident. To a far greater degree than had been the case under
earlier administrations, the Reagan White House had managed the
appointments process overall in such a way as to assure the compatibility
of the views of Reagan appointees with those held by the President himself.
As one scholar notes of the Reagan appointments process "By carefully
screening appointees for ideological consistency, the President secured
appointive executives who were, in general, dependable in their commitment
to his programs and philosophy". 1 2 Thus, to observers of HUD in
Washington, it came as no surprise that soon after his formal nomination on
March 20, 1981, Bollinger publicly stated his intention to reduce the
number of administrative requirements attached to the Community Development
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Block grant program. "CPD certainly needs to get off of the backs of
mayors and development offices," he asserted. "CPD is going on a diet." 13
With respect to the issue of program benefits for low and moderate
income residents of entitlement jurisdictions, it soon became clear that
the move toward deregulation of the program would mean reversal of the
federal role in assuring that the bulk of CDBG funds served low and
moderate income constituencies. As one of his first official acts as new
head of the CPD division, Bollinger took firm action to roll back the low
income emphasis in the program adopted during the Carter years. On May 15,
1981, Bollinger issued a new notice to the field office staff, who were in
the process of reviewing the localities' year 7 applications. The notice,
effective immediately, significantly altered the criteria they were to use
in evaluating the acceptability of grant applications.
"Local discretion and flexibility are the cornerstones of the CDBG
program," the notice stated, "Over the past few years, HUD has imposed
additional administrative requirements which have tended to reduce the
freedom of localities to decide which activities to fund ... While
comprehensive statutory and regulatory changes to reverse this trend are
being considered, several steps can be taken immediately within the
framework of existing regulations to increase local discretion and
flexibility."14
The notice retracted several of the administrative requirements that
had been added to the program during the Carter term, including those
designed to ensure geographic concentration of local efforts, and those
aimed at protecting the poor from housing displacement. But clearly the
most significant change effectuated by the notice was the dismantling of
the administrative strategy employed by the Carter administration to prod
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localities to devote a weighty share of their grant resources to serving
the needs of the poor. While HUD field staff under Embry had been
instructed to do a careful analysis of "who benefits" from grantee's
proposed programs, and to utilize percentage benefit thresholds as a means
of discerning local adherence to the redistributive mandate of the Act, the
notice was emphatic in stating "All such percentage benefit thresholds are
hereby revoked." (emphasis in the original) .1 5
It is important for the understanding of ensuing events to note that
the Bollinger notice did not, at this point in the program's history, go so
far as to instruct HUD field staff to assume a stance of complete
neutrality on the issue of "who benefits" from the local activities slated
to be financed with local block grant funds. Field staff were instructed
to conduct a general evaluation of how the needs of low-income residents
were addressed in local applications in order to identify any cases where
the composition of a local program could be construed as "plainly
inappropriate" to local low income needs. Thus for the time being, HUD
administrators took the position that the primary objective language did
have some supremacy over the other "primary purposes" of the program, and
did have the effect of imbuing HUD administrators with some obligation
(albeit a most limited one) to assess how local programs were meeting the
needs of the poor.
Nonetheless, the notice did have a profound substantive effect on
program administration. No longer would localities meeting the 75% benefit
standard be granted favored status by HUD officials, and no longer would
localities be required to pass a 50% "principally benefits" test unless
they were released from that obligation by receiving special dispensation
from the Central Office at HUD. Only the most limited assessments of how
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local programs were serving low income constituencies would now be
conducted, and only the loosest and most nebulous kind of benefit standard
(plainly inappropriate) would be applied. The message to HUD field staff
and localities in the notice was clear; federal officials were to grant
localities far greater latitude than they had been afforded in the
preceding years to decide how and upon whom, CDBG grant funds should be
spent. Only in the most egregious instances of neglect of low income
constituencies would federal grant powers be utilized to afford protections
to the poor.
The Interest Groups Respond
The change in HUD policy reflected by the notice drew mixed reactions
from HUD's constituency groups. Representatives of the Working Group for
CD Reform were understandably "horrified" to learn their hard fought gains
in securing a low-income emphasis for the program had so rapidly fallen
away. The group's allied Legal Service Task Force fired off a letter to
Assistant Secretary Bollinger vigorously protesting the administrative
change. In the letter they questioned the legality of the notice (since
the lifting of targeting percentages had put the notice at odds with the
formal 1978 version of the administrative regulations still on the books),
and requested a meeting with Bollinger to discuss their concerns.16 Acting
upon the advice of HUD's Office of General Counsel, Bollinger responded
that the action fell within the bounds of his authority. Though contrary
to existing regulatory policy, he asserted, the notice was nonetheless
consistent with HUD's interpretation of its obligations under the law.
With the demise of the Carter Administration, the Working Group had clearly
lost influence at the agency. - As a result, Bollinger declined their
request to meet.
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Reactions by other interest groups involved in program politics
further weakened the position of the Working Group leaving them isolated in
their opposition to the notice. Representatives of the National
Association of Counties registered enthusiasm for the new policy. "We're
very happy about it," their spokesman said. 17 Other groups representing
mayors and city officials (who comprised the largest grantee constituency)
were more cautious, but gave the measure a feeble nod of assent. The
National League of Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors had by this time
discovered their members had faced few of the grave difficulties they once
anticipated in complying with the Carter targeting directives. Thus for
these two groups, the May 1981 notice lifting these particular percentage
review tests occasioned neither rejoicing nor dissent. However their long-
standing advocacy for enhanced local discretion under the program
engendered a stance of general support for the new measure, because, in the
words of one mayoral lobbyist "when someone tells you they're relaxing a
requirement, you just don't say no." 1 8
As HUD officials were completing this first phase of their
deregulation strategy -- revoking the targeting initiative through new
directives to the field, HUD staff were also engaged in drafting a new bill
for the Congress to implement its deregulation philosophy through
legislative reform.
Legislative Action in 1981
The Community Development Block Grant Program had not been scheduled
for Congressional action during the 1981 session. In fact, the program had
been reauthorized for a third three-year period only four months before the
Reagan Administration took office. The 1980 reauthorization had proceeded
with little of the rancor or Congressional infighting which had marked
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legislative action on the program in earlier years. Moreover, reflecting
fundamental Congressional satisfaction with program operations, the
reauthorization process had yielded a statute virtually unchanged from that
passed in 1978. Nonetheless, the new Administration, eager to place its
legislative imprint on the program, moved quickly to develop new
legislation which would significantly alter the Title I CDBG provisions.
As was the case with the administrative notice HUD adopted in May of
1981, the new legislative proposals reflected the policy orientations
elected by advisors close to the Presidency. Acting under guidelines set
forth by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and transmitted to HUD
directly by White House counselor Edwin Meese, the new HUD officials
drafted legislation designed to "pare the [CDBG] program down to its most
essential objectives [and] to clear it of unnecessary requirements and
federal interventions ... "19 While the legislation carried over both the
Section 101 primary objective clause, and the three "maximum feasible
priority" aims, the new emphasis the bill placed on local discretion
presaged a shift in the weight which would be given to each of these
provisions. The bill HUD prepared for the Congress in many ways bore a
striking resemblance to the Special Revenue Sharing legislation originally
proposed by the Nixon Administration in 1972.
The new legislation devised by the Administration sought to strip away
virtually all the local application requirements mandated under earlier
legislation. Under the provisions contained in the bill, communities would
no longer be required to submit to HUD a detailed proposal designating the
specific activities, their locations and beneficiaries, on which that years
CDBG monies would be spent. Nor would the program require submission by
localities of a three year plan outlining the community's needs and
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objectives alongside local strategies for how these needs would be met. In
place of an application containing these items, the entitlement communities
would be required under the proposed legislation to submit only a very
general "statement of community development objectives" accompanied by
certifications that the localities were in compliance with relevant
requirements of the law. In this regard, the new proposals harkened back
to the era of the Ford Administration during which certifications were
accepted by HUD without any substantive review of their validity.
But the legislation offered by HUD officials moved beyond the approach
followed in the Ford years in its attempt to lend a true "revenue-sharing"
cast to the program. Under the legislation in the Ford era, HUD held res-
ponsibilities for reviewing and approving local grant applications. Under
the Reagan Administration proposals, HUD would be stripped of its authority
to, at the front end, approve or disapprove local grants. So long as the
required statement and certifications had been filed with the agency, grant
release was to be automatic, though HUD did retain authority to undertake
post hoc reviews and apply sanctions for local misuse of funds.
The interest groups were caught off guard by the proposal. Neither
segment of the program's interest groups had been consulted during the
drafting process or provided with copies of the legislation before it was
forwarded to the Congress. Arriving on Capitol Hill late in the
legislative cycle, the timing of the bill's introduction left groups little
time in which to formulate or transmit to Congress their views. On the
House side, the legislation arrived at the Subcommittee nearly three weeks
after interest group testimony on community development issues had been
heard. On the Senate side, the bill arrived the evening before groups were
to appear at Senate hearings, prompting letters from each of the key
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program constituency groups requesting postponement of the hearings until
each had an opportunity to review and poll their members to formulate a
Position on the bill's contents.20 Though supported by Senate Democrats,
Senate Republicans who now controlled the Committee rejected the request,
leaving groups with little opportunity to inject into Congressional debates
on the legislation, their constituencies' perspectives or policy views.
Reaction to the Administration Bill in the House and Senate
While the Administration bill received an endorsement from the
Republican minority on the House Subcommittee, it met stringent opposition
from the Democrats who held the majority position on that body. First and
foremost among the concerns voiced by Democratic leaders was the fear that
elimination of HUD's pre-grant review and approval role, and replacement of
the detailed application submission with a vague statement of local
community development objectives would serve to erode local fealty to the
programs overarching national goal. With the demise of Democratic Chairman
Thomas Ashley, the new Democratic standardbearers on the House Subcommittee
manifest far greater concern with the role of federal agents in affording
protection to local low-income constituencies; far less concern with the
provision of local discretion. In opposing the Administration's proposal,
Congressman St. Germain reflected the new position taken by House
Democrats, asserting that the Administration's bill would out "not just red
tape, but red, white and blue tape". "In essence", he argued, "it turns
[CDBG] into another revenue sharing program with few federal controls". 21
Rejecting the Administration's legislative proposal, House Democrats
succeeded in reporting out their own version of the bill; one which left
CDBG operations virtually intact.
The Administration's bill fared somewhat better on the Senate side.
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There, Republicans, who now controlled the Senate Committee, for the most
part shared the Administration's conviction that some deregulation of the
program was warranted. While they incorporated most of the provisions of
the Administration's bill into their own legislative proposal, they did
manifest some concern that the legislation not result in a strictly "hands-
off" revenue-sharing approach to the program -- an approach which they
feared would dilute programmatic emphasis on the attainment of existing
national goals. Though their bill did eliminate the detailed local
application requirements, and did strip HUD of its pre-grant approval
powers, it at the same time added back to the legislation mandates for some
citizen involvement in local CDBG efforts, and requirements for the
preparation of a housing assistance plan, albeit in less restrictive forms
than had been employed under the program to date.
More significantly, though, in an effort to alert HUD to Senate
Republican concerns that deregulation not untether the program from its
national aims, nor transform the program into a special revenue sharing
effort, the Committee Report accompanying the final Senate bill, a report,
authored by the Republican staff, contained the following qualifier:
It should be emphasized that the Committee's intent is to cause
procedural simplification rather than substantive change ... (I)n
conjunction with the simplification and restructuring of the pro-
gram, it is desirable to reaffirm the program's overall objective
contained in Section 101(c) - the development of viable urban
communities by providing decent housing and a suitable living en-
vironment, principally for persons of low and moderate income. 2 2
In the eyes of the Senate's Democratic contingent, however, these
assurances from their Republican counterparts did not go far enough.
Senate Committee Democrats were uniformly concerned that the bill, in
stripping away HUD's role in reviewing proposed expenditures, would
eliminate any effective guarantee that localities would continue to meet
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the program's national aims, in particular the aim of serving the nation's
poor. Having failed in their attempt to kill the bill in Committee by an
8-7 party line vote, the Democrats took their battle against the new
provisions to the Senate floor where Proxmire, long a staunch proponent of
the program's low and moderate income emphasis, proposed an amendment to
strike the new provisions from the legislative package.
In the lengthy floor debate on the bill, Committee Democrat after
Committee Democrat spoke out against the proposed legislative changes.
Democratic Senator Alan Cranston captured the Committee minority's concern
when he charged that "this change in the formal application procedure ...
is a perverse attempt to permit cities to avoid using CDBG funds for low
and moderate income persons as set forth in the purposes of the Act." 2 3
But Republican Senator Richard Lugar spoke on behalf of Senate Committee
Republicans against the Proxmire amendment, alleging that "the minority
misconstrues our purposes." 2 4
Consistent with the Committee majority's assumptions that the bill
would produce only procedural simplification, Senate Subcommittee Chairman
Lugar argued:
"We are saying that the application ought to be simple. It ought
to hit head on the general objectives of this legislation to help poor
people, to help provide decent housing to the poor, to focus our
objectives on those who are of poor or at best moderate income in
community development activities.
Those have been the objectives from the beginning and they are the
objectives now, unchanged. But it makes a whale of a lot of difference
how you approach that application situation ... At least some of us felt
the public said (last November) we have had enough of overregulation,
bureaucracy run amok, control on top of control and we would like
somebody to get in with the scissors and start cutting the pages out,
and that we have done." 2 5
In the end the Proxmire amendment went down to defeat by a 53-37 vote.
The Republican crafted legislation then passed the full Senate by a vote of
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65-24.
Strategic Legislative Actions in the House
The House bill, in the meantime, was following a very different
legislative path, one which would ultimately prove to dilute the influence
of its key Banking Committee actors over the legislation, and render the
Subcommittee majority's opposition to program deregulation irrelevant.
Rumors were rife on Capitol Hill that the new Administration would
attempt to circumvent the substantive legislation approved by various
Authorizing Committees within the House by seeking to fold the Adminis-
tration's legislative proposals into the House's Budget Reconciliation
bill. Though a highly irregular route for securing substantive program-
matic changes, under Congressional procedures such actions were allowed.
Congressional procedures do permit budget legislation to mandate program
changes where the changes could affect a program's budgetary outlays.
Reinforcing House Democrat's suspicions that the Administration would
attempt such a move were arguments being voiced by Administration
spokesmen that CDBG deregulation would serve to lower the program's
administrative costs.
In a tactical attempt to render acceptance of the Administration's
provisions as part of the Budget legislation more difficult, the full Bank-
ing Committee pursued a highly unorthodox tack. With the concurrence of
both Subcommittee Chair Henry Gonzalez and Committee Chair Fernand St.
Germain, the full House Banking Committee acted to remove the Subcommittee
legislation from its separate authorization track through the House. On
June 9, 1981, the House Banking Committee, on a party line vote, added its
housing and community development proposals to that chamber's Budget
Reconciliation bill.
198
Angered by the House move to eschew a separate housing authorization
process, Senate Republicans quickly followed suit. With the decision again
reflecting party-line divisions, the Senate Banking Committee voted the
very next day to add its Republican-crafted housing and community develop-
ment legislation to the Senate's Budget Reconciliation bill. The fate of
the CDBG legislation in both chambers thus came to be tied to Congressional
action on the broad-ranging contents of the massive Budget Reconciliation
package.
The House Committee's action to fold its legislation into the
reconciliation proposals had been initiated as a protective strategy,
designed to assure that the housing and community development proposals it
had accepted would be approved by the Democratic majority when the package
was considered on the House floor. But the effort backfired badly, leaving
Committee Democrats with little voice over the legislative directions
established for housing and community development programs.
On June 26, 1981, when the Budget Reconciliation bill was put forth
for a full vote on the House floor, House Republicans, joined by a series
of "Boll Weevil" Democrats, offered up a substitute version of the
reconcili-ation legislation known as the Gramm-Latta proposal. Contained
in the Gramm-Latta legislation were provisions that replaced virtually all
of the current content of the House-Committee-drafted portions of the bill
with the original proposals offered by the Administration during the first
half of the year. With respect to the Community Development Block Grant
program, the amendment contained verbatim the original Administration
proposals to convert the block grant to a kind of special revenue sharing
program -- proposals the House Banking Committee had earlier rejected in
full.
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Amidst heavy lobbying by high-ranking Administration officials,
including the President himself, a coalition of support for the Administra-
tion's version of the sweeping Budget Reconciliation package congealed.
After succeeding by a mere seven vote margin in securing a key rule change
which would allow only a single up or down vote on the entire budget
package, the coalition of House Republicans and conservative Boll Weevil
Democrats went on to approve the substitution of existing provisions with
the Gramm-Latta legislation by a similar 217-211 vote. In the yes-no vote
which followed, the Gramm-Latta legislation was accepted in the House 232-
193. The move signaled deep trouble for House Banking Committee Democrats,
who now knew they would be forced into Conference on the housing and com-
munity development issues with not their own bill but the Administration's
version in hand.
Since the full Senate had, the day prior to House action, approved its
own version of the Budget Reconciliation measure, one in which the Senate
Republicans' housing and community development proposals had been retained
intact, a Conference was needed to reconcile the provisions of the House
and Senate bills. House and Senate Committee staffers were later to
characterize the 1981 Conference as one of the most frustrating conferences
the Democrats had ever faced. 2 6
The House Democratic contingent to the Conference was lead by St.
Germain, Reuss and Gonzalez. Key leaders of the House Authorization
Committee, each stood vehemently opposed to deregulation and each had
argued in Committee against adopting any major programmatic change. Had
they carried their own Committee bill into Conference, they, with backing
from Senate Democratic conferees Proxmire and Williams, would likely have
succeeded in blocking deregulation changes in the Conference. But House
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floor actions which substituted Gramm-Latta proposals for their Committee
version of the legislation left them little room to advance in Conference
their original views. With great reluctance, House Democrats participating
in the Conference were compelled to accept virtually all the Senate bill's
CDBG provisions, which they considered a marginal improvement over the
Administration's version which had emerged from the House.
Democrats of the Conference from both chambers were highly dissatis-
fied with the final version of the legislation the Conference had produced.
Proxmire argued that inclusion of substantive program changes in the
omnibus budget legislation represented "a terrible precedent." "We're
short-circuiting the legislative process," the Senator had claimed. 27
Labeling the process through which housing and community development
amendments had been made to the legislation "a disgrace", Proxmire joined
the other Senate Democratic conferee, Senator Harrison Williams, in
refusing to sign the Conference Report.
House Democrats were similarly disgruntled. The Gramm-Latta legisla-
tion they were forced to carry to the Conference had, in their view, not
resulted from careful deliberation of the implications of policy changes
the new legislation proposed. Furthermore, the floor action which yielded
the House bill was seen as an affront to the Committee. In substituting
provisions the Committee had earlier considered and rejected, the action
stripped the Authorizing Committee of its normal prerogatives to exercise
policy control. Thus, even as the bill passed from the Conference
Committee back to the full chambers, it carried, in the eyes of key
Democratic actors a cast of illegitimacy.
House Democrats vowed to introduce legislation to rescind the CDBG
changes in the next Congressional session. In addition, one House Democra-
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tic Subcommittee staffer predicted Democrats would fight the implementation
of the provisions, particularly CDBG provisions, of the Conference bill.
Presaging future disputes over CDBG regulations linked to the new legisla-
tion, he claimed "We will use the legislative process to the maximum extent
possible ... to question the regulations that implement these changes."2 8
The full Budget Reconciliation package, of which the CDBG legislation was
now a part, emerged from the various Conferences to which its parts had
been assigned in late July. Placed before the full Congress, the resulting
statute passed both Houses on July 31, 1981.29 The Omnibus Reconciliation
Act, signed into law by President Reagan in August, represented for the
CDBG program a clear victory for the Administration's deregulation
strategies.
The Provisions of the 1981 Statute
Although Senate Republican-authored modifications to the Administra-
tion bill had led the final legislation to fall short of securing the more
ambitious, full revenue-sharing type changes the Reagan officials had
initially sought for the CDBG program, the Administration had succeeded in
altering the legislation in a manner which tilted the program more in that
direction. At least in terms of the mechanics of the grant-in-aid process,
the CDBG law now more closely resembled the original Nixon bill.
The new law softened several of the federal requirements previously
imposed upon local grant recipients, including those related to citizen
participation, and to the paperwork documentation localities had been re-
quired to submit. Localities were released from their former obligations
to submit to HUD a lengthy detailed annual application packet, containing a
three year plan for meeting local needs with CDBG resources, and a detailed
proposal specifying the particular projects (including costs, locations,
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and beneficiaries) upon which their annual grant allotment would be spent.
Instead grantees were, under the new law, required only to submit a much
more general and abbreviated document to serve as its "final statement of
community development objectives" and intended CD strategy. Alongside this
brief submission, localities were required to file signed certifications
that relevant requirements of the Act and designated civil rights legisla-
tion would be met.
Moreover, the legislation recast the role to be played by HUD offi-
cials in administering the program. While HUD had, under prior statutes,
held responsibilities for reviewing local grant applications, and approving
the release of local CDBG funds, the new Act effectively stripped HUD of
its authority to conduct pre-funding application reviews. Provided the
locality's "final statement" and certifications had been submitted to the
agency, HUD was, under the new law, to automatically release the locality's
grant allotment. Contrary to past mandates and practices, HUD's role in
the program was now confined to conducting post-hoc reviews of local
performance.
But bound up in -these modifications in the grant-in-aid process were
several significant issues regarding the nature of HUD's responsibilities
for assuring the program would continue to meet the national aims set for
it (aims left intact in the new legislation) and indeed, issues regarding
exactly how those aims were to be construed. The 1981 legislation, like
the many versions of the CDBG law which preceded it, did little to
ultimately resolve questions of HUD's substantive responsibilities for
overseeing local CDBG efforts, or to clarify Congressional intentions
regarding the seven-year CDBG goals disputes.
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Persistent Conflicts in Programmatic Aims
The Section 101(c) clause, specifying the "primary objective" of the
program to be "the development of viable urban communities by providing a
decent home and suitable living environment and expanding economic oppor-
tunities principally for persons of low and moderate income" was retained,
as it had been since the program's inception, in the Act's opening
"Findings and Purposes" section. But also carried over in the new
legislation was the operational provision which had in earlier periods been
construed as implying that there might be an alternative and broader triad
of national programmatic aims which localities might legitimately employ
CDBG funds to pursue. The new legislation reiterated, as well, in near
verbatim terms, the confusing provisions related to the maximum feasible
priority clause.
Though localities were no longer required to submit applications
specifying in detail the projects on which they intended to use CD funds,
they were still required to certify at the outset that in designing their
projected uses for their annual grant allotment, they had given "maximum
feasible priority toactivities which will benefit low and moderate income
families or aid in the prevention or elimination of slums and blight."
Alternatively, as before, localities were permitted to include in their
internal planned expenditure program, projects "designed to meet other com-
munity development needs having a particular urgency because existing
conditions pose a serious and immediate threat to the health or welfare of
the community." Thus in the new legislation both the "primary objective"
and the three aims linked to the maximum feasible priority clause were left
intact.
The continued inclusion of both these sections in the 1981 legislation
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left many questions regarding the intended relationship between these two
portions of the law, and the manner in which they were to shape HUD's
responsibilities as stewards of the programmatic effort. Moreover, defini-
tive answers to these important questions were rendered even more elusive
as a result of the reforms which altered HUD's role in the block grant
process.
One factor contributing to the atmosphere of confusion surrounding
Congressional intentions with respect to the proper relationship between
these two segments of the Act's contents was the fact that certain
legislative language adopted during the 1978 legislative session had, as a
byproduct of the elimination of HUD's application review role, been deleted
from the 1981 statutes. With elimination of segments of the law pertaining
to HUD's powers to approve or reject applications, the convoluted language
containing the only statutory reference expressly linking the single open-
ing "primary objective" to operational provisions of the law had inadver-
tently been dropped. (This was the paragraph that read "the Secretary may
not disapprove an application on the basis that [it] addresses any one of
the primary purposes [found in the paragraph containing the maximum feasi-
ble priority clause] to a greater or lesser degree than any other, except
... if the Secretary determines that the degree to which a primary purpose
is addressed is plainly inappropriate to meeting the needs and objectives
which are consistent with the community's efforts to achieve the primary
objective of the Act").
Contorted though it was, this language had lent legislative support to
the notion that the primary objective clause was in some way intended to
have substantive meaning for programmatic operations. The presence of a
reference to the primary objective in the operational provisions of the law
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had provided legislative reinforcement to an interpretation of the statute
(as had been made by Carter officials) in which the mandate to principally
benefit low and moderate income persons was intended to in some fashion
overlay local obligations to serve the three aims of the maximum feasible
priority clause. With deletion of this paragraph, the operational segments
of the law no longer contained any express reference to the singular
primary objective of the law -- a factor which would later prove to have
significance in the post 1981 guideline disputes.
Moreover, with respect to Congressional intentions regarding HUD's
revised role in overseeing local grant efforts, the 1981 legislative
machinations had done little to fully clarify the nature of HUD's new
obligations under the Act. Though Senate Republicans (who served as the
virtual sole Congressional authors of the 1981 legislation) had at the
bequest of the Administration acted to delete HUD's role in -- at the front
end -- reviewing and approving local grants, they had sought to notify HUD
officials that in so doing, they were not attempting to significantly
diminish HUD's national responsibilities for overseeing local grant
efforts, but rather to shift the point at which they were exercised to the
post-audit local performance review stage where sanctions and penalties for
inappropriate use, of grant funds were to be applied. "It should be
emphasized," the Senate Republican crafted Conference Report cautioned
"that the Committee's intent is to cause procedural simplification rather
than substantive change."
Accordingly, localities were required under the new law to submit an
annual performance report, in which they delineated the projects upon which
grant funds had been expended -- performance reports subject to a substan-
tive post-hoc federal review. Yet the sections in the 1981 law pertaining
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to HUD' s post-hoc review duties contained a curious amendment in phrase-
ology; one which served to further perpetuate confusion regarding the
character of HUD's post-audit oversight role. Under the new law, HUD
officials were now charged with determining, during the post-audit phase,
"whether the grantee has carried out [its] activities and its certifica-
tions in accordance with the requirements and the primary objectives
(plural) of this title" (emphasis added).30
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CHAPTER 8: REGULATORY ACTION AND REACTION:
PROGRAMMATIC CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION 1981-83
Changes in the Guideline Process: An Expanded Role for 0MB
The manner in which decisions regarding the content of CDBG regulations
were reached in the period following passage of the 1981 legislative
amendments reflected some significant shifts in the guideline role played by
HUD officials vis a vis other institutional actors in the government's
Executive Branch. To a far great extent than had been the case in any
earlier period of the program's history, the new regulatory decisionmaking
process reflected a greatly expanded role for officials in the President's
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
Under prior Presidential Administrations, the staff of OMB had been
afforded a role (albeit and relatively weak one) in overseeing the
development of formal regulations set forth by administrative agencies.
OMB had been charged with the task of reviewing and commenting upon the
content of proposed regulations prior to the time they were forwarded to
the Congress or published in the Federal Register.
The ostensible purpose of the OMB review was two-fold -- to see to it
that regulations proposed would not have a significant negative impact on
Executive budgetary considerations, and further, to assure that the
regulations elected by administrative agencies were not markedly
inconsistent in tone or tenor with the general governmental themes and
approaches set forth by the President. Where they found regulations to be
at odds with either budgetary or substantive Presidential aims, OMB
officials were empowered to send the regulations back to the administrative
agency with suggestions regarding how they might be altered to bring their
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content more in line with Presidential preferences.
Though this oversight role afforded OMB officials an opportunity to
leave their imprint on programmatic rules and regulations, throughout the
Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations, OMB staff had elected to exercise
their oversight authority sparingly. OMB officials rarely voiced objection
to rules proposed by HUD authorities, leaving the regulatory review process
to function more often than not, in the words of one HUD official, as a
simple "courtesy review."I Moreover, where disagreement did surface between
the two bodies over the substantive content of regulatory issuances, OMB
staff were, in the final analysis, inclined to defer to the wishes of the
administrative agency assuming the stance that agency representatives were
in a better position than they to adjudge the administrative directives
called for in any particular case. This largely deferential OMB posture
had left agency officials relatively free, under prior Administrations, to
craft approaches to the implementation of public programs largely as they
deemed fit. But with the rise to power of President Reagan, OMB's role in
the process of regulatory craftsmanship underwent radical change.
Under Reagan's Executive Order 12291, issued shortly after his
assumption of office, OMB was granted broader and weightier powers to
oversee and shape the regulatory initiatives to be employed by
administrative agencies. 2 From a stance of passivity and deference to
agency officials, OMB staff were now directed to assume a more active and
aggressive posture in the exercise of their regulatory oversight role. OMB
was now charged, by Presidential order, with keeping a tight rein on agency
rulemaking activity; with ensuring, above all, that the content of
regulatory initiatives reflected, in toto, the President's favored
approaches to policy administration. To lend weight to OMB's exercise of
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its oversight responsibilities, OMB officials were granted the authority,
under the new Executive Order, to prevent the release of any agency
regulatory issuances with which they disagreed.
OMB's Role in the Drafting of the 1982 CDBG Entitlement Regulations
The expanded regulatory oversight role provided OMB under the Executive
Order was one OMB staff pursued with great vigor, and had a powerful effect
on the way rules for the CDBG entitlement program were developed at HUD.
Throughout 1981 and 82, as HUD officials deliberated the guidelines they
would use to implement the 1981 legislative amendments, they repeatedly were
called into meetings with their regulatory overseers at OMB. During these
meetings, HUD officials were given their marching orders. If OMB was to
grant approval to the release of the entitlement regulations, HUD staff
would be expected to hit hard in crafting regulatory content on two basic
Presidential themes. 3
First, HUD officials were to place an emphasis on reducing the federal
role in program operations to the greatest degree possible. In the eyes of
the President, federal agencies in the past had all too frequently acted to
strip authority for decisionmaking from the hands of state and local
officials, in whose hands he felt programmatic decisions rightfully
belonged. Consonant with President Reagan's espoused desire to restructure
the federal system in a manner which decentralized power away from
Washington, HUD officials were (to the maximum extent permissible under
statutory edicts) to act, in regulations, to reduce the federal
government's role.
Second, in implementing legislative directives, HUD officials were to
adopt a strict "constructionist" (legalistic) approach to the interpreta-
tion of the law. OMB officials set forth the principle that where specific
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provisions of a statute were unclear, HUD's regulations were to reflect a
stance of "maximum feasible deference"4 to interpretations of those
provisions that might be made by state or local officials. In other words,
HUD was not to include in its regulatory issuances, any administrative
embellishments or even clarifying addendums to statutory language that
would have the effect of constraining local discretion in interpreting the
law. HUD was to interpret legislative provisions regarding its role as
program executor in as narrow a manner as legally possible. It was to
include in regulations provisions for the imposition of federal constraints
on the exercise of local authority only where such constraints were
absolutely, clearly and unquestionably mandated by the language of the law.
OMB Perspectives Enforced by HUD's Chief Legal Advisor
Internal enforcement of HUD's fealty to these OMB directives was
carried out during the crafting of the new CDBG guidelines by the Reagan
political appointee who now headed the HUD Office of General Counsel (the
legal advisory arm of the agency) John Knapp. In contrast to the Carter
era guideline reformulation process, in which regulatory development had
been handled in a more open and "democratic" manner [advisory input had
been sought early on from both other divisions of the agency, local
officials and constituent interest groups] the content of guidelines to be
issued in the post 1981 period was now shaped in a more closed and guarded
fashion by the hands of only a few -- Knapp, Assistant Secretary for CPD
Stephen Bollinger and a handful of senior CPD career staff. Of this small
group of internal actors, it was Knapp who would play the key influential
role.
As deliberations regarding the content of new guidelines proceeded, it
became clear that following OMB directives to the letter would lead the new
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CDBG guidelines to result once again in a radical deviation from HUD's
prior administrative practices. As this became apparent to CPD career
staff who had held their positions during earlier periods of the program's
existence, a few voiced their dissent. Such a marked shift from existing
patterns of interaction between federal and local program authorities, they
argued, would be severely disruptive to the agency's administrative efforts
-- efforts which had already been subject to tremendous instability and
confusion as a consequence of prior guideline reforms. Moreover, such a
move was in their eyes not only administratively but politically unwise.
In too drastically upsetting the carefully crafted balance between the
policy mandates for decentralization and redistribution that had emerged
during the final period of the Carter term, (a balance which for the first
time in the program's history had yielded a modicum of political
quiescence), the new guidelines HUD was moving toward adopting would
generate a firestorm in the agency's political environment, they warned.
But their arguments to proceed with caution fell on deaf ears. CDBG
regulations were to fully and unquestionably reflect the preferences held
by the President, as conveyed to the agency by their overseers at OMB.
Forging Guidelines Implementing the 1981 Statute
In addition to his formal role as head of HUD's legal advisory
division, Knapp had been designated by Secretary Pierce as HUD's
"deregulation officer" -- an informal position which lent his views
particular authority during the drafting of the new CDBG entitlement rules.
As an attorney, Knapp focused his attention (and those at CPD who worked in
tandem with him) upon a careful reading of the legal language contained in
the amended statue. 5 As a political actor -- a Presidential loyalist and
voice for OMB within the agency -- Knapp carried to his reading of the
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legislation political aims which would lead him to advance in regulations,
an interpretation of the statute in which HUD's role would be reduced to
the maximum extent legally permissible.
As Knapp and those operating under his guidance examined the
legislation as it stood in the aftermath of the 1981 amendments, three
sections of the law drew their attention. First, as had been the case in
earlier versions, the 1981 law carried over (in the Act's findings and
purposes" section) language declaring "the primary objective of this title
is the development of viable urban communities ... principally for persons
of low and moderate income."
Second, although detailed application requirements had been deleted,
localities were still required in the law to certify (before grant release)
that their projected plans for use of their grant allotment had been
designed to give maximum feasible priority to either benefiting low and
moderate income families or preventing or eliminating slums and blight, or
alternatively that they were designed to meet urgent community development
needs. And while HUD officials were no longer expected to review the
validity of local certifications, or the contents of local plans during the
application process they were required to do so during the conduct of their
post-hoc review of local performance.
While many had presumed that HUD's responsibilities for overseeing
local use of grant funds were only being shifted in time by the new
provisions, not altered in substance, the actual wording contained in the
legislation provided no clear guidance on this point. Perhaps not
surprisingly, given the idiosyncratic history of the CDBG legislation, in
this third key segment of the law - the segment specifying HUD's post-hoc
review obligations - the language of the 1981 statute contained a curious
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linguistic mutation. Under the amended provisions of the statute, the new
legislative language specified that "The Secretary shall, at least on an
annual basis, make such reviews and audits as may be necessary and
appropriate to determine ... whether the grantee has carried out (its local
program) and its certifications in accordance with the requirements and the
primary objectives (plural) of this title."6  This was the first time any
language referring to multiple "primary objectives" had ever appeared in
CDBG statutes (prior versions had referred to primary purposes, but the
primary objective itself had always stood alone and singular). And as
Senate Committee authorities would later assert, the insertion of an "s" in
the phrase "primary objectives" had been the result of an unintended
misstep in the legislative drafting process. 7
Nonetheless, this very minor alteration in the language of the
legislation afforded HUD officials in legal latitude they sought to remove
a low-income emphasis from the CDBG program and thereby free localities
from one important set of prior constraints under which they had been
compelled to operate. Although the legal logic which Knapp and his CPD
cadre elected to apply to the convoluted language of the Act was complex,
in simple terms it operated in the following way.
Since the Section 101(c) "primary objective" language was set forth in
the Act's findings and purposes" section rather than in the operational
requirements sections of the law which delineated HUD's specific
responsibilities for programmatic execution, according to legal tenets, it
fell into a kind of no man's land. Within the legal community, opinion
would be divided as to whether or not HUD would be legally compelled to
grant the phrase authoritative, substantive meaning in establishing the
regulatory framework under which the program was to be administered. Some
216
legal scholars would be inclined to assert that the contents of a statute's
"findings and purposes" section must be interpreted as bearing power over
operational provisions of an Act. They would maintain that statutes are to
be read as-a-whole, with the effect that the substance of substantive
language contained in the "findings and purposes" section must be read by
administering authorities so as to modify the meaning of the specific
operational requirements set forth in the law. But other legal scholars
would be inclined to assert an antithetical view. They would be on equally
solid legal ground in arguing that HUD could view the "findings and
purposes" section as symbolic and not substantive -- that the language of
this opening section could be ignored in setting administrative guidelines
so long as the specific provisions set forth in the statute's operational
requirements sections were in fact put into effect. This second
perspective was prominent among those sectors of the legal community who
advocated (as did OMB and Knapp) a strict constructionist approach to the
interpretation of the law.
Since the relevant operational requirements section of the 1981 Act
contained language specifying that HUD's post hoc review of local
performance was to be aimed at determining whether the local grantee had
carried out its program in accordance with the primary objectives (plural)
of the legislation, this section of the law could be read as imbuing HUD
with the express responsibility to examine only whether localities directed
their activities toward serving any one of the three aims referred to in
the section containing the maximum feasible priority clause (since these
three aims could reasonably be construed as the "primary objectives" to
which the new anomalous phrase referred). Viewed in a strict
constructionist manner, the new reference in the 1981 law to multiple
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"primary objectives" lent additional weight to an interpretation of the
law, in regulations, that would give no overriding superiority to the
program mandate of "principally benefiting" low and moderate income persons
but instead would grant localities free rein in electing which of the three
"primary objectives" it might choose to use CDBG funds to address.
The Content of HUD's Proposed Entitlement Regulations
It was almost irrelevant to the initial drafting of the regulations
what Congressional actors from either side of the aisle had had in mind in
passing the 1981 amendments with language that took the form it did.
Operating under 0MB directives to look only to the statute, no
Congressional advice in framing the new rules proposal had been sought. 8
Taken solely at face value, the ambiguous provisions of the 1981
statute provided an occasion for HUD to utilize the strict legal
constructionist approach advocated by OMB, and in so doing to accomplish
OMB's goal of reducing the federal role in the operation of
intergovernmental grants. As a result of both the ambiguity of statutory
language and OMB's predominance in the guideline development process, the
formal entitlement rules HUD proposed diverged markedly from past
approaches to the issue of redistribution vs. decentralization. Forwarded
to Congressional Committee actors for review (as required under the 7(o)
legislative review mandates enacted in 1978) and published in the Federal
Register in October 1982, the new guidelines made extensive changes in a
variety of program area. But in perhaps the most significant reform
advanced by the new regulations, the new guidelines proclaimed:
In the past, HUD reviewed each entitlement community's (planned
program) to determine whether the extent to which the (local) program as a
whole would benefit low and moderate income persons would be plainly
inappropriate (under the Act)...
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the Congress has stressed that the choice of eligible activities on
which block grant funds are to be expended represents the recipients
determination as to which approach or approaches will best serve the
primary objectives of the program. Therefore ... HUD will no longer
conduct any review of the grantee's overall program with resrct to
benefit to low and moderate income persons (emphasis added).
These changes in the guidelines HUD now proposed to employ represented
a virtual 1800 turnabout from the guideline approaches used to govern CDBG
program implementation during the Harris/Embry years. Not only would HUD
no longer apply percentage benefit standards to test localities for con-
formity with the program mandate to "principally (benefit) persons of low
and moderate income," it would no longer review how localities distributed
program benefits at all. In the approach they proposed, HUD officials
moved to expunge the redistributive mandate of the program and supplant it
with a wholehearted emphasis on local discretion and choice.
While each local activity funded with block grant resources still had
to be directed toward serving one of the three "primary objectives" of the
program (interpreted in regulation as the three aims set forth in the sec-
tion containing the maximum feasible priority clause) localities' choice
of the mix of activities they would fund was no longer required in any way
to be directed toward securing the espoused national goal of improving
living conditions for the poor. In accord with OMB edicts regarding
"maximum feasible deference" to local interpretations of the Act,
localities would now be free to approach these aims as coequal objectives-
to choose, at their discretion, which of the three "objectives" they might
wish to address. Under the new proposed rules, HUD would no longer be
afforded any basis on which to challenge a locality's internal distribution
of program benefits, even if its allocation of grant monies reflected total
neglect of the needs of the jurisdiction's poor.
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[Note: As if to add insult to injury the new regulations would inflict
on low income constituents, the guidelines further enhanced local discretion
by loosening the criteria under which projects could qualify as
"preventing/eliminating slums and blight or meeting other urgent community
development needs - a shift which would likely have the effect of inducing
an even greater deflection of local expenditures away from activities which
would benefit the poor.]
Reactions to the Proposed Guideline Changes in the 97th Congress
In light of the CDBG program's history in the Congress, wherein some
Congressional faction had always been present to urge an emphasis on its
decentralization mandate over its redistributive one, one would have
expected the new guideline proposals to engender active support from some
Congressional quarter, or at least receive a faint nod of assent. Yet each
of the four key legislative factions responsible for oversight of the
program at this point in time voiced serious objections to the new
administrative measures -- objections centered largely around HUD's
assertion that it no longer would conduct for local CDBG programs any
overall low income benefit review. While HUD officials had expected to
obtain waivers to the Congressional regulatory review period (which delayed
regulations for 35 days of continuous Congressional session before they
could be put into effect)_ they had clearly misconstrued Congressional
sentiment, as each of the four factions rejected the waiver request.
House Republican Subcommittee leaders privately voiced to agency
officials their concern that the new regulations swung too far in the
direction of downplaying the prior emphasis on low income constituencies. 10
But it was on the Democratic side of the House that opposition to HUD's
regulatory issuance was most vitriolic and intense. Having stood staunchly
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opposed to the legislative reforms adopted over their objection in 1981,
the new guideline proposal was seen by House Democrats as confirmation of
their worst fears about the 1981 amendments -- that they would serve to
transform the program into no more than a revenue sharing initiative,
emphasizing local discretion at the expense of the poor.
Ironically, HUD's proposal would likely have met with acceptance from
former House Subcommittee leaders -- Democratic Chairman Thomas Ashley and
ranking minority member Garry Brown. (Both had in 1978 asserted the view,
albeit unsuccessfully, that the three components of the maximum feasibility
priority clause were intended to serve as "coequal" programmatic aims.)
But by 1982 neither held positions in the Congress. Replacing Ashley as
both Chair of the Subcommittee and spokesman for its Democratic majority
was Representative Henry Gonzalez, who held a most contrary vision of the
CDBG Act's requirements and intent.
Although Gonzalez had served under Ashley on the Subcommittee both at
the time of and after the passage of the original 1974 Act, he had never
truly shared Ashley's view of the program's basic character, and had from
time to time voiced his dissent. To Gonzalez, the chief overriding purpose
of the program from its inception was to enable localities to undertake a
diverse array of urban projects which would principally serve the nation's
poor; the proper role of federal authorities to impose sufficient federal
checks on local behavior to assure that that occurred. 1 1
While Gonzalez had been but one small voice in the program's earlier
periods (one overridden by Ashley's weighty rule over the Subcommittee) by
1982, many who originally shared and supported Ashley's views were gone.
Nearly half the Subcommittee Democrats had been elected in 1980; their
views shaped by the unsuccessful battle against program deregulation in
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1981. Moreover, many veterans of earlier periods now lent their support to
Gonzalez's view. According to a key Democratic Subcommittee aide, the
support "was not the result of Gonzalez's heavy hand; he did not operate
that way. It reflected a real depth of feeling on the part of Committee
Democrats on this issue". 1 2 Buoyed by the strong backing his view received
from his House peers, Gonzalez wasted no time in conveying, both publicly
and privately, House Democrat's vigorous opposition to HUD's new rules.
An Escalating HUD/House Leadership Dispute
The opening shots in this new skirmish over regulations were leveled on
the editorial pages of the New York Times. In response to a published
letter from Assistant Secretary Bollinger in which he (Bollinger) sought to
dispel criticism of agency actions by maintaining that HUD fully expected
that localities would continue to meet the Act's primary objective, even in
the absence of a mandated federal compliance review, Gonzalez launched a
stinging attack. In his published retort, Gonzalez accused HUD of
willfully undermining the prospects for achievement of the Central
legislative goal of the program, and publicly charged HUD officials with
negligence of their responsibilities under the law. Labeling the issue as
one of "grave significance to the Congress," Gonzalez asserted in no
uncertain terms "It is not enough that the Administration 'expects' that
the primary objective will continue to be met by communities, it has a
legal obligation to issue regulations that assure they (sic) will be met." 13
Moreover, lest the vehemence of House Democratic objections to the new
guidelines still be unclear at HUD headquarters, Gonzalez followed up this
public action with a letter sent directly to HUD Secretary Samuel Pierce.
The proposed regulations, Gonzalez charged in the correspondence, "fail in
major ways to implement the intent of Congress -- that the CDBG program
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used to principally benefit low and moderate income families."14 It is very
important, the Subcommittee Chair stressed in his letter "that substantial
revisions (to the CDBG regulations) be made."
Gonzalez's letter went beyond voicing objection to HUD's proposal to
delineating quite specifically the "substantial revisions" the Subcommittee
would seek in the new regulations. In so doing, the Gonzalez letter
reflected quite concretely their vision of the intent and requirements of
the CDBG law. While several items were mentioned, two fundamental changes
emerged as the absolute baseline minimum House Democrats would insist upon
if they were to grant the waiver allowing immediate effectuation of new
program rules.
First, in the eyes of House Democrats, it was essential that HUD
acknowledge in its guidelines both the primacy of the primary objective
over the other three aims cited in the Act, and HUD's responsibility to
monitor localities to see that their program's served that overarching
goal. In practice, HUD was informed, this meant restoring a federal review
of how low income persons were served by local expenditures, and the
rendering of an annual determination as to whether each localities'
program, taken as a whole, principally benefit low and moderate income
groups as stipulated in the primary objective of the Act.
In a second concession House Democrats sought for the new regulations,
the specific administrative strategy HUD was to employ in making a
determination of compliance with the "principally benefits" mandate was
concretely spelled out. House Democrats rejected the idea of leaving
compliance determinations to the arbitrary judgement of HUD field staff.
HUD would be expected to utilize in its review process a standardized low
income benefit test. In judging whether a grant recipient had complied
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with the primary objective to a degree sufficient to avoid financial
penalty, HUD was to utilize a uniform "majority of funds" standard. "The
Department (is to) consider the primary objective of the Act to be met,"
the Subcommittee's letter stated "if a majority of the grantees funds are
used ... (for) activities that benefit low and moderate income families." 15
In effect the position taken by the Subcommittee majority bore great
resemblance to that advanced in regulations during the Embry/Harris year.
Though no preferential treatment would be afforded localities who earmarked
75% of their grant for low income residents, a minimum standard threshold
of redistribution would be administratively required of localities under
the Gonzalez regulatory plan.
HUD officials were perhaps understandably resistant to the idea of
employing a majority-of-funds test for compliance, in light of prior
programmatic conflicts over how and whether percentage standards could be
used. (Although even at this late date the extent to which the outcome of
the 1978 battles precluded HUD use of the majority of funds criterion was
subject to dispute). Yet the intransigence of HUD's position in rejecting
all aspects of the Gonzalez proposal-including its refusal to restore
clear and substantive benefit review procedures of any sort in actuality
had a far deeper root in other sources.
In the months immediately following the October 1982 rules proposal,
it was the weight of the strict constructionist approach to law OMB had
prescribed to govern rulemaking which led HUD officials to be markedly
unconciliatory in meetings with their House Democratic opponents. Knapp
and others operating under his direction repeatedly informed Gonzalez's
emissaries that neither a federal review for compliance with the primary
objective nor a majority of funds test for local programs was specifically
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mandated in the operational requirements sections of the statute. 16
Employing legalistic arguments as a weapon in the burgeoning political
dispute, their reminded agents of the House majority that HUD could and
would, despite Congressional objection, consider themselves bound to do no
more than was specified in the law during their routine oversight review --
"to determine whether the grantee has carried out (its program) in
accordance with the primary objectives of (the Act)."
Reactions in Senate Chambers
Senate Democrat's longstanding advocacy of a targeted low-income
oriented approach to the program rendered them similarly hostile to the new
rules proposal -- though having fallen to minority party status in 1980,
they were even less-well-positioned than their House counterparts to exert
through their oversight functions any significant HUD policy control.
Nonetheless, seeking to make use of all available tools at their disposal
to induce HUD to alter its stance, ranking majority member Donald Riegle
fired off a letter to Secretary Pierce on the Committee minority's behalf.
Informing Pierce that they were rejecting HUD's request for a review-period
waiver, Riegle alleged the regulations were both "inconsistent with the law
and (its) legislative intent."1 7 The most serious transgression which
prompted the allegation, Riegle indicated
"stem(s) primarily from the Department's decision to eliminate
any review ... for overall benefit to low and moderate income
persons, despite a clear statutory mandate that the CDBG program
principally benefit lower income persons." 1 8
Riegle went on to stress the 1978 Congressional actions rejecting the
"coequality" principle and reprinted the Section 101(c) primary objective
section, underscoring the principally for low and moderate income persons
phrase. And while Riegle did not specifically advocate use of a majority-
of-funds standard he did seek restoration of some type of an overall
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"principally-benefits"-oriented test. Though he advised Pierce to withdraw
the regulations "to bring them into compliance with the law," Senate
Democrats -- now at the bottom of the Congressional pecking order --
received no more than an acknowledgement their objections had been
received.
The Senate Republicans' 'Response
From HUD's vantage point, perhaps the most significant adverse
reaction to the new CDBG guideline proposal emanated from the Senate
Republican side of Capitol Hill. Senate Republican Committee members (led
by such staunch Administration supporters as Jake Garn and Richard Lugar)
had forged a close alliance with HUD officials, and had originally
championed the legislative drive to pass deregulatory CDBG amendments in
1981. Moreover, the irregularities in the legislative process which tied
the 1981 CDBG amendments to the Omnibus Reconciliation Act's passage had
left Senate Republicans the virtual sole Congressional authors of the 1981
statutory reforms. In light of both of these factors, one would have
expected little animosity to develop over the new regulations between HUD
rulemakers and their Senate Republican partners. Yet, in fact, quite the
opposite occurred.
HUD officials had failed to consult with Senate Republicans as the new
rules were being drafted -- presuming that, having supported the 1981
deregulation initiative, they would concur with the lifting of low income
constraints on localities via the new program rules. But as soon became
clear to HUD officials, when it came to the redistributive mandate of the
program, and HUD's responsibilities with respect to its attainment, Senate
Republicans held a vision of the CDBG legislation more closely aligned to
the position of their Democratic opponents than to that of HUD.
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In pushing the legislative deregulation package, the Senate majority
had sought to reduce existing paperwork requirements and to eliminate an
application process which they agreed with HUD officials had become unduly
burdensome on localities. But in altering the legislative provisions in
1981, one thing they claimed never to have intended to do was to diminish
the power over program operations of the primary objective of the Act. In
the words of one key Republican staff member:
Having asked (HUD) early on (in 1981) whether the procedural
changes were going to mean any difference in the substance of
the program, and having gotten such ready assurance that it
would not, it was a real surprise, then to find this regulatory
proposal laid out in such a way that seemed to be so totally at
odds with (those assurances). 1 9
The Senate majority's deep opposition to the new rules was rooted
virtually into toto in their objection to HUD's lifting of the federal low-
income benefit review. Angered by what they saw as a betrayal of prior
understandings, and convinced HUD's removal of low-income benefit
obligations went beyond the terms of the 1981 Act, the Senate Committee
Republicans adopted a remarkably public and hostile stance toward the 1982
guideline proposal.
In a formal letter to Secretary Pierce, Committee Chairman Garn
charged the regulations "do not reflect the policy intent of Congress" and
"vary widely from the letter and spirit of the legislation." 2 0 Denying
HUD's request for a review-period waiver, Garn conveyed the Senate
Republicans' belief that HUD had exceeded its legal authority, stating "I
strongly urge you to withdraw and redraft with proposed regulations to make
only those procedural changes ... which were adopted by Congress in 1981 ."21
Even more surprising than the strong language employed by their former
Congressional allies was the unconciliatory nature of HUD's response. In
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meetings with Garn's agents, HUD cited as justification for their actions
statutory language stipulating they were to assess how localities conformed
with the now-plural primary objectives on the law. Informed by Garn's staff
that the insertion of an "s" resulted from a flaw in the drafting process
and that there had been "absolutely no sense (on the part of any Committee
Republican) that in adding the "s" we were somehow changing the rules of
the game on this issue", HUD officials simply stated that that view was not
expressly spelled out in the law. 2 2
Marshalling yet other evidence that HUD's stance was inconsistent with
Congressional intentions, Republican agents cited language from the 1981
Conference Report accompanying the legislation specifying "It should be
emphasized that the Committees intent is to cause procedural simplification
rather than substantive change," and language expressly reaffirming "the
program's overall objective ... the development of viable -urban communities
.. principally for person's of low and moderate income." But HUD was
immovable, reiterating that "the Conference Report does contain some
guidance... but it ain't the law." 23
The posture taken by HUD officials in dealings with all the Committee
players (even their Senate Republican allies) was a rigid and dogmatic one.
Faithful to OMB's directives, they took the stance that what each of the
factions was seeking in some form -- an overall review for conformity with
the Act's redistributive mandate -- was not expressly delineated in the
statute. If Congress wished to change the statute, fine; but until then,
HUD intended to rely fundamentally on the approach to program
administration set forth in the proposed rules.
The Interest Groups Realign
The major players in the 1982-83 guideline battles were Congressional
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members, angered at HUD's "impertinence" in suggesting that they had little
right (short of statutory redrafting) to try to influence how HUD
implemented the CDBG legislation in its rules. Yet as became clear in the
aftermath of the 1982 rules issuance, a noteworthy shift in the alignment
of key interest groups on CDBG issues had occurred. Though interest group
influences were not the prime motivating factor behind Congressional
opposition to HUD's actions, neither were they wholly irrelevant to the
ultimate outcome of this round of programmatic conflict, for the altered
stances taken on the part of key HUD constituencies yielded for the first
time in the early 1980's a rough convergence of constituent opinion on
regulatory matters -- one that facilitated later Congressional action to
compel HUD to make significant changes in the CDBG regulations.
When the 1982 rules proposal was issued, the low income constituencies
of the program were predictably outraged, and deluged HUD offices with
letters of dissent. While they objected to dozens of items in the new HUD
guidelines, deletion of the "principally benefits" review drew the broadest
and most severe attacks. 2 4 Terms like "callous disregard for the nation's
neediest" and "wholesale abrogation of federal responsibility" peppered
their letters of response. And quite uniformly, the charge was leveled
that HUD was in defiance of Congressional intent in passing the 1981 law.
In ceding such great discretion to local officials, and so radically
reducing federal constraints, the poverty coalition argued, enhanced local
flexibility would only come at the cost of expanded local negligence of the
needs of the urban poor.
In light of these organizations' historical posture on targeting
questions, their opposition to HUD's rules was wholly predictable. Yet not
so predictable was the reaction received from the poverty coalition's past
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adversaries -- interest groups representing local officials and mayors.
Though in the past the local officials' lobbies had vigorously promoted the
cause of enhanced local discretion, and had done battle to avert the
imposition of targeting directives during the Harris-Embry term, they now
took a stance in opposition to the greater flexibility being promised them,
and voiced strong objection to HUD's version of the new CDBG rules.
The U.S. Conference of Mayors forwarded a letter to Pierce stating the
Conference "opposes strongly HUD's published intention not to conduct an
overall (low income benefit) review." 2 5 Likewise the National League of
Cities severely criticized HUD's position, arguing they were "concerned
about underregulation as well as overregulation in the CDBG program".2 6 And
the most die-hard opponent of earlier targeting initiatives, the National
Association of Counties -- even while conceding "NACo certainly supports
maximizing local flexibility" -- went on to assert localities should be
subjected to a program-as-a-while "principally benefits" test. 27  (Moreover,
similar letters of dissent were received from local officials throughout the
country, suggesting these groups were not significantly out-of-tune with
their constituent's desires).
Compared with earlier periods, these responses reflected a surprising
and significant turnabout in these groups' stances on issues of
decentralization vs. redistribution under the program. Though prior
proponents of relatively unfettered local flexibility, these groups now
actively sought the imposition of federal restraints designed to enforce
local fealty to the redistributive aim of the law.
In fairness, it is.-likely that some members of these organizations had
always favored some low-income targeting restrictions, despite the public
protestations of the interest groups who purportedly spoke on their behalf.
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As Frieden and Kaplan had observed, some mayors see federal restrictions as
performing a useful political function -- enabling them to serve their
neediest populations (as they wish to do) while deflecting pressures from
politically stronger constituents by claiming they are forced to target as
a result of federal rules. 2 8 While this may account in part for their
actions during this period, key actors from the local officials' lobby
suggest some even weightier explanatory variables lay behind this apparent
shift in public posture toward what constituted appropriate HUD CDBG rules.
During the Reagan term, relations between the interest groups and HUD
officials had deteriorated markedly. In a deliberate effort to facilitate
advancement of the President's agenda, political appointees at the agency
had launched a concerted drive to insulate the CD program office from
external political pressures, with the result that interest groups found
themselves closed out of deliberations over administrative issues and
legislative initiatives to a degree unprecedented in the past. Not only
were groups denied an opportunity to offer meaningful advice or input
regarding programmatic issues, but even information about the
Administration's plans for new policy directions was withheld until
presented publicly as a virtual fait accompli. 2 9 So stringent were controls
over release of information, and so restricted was formal access to program
career staff with whom they had historically worked, that some program
staff resorted to holding clandestine meetings with interest group agents
in restaurants and hotel lobbies to deliver even the most basic information
on developments within the agency.
While the offense groups like the NLC, the USCOM and others took at
being excluded from the agency contributed to their willingness to publicly
take HUD to task, in and of itself, it was unlikely to have produced the
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significant modification in their stance on CD regulations that was
observed. But the atmosphere of suspicion bred by their exclusion, coupled
with the prevailing budgetary politics of the day, combined to spark a
deliberate shift in their position, leading them to now vigorously urge
that some federal targeting restrictions be reimposed.
The Impact of Budgetary Politics
Prior to 1981, the CDBG program had enjoyed consistently escalating
levels of financial support (see Table 8-1). Between fy 1975 and fy 1980
the overall CDBG budget (of which 80% was statutorily earmarked for the
entitlement portion of the program) rose from $2.43 billion to a peak of
$3.75 billion. Although in the final period of the Carter term, inflation
had begun to erode the real purchasing power of these grant funds, in
nominal terms, the CDBG budget had fared better than many other domestic
programs during this era, remaining at what was basically a nominal study-
state level of $3.7 billion dollars a year between fy 1979 and fy 1981. In
the early years of the Reagan Administration, however, concern with the
rising federal deficit served to significantly alter the climate of
budgetary politics on Capitol Hill.
TABLE 8-1
CDBG PROGRAM FUNDING BY FISCAL YEAR
(In Billions of Dollars)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
$2.433 $2.802 $3.248 $3,600 $3,750 $3.752 $3.695 $3.456 $3.456*
ean additional $1 .0 billion dollars was added to the CDBG budget in
fy 83 for a one-time emergency jobs program effort, but the routine
level of support remained at $3.456 billion.
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1984
Consolidated Annual Report to Congress on Community
Development Programs (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1984),
p. 3.
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During the 1981-82 period, the Reagan Administration's drive to slash
national non-defense expenditure levels had led to the elimination of many
federal domestic programs altogether, and the infliction of deep budgetary
cutbacks in those that remained. Relatively peaking, the CDBG program
fared well during this initial period, suffering a reduction of only $239
million in appropriated funds; a reduction of less than 6.5% from the prior
fy 81 amount. Though a victory of sorts for urban areas, local officials
were well aware that OMB Director David Stockman had favored elimination of
the program and as a consequence were increasingly concerned with sustaining
levels of support for the program within the Congress. Some of the mayoral
lobbyists had come to believe that Congressional reluctance to extract even
deeper cuts from the program emanated from legislators' acceptance, in
principle, of the need to protect those programmatic efforts which served
the nation's poor. As this belief gained currency within the network of
local officials and their interest group representatives, many began to
harbor suspicions that the deregulation strategy Reagan officials at HUD
were now pursuing was actually only a part of a much broader, clandestine
political plan. By reducing the emphasis on low-income targeting under the
program, and otherwise seeking to refashion operations to stress special
revenue sharing features of the grant, they began to believe, Administration
officials were strategically seeking to undermine the program's identity --
paving the way for its later elimination on the grounds that this was merely
a revenue sharing program (serving primarily local not national purposes)
and that there simply were no longer any excess federal revenues to be
shared. 3 0 Speculation regarding this long run strategy was further fueled
when in January 1983, the Administration advocated (though unsuccessfully) a
plan to consolidate General Revenue Sharing and CDBG.
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Interestingly enough, the issues lying just below the surface during
this phase of the guideline controversies were precisely those that had
been raised by the Senate during the original deliberations over the
program's form and substance in 1974. Did the establishment of a national
program require, as justification, achievement of specific compelling
national goals? Was the provision of highly-flexible, revenue sharing-type
funds to localities simply too frivolous a use of scarce federal resources?
While the relative prosperity of the early 1970's rendered answers to these
questions clouded at the time of the Act's original passage, they moved
steadily into clearer focus in the recessionary atmosphere of 1982.
Mired in an atmosphere of frenzied budget cutting activity, local
officials grew increasingly fearful that enhanced local discretion might
come at the expense of the program. Pointing out that General Revenue
Sharing had not had a funding increase since 1976, while CDBG had registered
overall at least a modest gain, one interest group lobbyist explained "the
mayors are convinced, and I think rightly so that their (Congress's) support
for the CD program is because it is targeted... if there are requirements
that nobody is checking, why the heck should they (continue to) fund this
program?" 31 Another representative from a different branch of the local
officials' lobby expressed the fear that were they to support the effort to
lift the targeting regulations "we (would be) playing into the hands of
those who wanted to eliminate the program." 3 2 Increasingly then, local
officials felt the need to sacrifice some of the flexibility they had
valued, in order to preserve a strong programmatic and budgetary defense.
Thus while they earlier had sought greater freedom, they now sought the
reinstatement of at least some minimal federal targeting restraints --
restraints they might later offer as evidence of the program's inherent
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national value. As a consequence, the historical cleavages in the program's
constituency now faded. The traditional adversaries in the interest group
network now moved toward greater unity, as both low income advocates and
mayoral lobbyists repudiated the co-equality principle reflected in HUD's
regulations and called for restoration of a federal low-income benefit test.
Congressional Actions in the 99th Congress
As is evident from the activities described in this chapter, during the
1982-83 period, the issue of low-income targeting vs. local flexibility had
once again become the central programmatic issue, eclipsing all others
as the focus of the intensifying regulatory dispute. Yet in stark contrast
to earlier eras of the program's history, the external actors now manifest
a high degree of consensus regarding the supremacy of the primary objective
as a mandate to rule HUD's strategies for implementing the CDBG law. In
light of the near-universal objections now voiced by key constituents and by
all four Congressional oversight factions responsible for the legislation,
one might have anticipated from HUD a major reformulation of its position.
Yet between October 1982 and February 1983, no genuinely significant shift
in HUD's posture on the regulations had occurred. As the 99th Congress
convened in January, Congressional leaders from both the House and Senate
Committees were returned to their posts, portending continuation of the
battles begun in October and rough road for HUD officials in the
Congressional session that lay ahead.
As with interest groups, relations between HUD and the Congress had by
this time reached a low point, leaving HUD virtually without allies on
Capitol Hill. Committee members in both the Republican Senate and the
Democratic House had grown increasingly outraged at HUD's intransigence,
and increasingly gravely offended that meetings they had intended as
235
negotiating sessions had so consistently deteriorated into occasions for
Knapp and others to "lecture" Congressional members on the lawmaking
process and the legalisms involved in the CDBG case.
It soon became clear to Committee members that neither denial of the
regulatory review period waiver, not direct warnings to HUD that the
regulations were in defiance of the intent of Congress had had their
desired impact. Out of frustration, Committee members began to urge that
more stringent actions be taken to assure the regulations would not be
permitted to take effect. As one Republican staff member asserted "(we)
didn't want to beat HUD over the head entirely (on this issue) but it just
got to a point where it didn't seem HUD was listening to any reason at
all."33
One possible course of action for the Congress was to promote passage
of a resolution of disapproval of the regulations, as provided under the
(7)o legislative regulatory review procedures added to the CDBG Act in 1978.
And in both the House and Senate Committees, serious discussion about
introducing such a resolution ensued. Though there was considerable
sentiment in favor of launching just such an initiative, ultimately both
Committees dropped plans for its pursuit.
For the Senate Committee, this would have been an unprecedented course
of action, for never before had the Committee seen need to resort to so
confrontational a measure to resolve a regulatory dispute. Moreover, there
was some concern on the part of key Senate leaders Lugar and Garn about the
Republican Senate being seen to "slap the hand" of the President in so
public a way.34 And while the Democratic House Committee had no such
reservation abut taking this action, questions regarding the
constitutionality of the procedures proved of central concern.
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Knapp had informed Gonzalez through Subcommittee staffers that he
considered the legislative veto unconstitutional and would not deem the
agency bound to respond to such actions - at least until the Supreme Court
ruled on a legislative veto case. Uncertain whether the resolution would
receive tandem support in the Senate, and concerned that an adverse Supreme
Court ruling would send them back to "square one", the House Committee
ultimately declined to report out the resolution it was considering. [And,
in fact, their concerns were well-founded, for less than six months later,
the Supreme Court ruled the legislative veto unconstitutional in the Chada
case.]
With some reluctance all Congressional factions came to the conclusion
that they would be forced to redraft the legislation. Though time
consuming, and fraught with the potential problems of both proprietary
House-Senate battles over the wording of particular provisions, and of
entanglement with political conflict regarding other elements of the
legislative package, Congressional members were firm in their conviction
that legislative action was now required. If statutory reform was what HUD
was demanding if it was to change it regulatory stance, statutory reform
was what it would get, whether or not it like the final outcome.
HUD's Gesture Toward Conciliation
An eleventh hour concession by HUD at the end of February did little to
stave off further action in the Congress. In a newly drafted guideline
proposal to the Congress, HUD offered to reinstate a "principally benefits"
federal review. Under the compromise plan they fielded, HUD officials
still rejected use of an absolute majority-of-funds low income benefit
standard, but offered to use it as a benchmark for a "safe harbor" benefit
test. If a locality devoted a majority of funds to low-income benefit
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activities, it could be considered in the "safe harbor" -- its program
deemed acceptable and exempt from further benefit compliance reviews. If
it did not, its program would be subject to closer federal scrutiny. While
this proposal may well have been more favorably received in an earlier
period, it now met with a skeptical Congress's eye. Pressed by
Congressional members to delineate what minimal level of redistribution
would be acceptable upon "close scrutiny", HUD agents demurred, asserting
that in keeping with a block grant approach, that determination would
depend on the particular local case. But such vagueness was now
unacceptable to the alienated majority of Congressional actors. As one
staff member related "we felt they were saying 'trust us' ... but too much
had transpired for use to be willing to leave things in their hands."3 6 In
the eyes of the Congress, HUD's last ditch compromise offer was seen as a
classic case of "too little, too late."
Legislative Reform: A Move Toward Resolving the Guideline Controversies
By early 1983, then, two basic factors propelled the legislative
process -- the alienation external players felt at HUD officials'
fundamentally unresponsive posture (linked in large part to their control by
OMB) and the rising concern manifest both among interest groups and now the
Congress that there was need to statutorily clarify and strengthen the
program's redistributive mandate as a shield against future moves to
eliminate the program. While it is likely that some Congressional action to
force change in HUD's regulatory position would have occurred even had prior
interest group cleavages persisted, the softening of constituent differences
greatly eased Congress's moves to legislatively resolve the ten year old
guideline disputes.
In contrast to the 1977-78 legislative period, the differences of
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opinion among Congressional factions were now greatly diminished. No one
sought to advance the idea of coequality among low income benefit, slums and
blight and urgent needs components, or to stress the special revenue-sharing
principle of unfettered local choice. Instead, there was broad and deep
consensus within the key Congressional Committees regarding the overriding
importance of the Act's primary objective and the attendant
responsibility of the federal government to enforce local adherence to that
aim. But as if to underscore the difficulties involved when Congress is
forced to provide the specificity of regulations as part of legislative
text, differences surfaced between the House and Senate over precisely what,
in administrative terms, this agreed-upon charge to HUD officials truly
meant.
Both Committees quickly reported out their own versions of new CD
legislation, versions which passed their respective chambers with
significant support from their membership as a whole. Of the two versions
the House's was clearly the more exacting measure.
Under the House bill, the amount of redistribution HUD would require of
each grant recipient was no longer left open to question -- a uniform,
specific national benefits standard was statutorily prescribed. 3 7 Each
locality would be required to demonstrate, on an annual basis, that at
least 51% of its yearly grant allotment had been devoted to CD activities
that benefit low and moderate income groups. And HUD was expressly charged
in the legislation with responsibility for assuring as part of its yearly
post hoc review of local performance, that each locality funded had passed
the 51% benefit test.
Moreover, reflecting concern that HUD might seek to undermine the
standard through use of liberal counting measures, the bill was
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extraordinarily specific in delineating not only the standard and the
administrative process to be followed but also the counting rules HUD was
to utilize in executing the benefit test. On the whole, the legislative
counting rules were quite stringent -- more so than the counting rules that
had been employed administratively during the Harris-Embry term.
Especially in light of the fact that the 51% standard would have to be
met in each program year, without exception, the counting rules would
significantly constrain the options available to many localities seeking to
pass the annual compliance test. Appropriately so, the House actors felt.
But the Senate was more wary of the stringency and rigidity inherent in
the House approach. Though they shared with their House colleagues and
belief in the necessity of establishing, once and for all, the clear
superiority of the Act's primary objective, and of reinstating a federal
review for compliance with this overriding programmatic aim, they differed
in their assessment of where to draw the line between targeting and
flexibility, as principles molding the administrative process under law.
Many felt the block grant character of the grant instrument demanded
greater flexibility than the House version provided, to afford HUD some
latitude to take into account variations in local conditions and pressing
community needs. As a result, they sought a less stringent set of
targeting provisions.
The Senate bill declined to prescribe specific counting rules and
sought a looser, though still mandatory, low income benefit test. 3 8 Under
the bill's provision, localities were not required to adhere to an annual
51% low income benefit standard, but instead to demonstrate to the
satisfaction of HUD agents, that their use of funds, over a three year
period "principally benefit" low and moderate income groups.
240
From Dispute Over Detail to Compromise Resolution
It was uncommon to find Congressional actors taking strong and
assertive postures regarding what typically would be viewed as the
"minutiae" of governmental policy -- especially since there were dozens of
broader and more central issues in contention in the larger housing/
development legislative package to which the CDBG amendments were attached.
But by now, HUD's regulatory unresponsiveness had forced such prolonged
attentiveness in the Congress to programmatic administrative particulars
that each Committee felt it had a proprietary claim to authorship of the
operational details in the new Act. Thus disputes ensued between House and
Senate actors over which version of the CD amendments best reflected both
the inherited primary objective mandate and the flexibility due localities
under block grants -- disputes which dimmed the prospects for legislative
action.
As the 1983 Congressional session moved into its final months before
adjournment, however, the desire to bring final closure to the guideline
controversies ultimately overrode these proprietary impulses. Congressional
members were painfully aware that for a period of nearly ten years since
the Act's original passage, a disproportionate share of both agency and
Congressional resources had routinely been absorbed by the persistent
regulatory conflicts -- conflicts rooted in the imprecision of the
provisions of the CDBG Act. Congressional members did not relish the idea
of prolonging the controversies and forcing the expenditure of even greater
time and energy on regulatory wrangling as they most certainly would be
compelled to do in the Congressional session that lay ahead.
Moreover, there was fear that Congressional stalemate on the CDBG
provisions would wrongfully be construed as tantamount to endorsement of
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the existing CDBG statute, and vindication of HUD's posture that -- in the
absence of clear, statutorily prescribed directives -- it was permissible
to deny the primary objective any superiority (in regulations) over the
other three aims contained in the Act. Mindful that, in contrast to
earlier periods, Congressional members were now in basic agreement that
redistribution was to be afforded dominance over local discretion as a
programmatic mandate, they did not wish to permit HUD the opportunity to
ignore Congressional consensus on this fundamental issue as a consequence
of their failure to resolve more petty differences over precisely how a
test for local compliance with the primary objective was administratively
to be done.
As a result, in the atmosphere of late 1983, tenacity gave way to
compromise on the CDBG provisions to be advanced in the larger housing
bill. In the version the House and Senate Committees jointly offered for
floor consideration, the House prevailed on use of a benefit standard, the
Senate on the period afforded localities in which to meet it.
Under the compromise bill's provisions, a new test for compliance with
the primary objective was statutorily mandated, as were the particulars of
the compliance test. Each locality would be required to demonstrate that
at least 51% of its funds had been utilized for activities benefiting low
and moderate income persons, but each was permitted to meet the new
national benefit standard over a period of three years (allowing annual
variation so long as the three year average was above 51%). And HUD was
expressly charged in the legislation with responsibility for assuring each
grant recipient met the uniform 51% benefit test.
Moreover, the bill did prescribe the specific counting rules HUD was to
utilize in making its determination of compliance, though they were now
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softened to conform to the less stringent benefit-attribution methodology
employed earlier during the Embry-Harris term. But on the whole, the
legislation was extraordinarily prescriptive, containing the kind of detail
one would expect to find not in legislation but in procedural administra-
tive handbooks. Clearly, in 1983, the Congress was unwilling, with respect
to treatment of this central programmatic issue, to leave anything open to
chance.
Throughout the ten year history of this major national grant
initiative, Congressional irresolution regarding the precise balance to be
afforded the diverging CDBG mandates for redistribution and decentralization
had persistently served to shift battles over policy issues from legislative
to bureaucratic regulatory turf. The result was exceptionally intense and
protracted political conflict focused on the typically more mundane
questions of what constituted appropriate programmatic guidelines to govern
implementation in the CDBG case. Moreover, the regulatory resolutions
reached at various points in the program's history were rendered no more
than uneasy settlements, readily dissolved by the entry of new regulatory
masters who had a different view of the legislation's meaning, and
considered themselves unbound by the discretionary accommodations reached in
the past. The toll legislative ambiguity had extracted on the program by
1983 was significant -- ten years of rampant instability in guideline
outcomes, leaving tumult, confusion and eroded confidence in its wake.
Mindful of this, the House and Senate sought to write the provisions of
the 1983 legislation in such a level of detail that ensuing guideline
activities would be confined to little more than transferring legislative
passages into regulatory text. With the passage of these amendments to the
prior version of the Housing and Community Development Act, amendments
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adopted and signed into law in November 1983, the regulatory controversies
which had so plagued the CDBG program, even into its maturity, had
legislatively been laid to rest. 3 9
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CHAPTER 9: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS:
"POST POLICYMAKING" POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY ACTIVITY
Upon successfully securing passage of the legislation which created the
CDBG program in 1974, Congressional authors were led to predict that history
would prove theirs to be the most noteworthy legislative action in the field
of urban policy since passage of the first federal urban renewal initiative in
1949. And on the occasion of his signing the CDBG measure into law, then
President Gerald Ford was prompted to prophesy that the new program would have
weighty and far reaching significance for the federal government. 1 Ten years
after the inauguration of the program, these prognostications carried a cast
of irony. For reasons other than those envisioned by the original actors,
these predictions had proven woefully accurate. As this detailed case history
illustrates, during its first decade of operations, the program had in fact
distinguished itself from other initiatives in several areas - in the
notoriously high levels of instability reflected in its administrative
operations, in the degree of intergovernmental discord the program had
generated, and in the unusually protracted and impassioned struggles it had
provoked among key national institutional actors over issues of what
constituted appropriate guidelines to govern implementation of the program.
At root, the protracted regulatory controversies which plagued the
program throughout this ten year period, had their genesis in the conditions
surrounding passage of this original CDBG statute. While the conventional
wisdom in the field of public policy holds that Congress assumes the central
burdens of policymaking, determinatively casting the essential character of
policy in the law it passes to the bureaucracy for implementation, the
conventional wisdom ill-describes the empirical realities found in the CDBG
case.
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The Framing of the Original Statute
Spawned in an atmosphere of turbulence and dissension, the original
CDBG legislation was a product of Congressional efforts to end a 3 1/2 year
legislative struggle over the contours of urban grant in aid reform.
Disenchanted with "excessive" federal categorical restrictions yet wary of
the "excessive" localism of the special revenue sharing alternative the
Nixon Administration offered, the Congress sought to create a new hybrid
grant instrument - consolidating the major urban categorical programs into a
single federal-local block grant.
While House and Senate legislative craftsmen could agree on many
elements to be incorporated into the new block grant experiment, some of the
most fundamental issues concerning the block grant's character served as
sticking points. To the Senate, it was essential that the new consoli-
dated program carry a strong redistributive mandate - that localities
target grant funds near-exclusively to their neediest populations; that
federal oversight authority be sufficiently strong to assure attainment of
this national end. But to the House, a more revenue sharing approach was
strongly favored. A decentralization mandate was to be central to block
grant operations; federal authority was to be intentionally weakened to
allow localities power (within broad parameters) to determine policy
priorities - both how and upon whom grant resources were to be spent.
Unable to reach full accord on these issues, yet unwilling to defer
action on grant reform any longer, the Congress papered over their
differences with statutory documents. Thus the legislative design for the
program they sanctioned proved no more than a patchwork of relatively
incongrous ideas.
As a result, the enabling statute contained several confusing
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provisions inherited from earlier versions of the legislation: a national
primary objective stipulating that funds were to be placed in service such
that they "principally benefit" low and moderate income constituencies,
coupled with provisions intimating federal deference to local authorities
regarding substantive decisions about the utilization of grant funds; a
mandate that "maximum feasible priority" be afforded by localities to the
needs of low income persons or areas, coupled with stipulation of a more
permissive set of aims which could be construed as equally legitimate and
eligible targets for expenditure, like averting blight in more well-to-do
areas or meeting other locally defined "urgent needs".
Each discrete set of elements incorporated into the final statute
reflected one chamber's legislative preferences for either a targeted
(redistributive) or a decentralized program, and divorced from the other
elements interspersed among them manifest a sound internal logic of its
own. Yet jumbled together they yielded an incoherent programmatic
blueprint. Having come to understand the final 1974 statute as a product,
not of compromise, as was claimed, but of situationally forced
agglomeration, I now know why early interviews with key actors proved so
difficult to decipher; why so often those involved in programmatic
controversies seemed to be talking past one another. Like the blind men
describing the elephant, each articulated a programmatic vision rooted in
selected segments of the creature; none able to offer a coherent vision of
this new legislative creature as a whole.
Though politically expedient for a battle weary Congress, for the
bureaucracy, the passage of such an ill defined and Janus-faced piece of
legislation had one critically important effect. It served to transform
the guideline development process into a surrogate policy process during
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the course of which the vaguarities of confusing legislative language would
have to be given concrete form and meaning; for while ambiguity can be
tolerated in legislative forums, it cannot be tolerated for long in more
action-oriented administrative ones where implementing agents seek precise
detailed instructions regarding how bureaucratic responsibilities for
executing a program are to be met. While Congressional resolution of
central programmatic issues in law typically renders guideline development
tasks less weighty and politically burdensome, Congressional indeterminacy
in the CDBG case had a contrary effect. With respect to this most
important urban program, bureaucratic authorities were delegated both
responsibility for and discretion to make (through guidelines) crucial
determinative decisions regarding the policy's character - whether federal
or local judgements would guide the grant process; whether redistribution
was to be mandated, and if so, how much.
Bureaucratic Succession and Shifts in Regulatory Policies: The Case
Synopsis
Congressional failure to, at the outset, lock the program into a clear
legislatively-specified 
-strategy for how the dual aims of redistribution
and decentralization were to be reconciled in administrative practice, left
the program vulnerable to the forces of bureaucratic transience. With
authority to set policy in this area having been ceded from the hands of
its legislative to its bureaucratic masters (who would render their policy
verdict through the guidelines they crafted) recomposition in the cast of
key bureaucratic actors at least held out the possibility that new guide-
lines would be initiated for the program. Moreover, so broad was the
discretionary territory ceded to guideline developers under the legislation
that it was conceivable that guidelines established for the program could
250
result in not just evolutionary but revolutionary programmatic change and
that was precisely what occurred. As a consequence of shifts in
Presidential administrations, sharp discontinuities in bureaucratic
programmatic leadership yielded attendant discontinuities in the program's
rules and character.
The Ford and Carter Era
Under the program's original bureaucratic stewards, David Meeker and
other Ford Administration appointees, CDBG regulations placed heavy stress
on the law's decentralization mandates. Impelled in large part by an
ideologically rooted vision of federalism, in which local autonomy would
"properly" be emphasized, national government relegated to play a fiscal
rather than a substantive priority-setting role, 2 bureaucrats created
guidelines which lent a distinct revenue-sharing cast to administrative
operations. Consistent with a revenue-sharing approach to national admin-
istrative efforts, no substantive low income targeting requirements were
incorporated; in fact the redistributive mandate contained in the
legislation was wholly ignored. While these guidelines satisfied House
Committee leaders who had advanced decentralization provisions in
legislative forums, and mayors who formed a crucial component of the
program's interest group constituency, they left other key actors in the
guideline arena intensely displeased.
Groups representing low income constituents who felt the Act's
"primary objective" language and its inclusion of the "maximum feasibility
priority" stipulation had guaranteed expenditures would be placed in
service of low income residents of recipient jurisdictions, brought
increasing pressure to bear on the agency to recast the regulations in a
manner which would rein in local discretion and assure priority attention
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was given to housing and service needs of the grantee's low income popu-
lace. Moreover, Senatorial authors of the legislation, who had advanced
legal provisions lending a strong redistributive tilt to the program, began
to publicly castigate HUD officials, charging that their elected guidelines
failed to reflect "the intent of Congress", meaning their chamber's inten-
tion that the more flexible block grant arrangements still weightily focus
expenditures toward meeting poverty needs.
Though initially resistent to instituting change in the regulations,
as dissent became more focused and intensified, regulatory craftsmen began
to deliberate how to alter the guidelines so as to appease their vocal
opponents. But before any altered version of the regulations could be
developed within the agency, a new regulatory regime had ascended to power.
Under leadership of Carter-era program chief Robert Embry, a new plat-
form for regulatory reform was now advanced, one which - in contrast to the
prior administration - reflected a contrary vision of federalism for the
program in which the proper national role was to serve as protector of
politically and economically disadvantaged interests. While some portion of
Embry's reform impulse may have had its root in his (and Secretary Harris's)
desire to anticipate what the White House may have wanted, no overt effort
to orchestrate change from the White House was evident to CPD staff. To
those inside the agency, Embry's personal convictions played a crucial
developmental role. "He definitely felt strongly toward making this program
benefit lower income persons", one staff member recounted, "and that (con-
viction) showed up in a number of ways throughout his term."3 Acting under a
reform impetus fueled and fostered by Embry's programmatic inclinations, and
bolstered by support from both the low income lobby and Senatorial critics
of prior guidelines, the bureaucracy now sought to effectuate targeting
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restrictions that would administratively validate the Act's redistributive
aim.
Taking their cue from the provisions found in the Senate's predecessor
legislation, and the regulatory interpretation the poverty coalition
offered of the Act's mandate, HUD bureaucrats proposed new administrative
regulations requiring that 75% of each locality's grant expenditures be
earmarked for low income projects. Yet when they attempted to institute
the new proposals, they found the hefty degree of low-income earmarking
they sought to mandate administratively proved more than the political
environment would bear. Local officials launched a vigorous campaign in
opposition to the measure, charging that the strong targeting requirements
constituted an effort to "categoricalize" the program, stripping them of
the discretion and autonomy they -felt had been promised them under the Act.
Moreover, they were joined in their opposition by House Committee leaders
who had been responsible for lending a strong decentralization thrust to
the provisions of the legislation. Again Congressional charges of
administrative "defiance of the intent of Congress" were leveled (this time
by House actors); once again regulatory craftsmen found themselves at the
center of an intense political dispute.
Believing themselves within the bounds of their legal authority, yet
fearful of the consequences of perpetuating such a highly visible and
intense political conflict, HUD officials opted to advance a compromise
solution.4 The final regulations they enacted contained a moderated but
significant redistributive requirement. Localities would have their
discretion constrained to the degree that no less than 51% of their grant
could be expended for low income projects, though administrative induce-
ments were provided to prompt localities to meet the higher low income
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target of 75%. While House leaders were initially unappeased by the
compromise, the slackening of local official's opposition to the measure
(as well as their own desire to turn attention to other affairs) rendered
the compromise tenable. Thus the final guidelines this regime had crafted
attained status as "legitimate" and valid administrative instruments for a
period of about three years.
The Reagan Era
With the rise to power of a new regulatory regime in 1981, however, a
new set of players were brought into the guideline arena. Reagan-era
appointees to positions of programmatic authority, Assistant Secretary
Stephen Bollinger and HUD chief legal advisor John Knapp, brought to the
agency a new agenda for programmatic reform. In contrast to the Carter-era
experience, however, the agenda these new programmatic stewards sought to
pursue for the program was less wholly a discretionary one (ie. grounded in
their own intra-bureaucratic assessments of what was needed for the program)
and more fully an externally-generated one, rooted in the fundamental
philosophies of government the President himself had pledged to pursue. In
making executive appointments, the Reagan White House had, with great care,
screened contenders for their fealty to the conservative vision of govern-
mental operations the Administration sought to advance.5 Thus as Bollinger
and later Knapp moved to institute reforms in the program, their vision of
the reforms that should be adopted were virtually inseparable from the
overarching White House view.
Like the programmatic stewards that preceded them, the changes they
sought to promote were rooted in a federalist philosophy - one which
reflected the decentralization theme of the President; one which paralleled
the Ford era posture toward the program, favoring expanded subnational
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autonomy and severe constraints on the role of national authorities in the
grant process. Thus they proposed enactment of new guidelines that stripped
the program of its redistributive requirements, and administratively
reinstated a revenue-sharing oriented grant form.
While Reagan-era officials may well have anticipated that the politi-
cal dynamics which had existed during the Ford era would enable them to
receive support from mayoral lobbyists and Congressional factions, support
that would serve to countermand the adverse pressures they would face from
the low income lobby, such was not to be. The political environment in
which they sought to resuscitate Ford-era type regulations proved
considerably different from that in which Meeker and his colleagues had
advanced their regulatory policies in 1974.
No longer were the mayoral lobbyists so militant in their insistence
on total autononr and freedom as their right under the block grant
character of the Act. Having discovered that the mild redistributive
requirements established during the Carter era had not proven unduly
troublesome to live with, they lacked the depth of sentiment necessary to
mount a campaign in support of such a major deviation from prior political
accommodations that had led to three years of programmatic truce.
Moreover, in the new budget-cutting context that marked the Reagan era,
they had begun to see utility in preserving an at least minimally
redistributive programmatic profile as a defense against future budgetary
cuts. Thus when Reagan Administration officials sought to advance their
special revenue sharing design in regulations, they confronted a programma-
tic constituency that was, at least with respect to the extremely non-
redistributive stance they were touting, relatively unified and
adversarial.
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What is more, by the time these actions were taken, the cast of
Congressional characters involved in programmatic issues had undergone
significant recomposition. Gone were House Congressional Committee leaders
who had traditionally defended a singular emphasis on the Act's
decentralization mandate, who had eschewed any redistributive requirements
as an infringement on local policy setting prerogatives. And though
legislative action advanced by new majority Republican Senatorial leaders
to simplify block grant administrative procedures had led HUD officials to
believe they would receive support for regulatory initiatives to retract
all requirements for low income targeting, Congressional sentiment had been
misconstrued. No faction of Congressional players now proved willing to
accept a programmatic vision of the effort in which federal protection of
the interests of low income constituents was to be totally abandoned. As a
result, Congressional actors bearing oversight responsibilities for
bureaucratic management of the program were now unified in voicing
objection that the new regulations bureaucrats were advancing for the
program were at odds with the Act's "legislative intent."
In the face of the unanimity of Congressional and interest group
objections to HUD's efforts to (through guidelines) reinstate a non-
targeted programmatic thrust, one would have expected HUD bureaucrats to
recast their regulatory offering in a manner which capitulated, at least to
some degree, to Congressional and interest group demands. But this era was
marked by the emergence of another new and potent political player in the
guideline arena - the President's Office of Management and Budget.
Empowered by Presidential order to exert strong executive control over
regulatory activities, OMB rigidified HUD's posture on the regulations. It
thus served as a crucial countervailing force on the bureaucracy, one which
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drove considerations regarding responsiveness to clientele and
Congressional forces out.
The Move Toward Congressional Resolution
In this reconstituted political arena, the struggle over guidelines
became less one among contending constituency/Congressional interests, and
more one of legislative and executive sovereigns battling for policy
control. Unwilling to accede to executive branch visions regarding how the
law was to be manifest in regulatory edicts, yet unwilling to perpetuate a
regulatory battle fought largely on bureaucratic turf (where now, as a
result of OMB dominance, their conventional levers of influence over
bureaucratic behavior-even the threat of legislative veto-had failed to
produce any results) Congress sought to shift the locus of programmatic
authority back into the legislative domain.
In recasting the legislation nearly ten years after its initial
adoption, the Congress sought to provide specific directives regarding how
far decentralist vs. redistributive claims on the administrative process
were to be legally permitted to extend. With respect to questions
pertaining to in what manner block grant funds were to be expended,
decentralization was permitted to prevail as the dominant principle; local
authority and discretion to elect particular project approaches was left
relatively open and broad in scope. But deviating from past legislative
unclarity, questions pertaining to for whom grant funds were to be utilized
were now clearly circumscribed as legitimate objects of national dominance
and concern. Under the new legislation, localities' subjugation to
national tests for how their efforts served the Act's primary objective was
no longer to be administratively optional, but mandatory, legislatively
formatted, and routine. Local discretion in this area was to be federally
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delimited.
Yet in an effort to only moderately constrain the options available to
localities under the new provisions, the Congress set the level of low
income targeting to be deemed a "nationally acceptable" reflection of local
compliance with the Act's primary objective mandate at the very modest
level of 51%.
In this legislative compromise, the Congress sought to adhere to the
rough contours of the informal political accommodations reached among
interested parties in earlier periods of the program's history. Though low
income advocates had lost ground with the omission in the law of the
administrative inducements used earlier to prod localities to meet a higher
75% benefit standard, they had scored a victory in securing use of a
mandatory legislatively-delineated benefits test. And while localities had
been stripped of any claim to preeminence in decisions regarding who was to
benefit from programmatic expenditures, they had scored a counterpart
triumph in the inclusion of a 51% minimum benefits standard which bound
them to allocate benefits in a manner which lent the program an only mildly
redistributive tilt.
In crafting the legislation such that it provided a degree of balance
between the pressures for local discretionary latitude, and for federal
protection for the poor from wholesale local neglect, the Congress was able
to amass, though not wholehearted enthusiastic support from all constituent
quarters for the measure, at least sufficient consent to act; for its main
goal in resolving the amorphous conflict in legislation was to reclaim,
from the recalcitrant bureaucracy, the discretionary policy-setting
prerogatives earlier ceded to bureaucratic hands. 6 While prior battles
invoked by the inherent tensions in the program's goals and format might
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continue, with respect to the central issues at stake in this dispute,
Congress - having not only clarified the priority to be afforded to the
decentralist and redistributional aims of the legislation, but having
written the detailed regulatory language into law - would in the future
serve (via its lawmaking activities) as the ultimate arbiter of competing
guideline claims.
Guideline Development: A Review of the Rein, Rabinovitz and Pressman
Framework
What the CDBG case reminds us, in a most definitive way is that at
root, the guideline process is, in fact, a continuation into another arena
of the political process.7 Though we have conventionally conceived of
regulatory craftsmanship as premised either on a model in which bureaucratic
agents serve as simple "translators of law" into administrative edicts, or
as non-partisan dispassionate "steward technicians" of the administrative
machinery of government, neither conception of rulemaking behavior appear to
capture the essence of the regulatory process as it was manifest in the CDBG
case.
While Rein, Rabinovitz and Pressman point out that "legal imperatives" 8
- the specific directives contained in the statute which empowers an agency
to take administrative action - often serve as the major foundational base
from which regulatory content will be derived, such a vision is premised on
the assumption that the law does in fact offer some guidance to bureaucra-
tic authorities regarding the issues at hand - that it does illuminate
bureaucratic agents as to their fundamental statutory responsibilities under
the terms of the legislation, and does provide (for the implementing
bureaucracy) at least a rough degree of substantive clarity regarding issues
of legislative policy intent. But the law clearly did not serve that func-
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tion in the CDBG case. Rather, the law incorporated not only excessively
vague but equivocal language which, in sanctioning both decentralization and
redistribution as overarching principles to govern the programmatic
enterprisq, delegated to bureaucratic authorities important tasks of
determining how these competing principles were to be reconciled in
administrative practice.
Moreover, despite repeated Congressional efforts to lend greater
specificity to the directives contained in the authorizing statute via
amendments made to the law in the period prior to 1983, Congressional
deadlock over favored priorities for the program rendered the "legal
imperatives" reflected in these amendments as unintelligible a guide to
legislative intentions as those contained in the original statute. Thus,
with respect to the issues with which this case is concerned, during the
first nine years of the program the law was consistently rendered an
impotent force in shaping bureaucratic regulatory behavior.
What is more, typical visions of the guideline development process as
an administratively-driven enterprise ill-fit the CDBG case history as well.
While Rein, Rabinovitz and Pressman suggest that bureaucratic regulatory
craftsmen will be impelled (by dint of their posture as stewards of the
administrative machinery of government) to cast guidelines such that
"bureaucratic rationality" - imperatives embedded in concerns for the
efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative process - is granted
supremacy over any policy-partisan preferences bureaucratic agents might
hold, "bureaucratic imperatives" 9 failed to play a significant role in
shaping bureaucratic regulatory actions in the CDBG case. While
administrative concerns were manifest among bureaucratic underlings during
the regulatory process (as in the Embry era when some objected that pursuit
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of a targeting strategy would prove administratively troublesome, or in the
Bollinger era when some warned that such a marked deviation, from prior
administrative practices as was being suggested would generate confusion
and administrative disarray) they ultimately had little impact in influenc-
ing the choices of the politically appointed bureaucratic leaders who opted
to play a major role in electing the guideline choices that were made.
Rather than resembling the process we typically presume it to be - a
neat, orderly and dispassionate bureaucratic exercise, conducted in
bureaucratic corridors isolated from "infecting" forces of politics-at-
large, the CDBG guideline process assumed a highly politicized character
with all the earmarkings of a political bar-room brawl. Several external
players vigorously sought and with varying degrees of success attained
political influence over the regulatory process. Guideline decisions
proved a source of conflict and contention throughout.
Yet the overtly politicized qualities of the guideline development
process as revealed in the findings of this case study do not necessarily
refute the contention that, under other circumstances, the regulatory
process may well assume the more apolitical, legalistic, technocratic
character often ascribed to it. The demeanor of guideline development
proceedings may well be a function of the breadth of discretion delegated
to bureaucratic authorities in the post policymaking forum, the stakes
involved in bureaucratic rulings for external attentive publics, and the
overt character of the issues which bureaucratic authorities are vested
with responsibility to resolve - all of which are predetermined by the
contents of the law.
In circumscribing those issues ceded to guideline forums for
discretionary resolution by bureaucratic actors, the law can be seen to
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shape the nature of the conflicts likely to surface during regulatory
proceedings, their intensity, and their scope. To illustrate, in some
instances the law cedes to guideline developers for resolution, either
issues that are of relatively trivial import, or issues which are at least
manifestly non-political in character; (e.g., ones which involve setting of
scientific "technical" standards as in air pollution policy; or ones which
are ostensibly "administrative" in content, such as those tethered to
elimination of programmatic "waste, fraud, and abuse").
In either set of circumstances, the law, though indeterminant, serves
to suppress the political dimensions of the guideline enterprise - in the
first instance because the stakes involved in the discretionary exercise of
bureaucratic authority are too low to activate external interests; in the
second because the political consequences of guideline choicemaking are
masked by the technical complexities of the issues involved, or their
allegedly "neutral, administrative" focus.10 Where these circumstances
prevail, the guideline development process will likely be imbued with the
essentially technical/administrative character we more conventionally
associate with administrative rulemaking behavior. Bureaucratically rooted
considerations will be prone to dominate; the broader political environment
in which regulatory decisions are crafted will be "de-politicized";
regulatory conflict will likely be more agency-internalized where it
develops at all. But such was not the case with CDBG.
In contrast, the issues which the CDBG law, in its equivocation,
demarcated as those to be resolved in guideline forums had a markedly
different quality. They were neither trivial, nor predominately
administrative in tenor; nor were they capable of being disguised as such.
Rather they constituted the most salient, most sensitive, and most
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intensely political of all programmatic issues - overtly tethered to major
questions of the apportionment of power among grant actors, notions of
federalism, and the distribution of the tangible benefits of the federal
government's largess.
Thus the law set the stage for the ensuing guideline proceedings,
virtually ensuring that the process would assume the markedly politicized
character that it did - that the scope of conflict would extend beyond the
bureaucracy's borders to mobilize external interests as important players
in the political contest; that political considerations (whether ideologi-
cally or pragmatically rooted) would be ceded a central influential role.
Guideline Development and "Post-Pol icymaking Politics"
Precisely because the guideline setting process emerged as such an
overtly political enterprise, garnering the attention and involvement of a
wide variety "outside" players in the rulemaking game, the CDBG case
provides an opportunity to examine the key external relationships with
which the bureaucracy is engaged in the post-policymaking period, and how
these relationships shaped (or failed to shape) bureaucratic discretion
over guideline choice. While the implementation literature has little to
offer by way of clear hypotheses regarding how these relationships are
expected to function, it is possible to extrapolate from the broader
political science literature reasonable tenets about the "significant
others" in the political arena within which bureaucracies are centered, and
how, during implementation, they and their bureaucratic cohorts would be
expected to behave.
Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy During the Implementation Period
In the literature on bureaucratic politics, great importance is
afforded the relationship bureaucracies maintain with their programmatic
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constituencies. From the client groups their programs service, bureaucra-
cies derive the external political backing they need in order to secure
(fram legislative forums) resources that sustain bureaucratic operations.
As Rourke points out, "it is essential to every agency's power position to
have the support of attentive groups whose attachment is built on an
enduring tie."il Since bureaucracies are so dependent upon political
support from the interest groups who represent the bureaucracy's
constituents, this political reality would lead one to expect bureaucratic
agents to seek to maintain a harmonious relationship with the clients they
serve; to exercise discretion in a manner which seeks to appease (to the
extent feasible within the bounds of the law) the desires of key interest
groups to which they are beholden. Yet the manner in which HUD's constitu-
ency was structured rendered the blanket appeasement of pertinent
constituent groups problematic.
Inherited from the prior urban programs which were consolidated under
the block grant banner, (including Model Cities and Urban Renewal), both
low income residents of cities and local officials were incorporated as
central components of the bureaucracy's programmatic clientele. As a
consequence of their involvement with earlier programmatic initiatives,
both sets of interests were well organized and well-represented by a
panoply of strong and vocal lobbying organizations who had dealt with HUD
agency officials before. Yet their policy-preferences with respect to the
block grant program left these groups severely divided on the basic issues
in contention; their interests fundamentally at odds with one another.
Organizations representing mayors and other local officials who were
to be recipients of the grant allocations held an inherent interest in
securing for their members the maximum discretion possible in deciding how
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grant funds were to be expended; low income advocacy groups, on the other
hand, were similarly wedded to attainment of maximum federal protection for
their interests via earmarking of funds for use in meeting poverty needs.
And while, from time to time, other considerations tempered their singular
pursuit of these agendas, at root, each held these goals closest to heart.
Of significant consequence for their involvement in the post-
policymaking period was the fact that the legislation's ambiguous wording
lead each to believe it had scored a victory in legislatively binding the
program to the ends to which they were committed. In the eyes of the
mayoral lobby, the block grant's anti-categorical character had promised
realization of their goal of fundamental autonomy from federal direction;
to the poverty coalition, the law's primary objective and "maximum feasible
priority" stipulations pledged pursuit of a federally targeted, low income
oriented effort.
It would have been impossible for the bureaucracy, in setting
guidelines, to fulfill the high expectations held by both sets of
interests, for at root, the contest over these issues was a zero-sum game.
But the statutory unclarity served only to compound the dilemmas posed for
the bureaucracy in making the difficult post-legislative trade-offs that
would have to be made.
The Law's Mobilizing Effect on Interest Groups
In sanctioning the goals of both sets of clientele interests, the law
provided each equally with not only an invitation to become active
political participants in the guideline arena, but a legislatively rooted
basis for staking out their programmatic claim. Though their prior
involvement in predecessor programs made it likely each would attempt to
garner influence as program regulations were being drafted, had the
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legislation failed to (for either or both parties) expressly validate their
goals as goals of the program, it is conceivable that one or the other sets
of interests might have at some point felt themselves on less politically-
defensible territory - more inclined to accept adverse regulatory verdicts
as legitimate (though undesirable) ones; to give the battle up. But buoyed
by their conviction that the law upheld their claim on programmatic
resources, both proved tenacious and vigorous watchdogs of the bureaucratic
effort; active political contestants in the policy process even as it
extended into guideline forums; forces demanding bureaucratic attentiveness
throughout.
While creation of such a divided and highly-mobilized programmatic
constituency made HUD's tasks of guideline-writing a difficult exercise at
best, there is also evidence in the case history to sustain the view that
bureaucracies are less attentive to their "constituency-servicing"
functions than the literature on bureaucratic politics would lead one to
believe.
It was clear, from the very outset of the administrative effort in
1974, that the two key clientele groupings had staked out significantly
divergent positions on the regulations that would be sought for the
program; that they would assert on the administrative process virtually
antithetical programmatic claims. Had agency officials manifest as great a
concern for clientele-responsiveness as is commonly conceived, their
inclinations would have been to avoid offering regulations that would
significantly "tread on the toes" of one or the other sets of bureaucratic
constituents; that could be construed as tantamount to an action to
"disenfranchise" either one or the other of the programmatic groups.
Yet in electing the initial contents of the regulatory edicts they
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attempted to impose on the program, neither bureaucratic leaders of the
Ford era, nor the Carter era, nor the Reagan era sought to play a role as
mediator among contending clientele sectors. Instead each opted to advance
a set of regulations which were, in their extremism, quite predictably
bound to antagonize one or the other constituency groups.
Moreover, even where officials at later stages of their administrative
tenure did prove more willing to consider assuming a more middle-of-the-
road regulatory posture (as at the end of the Meeker regime when
reformulation of initial regulations was being discussed as an option, or
at the end of the Embry term when officials did, in fact, back away from
the strict 75% benefit rule they favored) it appears the parties they most
keenly sought to mollify were not the interest group constituents per se
but the more important actors who held positions of authority in the
legislative branch. Only at key points at which Congressional members used
their oversight authority to bring intense pressure to bear on bureaucratic
actors to revise regulatory content did the impulse for mediation emerge
within the HUD bureaucracy, and even then, the impulse for mediation did
not consistently prove very strong.
Congressional- Bureaucratic Relations During the Implementation Period
The bureaucracy partakes in a special relationship with the Congress
because ultimately the bureaucracy acts under legislatively-crafted edicts
from whence its implementation powers derive. Nonetheless, most writings
on implementation neglect to offer any significant discussion of
bureaucratic-Congressional interactions during the implementation period.
Having issued their charges in the law, Congressional actors are presumed
to remove themselves from the scene, leaving bureaucracies to execute the
charges lawmakers rendered unfettered. 1 2
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This underriding notion of Congressional disinterest in the
implementation of policy is also reflected in the bulk of the literature on
legislative behavior which, in examining the role of the Congress in the
workings of the modern day administrative state, finds that Congress has
relegated to itself the role of the "absent partner" in the implementation
enterprise. Legislative scholars assert that Congress rarely undertakes
any serious effort to conduct surveillance over policy once a statute
leaves Congressional hands, and even more rarely manifests the will to make
use of the tools available to it to mold bureaucratic behavior in a manner
deemed more consistent with legislators' "policy intent". 13 Indeed, many
observers of the Congress have long-lamented the unwillingness of lawmakers,
even in the face of ever-broadening delegations of authority in enabling
statues, to devote time and attention to pursuit during implementation of an
aggressive legislative oversight role. 14
Yet these common assertions regarding Congress's inattentiveness to its
legitimate legislative oversight function find little support from the
events recounted in the CDBG case. Among key Committee actors vested with
oversight responsibilities, Congressional interest in how the CDBG program
was being implemented by the bureaucracy proved both widespread and
enduring. Moreover, with a notable degree of regularity throughout the nine
year period, key oversight authorities sought to periodically intercede
directly into the bureaucratic rulemaking process to render implementation
outcomes more responsive to "Congressional will."
[Note: One surprising feature of the CDBG case is that these
activist inclinations were sustained throughout the comings and goings
of several Presidential administrations, and through periods of succes-
sion of Committee/Subcommittee leadership in both the House and Senate.
268
And while the Congressional literature suggests that where legislative
oversight is pursued aggressively, partisan politics can be found at
its root (stemming from a desire to publicly embarrass administrators
of the opposing party),1 5 partisan impulses were not at the
heart of Congressional-bureaucratic conflict in the CDBG case. During the
Ford Administration, oversight challenges emanated from a bipartisan
Senatorial coalition; during the Carter Administration from a bipartisan
alliance in the House; and during the Reagan Administration from a
bipartisan network of actors in both legislative chambers.]
Precisely because legislative efforts to intervene proved so persistent
throughout the implementation period in the CDBG case, the experience of the
CDBG program might prove informative to the contemporary literature on
Congressional behavior; might contribute to an understanding of a newly
emerging role of the modern legislature in implementation in some way. Yet
for purposes of analysis of this facet of Congressional -bureaucratic
relations, lawmakers' efforts to influence bureaucratic guideline activity
should be examined separately during two discrete periods of the program's
history - one covering the early years of the program's operations (roughly
1974-78), the other covering the years from 1981-83. This is warranted
because in each period, the root impulse for Congressional oversight
intervention emanated from different sources; bureaucratic-Congressional
dynamics varied. Moreover, each period offers a discrete set of insights
into the complexities of the legislature's role in policy implementation.
Congressional Interventions into the Guideline Process: 1974-78
While Congressional oversight authorities demonstrated from the very
beginnings of the implementation period an uncommonly keen interest in the
guidelines under which the program was to be executed, it was not until the
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second year of program operations that efforts were initiated in
legislative quarters to overtly intervene to shape the process of guideline
choice. Having discovered (via interest group studies and a GAO management
review they had ordered) that initial rules adopted by agency officials
reflected wholesale repudiation of the low-income targeting language they
had added to the statute, Senatorial authors of the legislation took the
lead in seeking to make strategic use of their oversight prerogatives to
prompt bureaucratic reformulation of the regulations in a manner more
responsive to their programmatic concerns.
Calling HUD officials to testify before a previously unscheduled
oversight hearing, Senatorial critics sought to publicly convey their
displeasure with the course of action HUD had elected. While HUD
authorities had been well-aware that their guidelines favored the House
perspective to the exclusion of the Senate's, the unexpected intensity and
openness of Senatorial objections that their actions were in "defiance of
the will of Congress" led them to begin a reassessment of the political
wisdom of their decisions; an evaluation of how Senatorial oversight
activists might be appeased. Despite initial recalcitrance, sentiment
began to accumulate in HUD corridors that some modification of guidelines
in the direction of affording greater balance between House and Senate-
favored mandates would be necessary. Yet the emergence of a bureaucratic
impulse toward House-Senate mediation was interrupted by political events.
As Carter era officials replaced their Ford-era predecessors, they
received reminders during confirmation hearings of the resoluteness of
their Senate overseers' views. And though Senatorial attempts to secure
stronger targeting language in the 1977 reauthorization bill had been
thwarted by House opponents (leaving the ambivalence of formal legislative
270
edicts intact), the consonance of HUD officials' perspectives with those
held in the Senate emboldened them to recast programmatic guidelines in a
manner which placed heavy emphasis on requirements for targeting to the
poor.
It soon became clear, however, that in reformulating guidelines so as
to impose on localities a 75% low-income targeting standard, HUD officials
had run afoul of the decentralist-oriented interests of equally potent
oversight players in the House. Their interest in the administration of
the program piqued by their 1977 legislative battle with the Senate, House
authorities sought to countermand Senatorial influences on the guideline
writing process with regulatory oversight interventions of their own.
Through not only hearings but direct official correspondence charging
them with "defiance of the intent of Congress", House oversight authorities
sought to impel HUD officials to recant their position on the 75% rule and
to restore a more fully decentralized managerial approach. Confronted with
signs of recalcitrance on the part of agency actors - recalcitrance
grounded in Senate oversight authorities' overt support for the proposed
rules - House actors initiated legislative amendatory actions that, if
adopted, would bind HUD to use of more decentralist-oriented programmatic
rules.
Though in 1978, as in earlier periods, the politics of deadlock
rendered the House legislative actions unsuccessful (blocked by Senatorial
actions which left the legislative ambiguity unperturbed), their success in
establishing a new legislative review/veto process for HUD regulations
prompted Carter-era officials to reassess their stance. While the
legislation left them legal latitude to exercise broad discretion over CDBG
regulatory content (much as it had for Ford-era bureaucrats in the past),
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the regulatory-review process presented new perils for agency stewards of
the administrative effort. Under the newly created regulatory review
process, legislative oversight reviews would most assuredly prove more
routinized; political conflict with the Congress more protracted and
intense. As a result, bureaucratic actors sought to make gestures toward
mediation between House-Senate contenders to avert incessant Congressional-
bureaucratic struggle over programmatic rules. While their final guideline
offering (stipulating a 51% low income benefit standard with inducements to
boost targeting to 75%) appeased neither faction fully, it ultimately
reduced to a minimal level the degree of residual Congressional dissent.
Thus the 51/75% targeting compromise stood without significant challenge in
the Congress as program guidelines from 1978-81.
Legislative Specification and Legislative Oversight as Strategies for
Congressional Control over Implementation
In legislative theory, it is held that Congress has two routes
available to it, through which to exercise control over the bureaucracy -
legislative specification and legislative oversight.16 As a consequence of
the rapid expansion in the scope of governmental activity during the last
half century, controls via legislative specification have increasingly
functioned poorly.17 By virtue of limitations on its resources, expertise,
and time available in the legislative calendar, Congress has increasingly
moved away from attempts to forge fully-explicated statutes, opting instead
to fairly routinely provide only the broad contours of policy in
legislation, and to delegate authority to the bureaucracy to fill in the
gaps left in statutes during the implementation process. As Dodd and
Schott note "Today there exist so many issues that Congress cannot
'legislate' on all the decisions that face it; it has to delegate some
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decisionmaking to executive (branch) officials and agencies. Nevertheless,
delegated authority derives from the Congress, which has a responsibility
to ensure that this authority is used in a responsible and responsive
manner." (emphasis added). 1 8
In the eyes of many, this suggests that Congress should more diligently
pursue its legislative oversight function; should fulfill its charge to
exercise "continuous watchfulness" over bureaucratic actions. 1 9 Where
remediation is deemed called for, the argument holds, Congress can avert use
of use of burdensome statutory proceedings by making use of the non-
statutory and quasi-statutory tools available to it (hearings, direct
correspondence, legislative veto) to bend bureaucratic action to conform
more closely to "Congressional will."
Yet the CDBG case history evokes cautions about the ease with which
deficiencies in legislative specification can be remedied by reliance on an
activist Congressional posture toward the exercise of legislative oversight
functions. Because oversight activities are carried out by Committee
authorities of each separate chamber, rather than any body which represents
the collectivity of the legislative whole (like a joint Conference
Committee) there is no assurance that oversight authorities will speak to
the bureaucracy in the post-policymaking period with one voice.
In the normative discussions on legislative oversight, it is generally
presumed that Congressional oversight interventions will (and should) arise
where bureaucratic agents are widely perceived to have exceeded the bounds
of their statutorily-delegated authority; Congressional oversight powers
invoked in an effort to bind administrators to legislators' common
understandings of statutory meaning and intent. Yet in the CDBG case during
this particular period, legislative interventions arose not out of a desire
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on the part of legislators to steer bureaucratic discretion so as to reflect
common Congressional understandings (since at this point no common
understanding existed) but rather to attain via influence over the
regulatory process what diverging legislative factions could not attain
during the forging of the law.
The opposing House-Senate Committee camps can be seen during this
period to have persisted in their drive to attain greater "legislative
specification" that would have compelled administrators to issue
regulations wholly reflective of the programmatic ends they sought. Yet
when lawmaking actions in 1974, 1977 and 1978 repeatedly failed to provide
a clear victory or clear defeat to either faction, lawmakers, in the
legislative interim, turned their attention to the administrative realm.
There each legislative coalition sought to make strategic use of its
oversight authority to advance, through regulations, the policy perspective
they favored, in hopes that quiesance on the part of their opponents would
enable them to prevail.
Yet largely as a consequence of legislator's intense ideological
commitments to their policy perspective (rooted in conceptions of "proper"
federal arrangements), activism on the part of key interest group factions,
and a sense of programmatic "proprietorship" which both House and Senate
coauthors of the legislation seemed equally to hold, neither faction was
prone to assume a stance of passivity in the post-legislative periods of
this era.20
Only when four years of virtually continous struggle led legislators to
the realization that failure to soften their demands on administrators
would perpetuate House-Senate battles ad-infinitum, deflecting ever-
disproportionate shares of Congressional time and resources away from other
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important concerns; and only when the bureaucracy manifest clearly (as it
did at the end of the Carter era) an inclination to seek regulations which
carved out between House-Senate positions a genuine "middle ground"; only
then did House-Senate opponents demonstrate a willingness to desist in
efforts to make use of legislative oversight interventions to gain
strategic policy-partisan advantage over implementation activities.
Acceding (albeit with reluctance) to the compromise regulations Carter era
officials offered, legislators informally sanctioned the 51/75% benefits
regulations as reflective of Congressional policy intent.
Significance of these Findings for Post-Legislative Implementation Politics
It is left for others to pass judgement on whether the behavior of
legislative actors during this period in employing their oversight
authority to steer bureaucratic actions in directions they favored
represented an appropriate or inappropriate use of Congressional powers.
On the negative side, it may be asserted that invocation of the name of the
Congress for expressly policy-partisan purposes undermines both the
legitimacy and credibility of those who represent the institution to the
outside world. On the positive side, these actions did serve as an
effective check on the behavior of bureaucratic actors who manifest
surprisingly little inclination to fashion (without external prodding) a
set of regulations that gave voice (to some degree) to both sets of
mandates incorporated by legislative authors into the statute. Via the
pressures and cross-pressures imposed by oversight interventions,
bureaucratic "excesses" were identified and countermanded; an acceptable
vision of Congressional policy intent was over time permitted to emerge.
Regardless of one's posture on the normative questions at issue,
however, one implication of the case study findings is clear. To the degree
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that the findings regarding the extent of Congressional oversight activism
are not idiosyncratic, but reflective of a waxing inclination on the part of
lawmakers to take seriously their legislative oversight role,
administrative rulemaking forums may increasingly become the arena in which
intra-Congressional conflicts will surface, or in which prior disputes
unresolved in legislative forums will be perpetuated and played out.
Congressional Intervention into the Guideline Process: 1981-83
During the 1981-83 period, Congressional monitoring of and intercession
into the rulemaking process continued, yet the interventions differed from
the prior period in their proximate cause and intent. While during the
1974-78 period Congressional involvement was spawned by intra-
Congressional Committee battles over the meaning of the statute they had
authored, during the 1981-83 period it reflected a pitched battle for
dominance over administration between the "instititional Presidency" and
the legislative branch.
By 1981 , administrative practices premised on the 1978 compromise
Carter officials had crafted had become fairly-well institutionalized,
remaining in use for .what in the CDBG program was an unprecedented tenure of
three years. As the absence of conflict during this period attests, among
both those Congressional Committee authorities who had partaken the
compromise action, and those who had succeeded them in leadership positons,
the 51/75% benefits guidelines had attained acceptance as the manifestation
of Congressional policy intent.
Yet while the 51/75% guidelines had attained legitmacy as a reflection
of statutory meaning, Congressional authorities failed to act to secure
codification of the guidelines in law. In the absence of any overt intra-
Congressional or Congressional-bureaucratic tensions that would have led
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them to believe the compromise was not perceived as binding, Congressional
actors had assumed a posture of complacency. Presuming that continuity
would prevail, their informal pact hold, legislative actors secured passage
of a 1980 reauthorization bill which only perpetuated, rather than
elaborated upon, the language of the existing statute. And though, during
more controversial legislative action to alter procedural programmatic
requirements in 1981, lawmakers had inserted in addition to the primary
objective language another ill-worded clause which pluralized the term,
they sought in the law's companion Conference Report to convey their
expectation that the revised and simplified programmatic format would not
result in deviation from the substantive status quo. ("The intent is to
cause procedural simplification rather than substantive change," the report
read). The law itself, though., perpetuated prior statutory ambiguities,
and Congressional authorities' failure to rectify this by codifying the
guideline pact in statute would come back to haunt them, as less
cooperative agency officials came into positions of bureaucratic control.
The Overhead Executive and Implementation
It has generally been depicted in the policy studies literature that
the Chief Executive and his institutional agents exert little direct
control over administrative aspects of domestic public programs.
Preoccupied with tasks tethered to the President's responsibilities in
foreign affairs and with his dealing with the legislature in forging the
course of domestic policy through law, these officials have historically
manifest relatively little interest in involving themselves intimately with
"more mundane" bureaucratic implementation activities. 2 1 Moreover, even
where the executive establishment has shown desire to exert greater control
over the day to day functioning of administrative agencies, by and large it
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has historically been the case that the Presidential "reach" has exceeded
its "grasp".22 Members of the overhead executive have persistently
complained that even the politically appointed staff of bureaucratic
agencies (selected by the President) routinely display a tendency to "go
native"; to become part of the dominant bureaucratic culture of the agency
they are presumed to control. 2 3 The historical validity of these assertions
is sustained in the work of scholars who have described the modern-day
prevalence of policy subsystems. In characterizing the "whirlpools" within
which policy is made (and administered), bureaucratic agency, interest group
and Congressional actors are held to work conjointly; but no mention is made
in these works of an activist overhead executive role. 2 4
Running contrary to past administrative practices, however, the Reagan
administration in 1981 took steps to move OMB more centrally into the
administrative act. Having now been granted (under Executive order)
authority to guide and veto administrative regulations offered by
bureaucratic agencies, OMB was activated as a device for bending
bureaucratic actions to greater conformity to Presidential will.
Presidentially Rooted Initiatives, Congressional Response
With this new institutional mechanism set in motion, agency actors were
induced to sponsor guidelines more faithful to Presidential values than to
those manifest among Congressional authors of the legislation. In the
absence of clear statutory specification of the guidelines to be utilized,
HUD officials eschewed adherence to existing administrative practices.
Instead, they acted to carry forth OMB's charge to reflect Presidential
desires for decentralization of government functions by sponsoring new
regulations which not only removed a low-income targeting standard but
stripped federal agents of any low income advocacy or benefits-oversight
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role.
Reflective of a continued commitment to pursuit of an activist
oversight posture which had been manifest among previous Congressional
program authorities, both House and Senate actors gave close scrutiny to
the proposed regulations. Yet in the judgement of key Congressional
lawmakers (the selfsame group that had authored and sheparded the most
recent 1981 legislation through the Congress) the regulations were
uniformly deemed to be grossly deficient. None of the key legislative
authorities adjudged them even proximately reflective of Congressional
policy intent. As had occurred in prior periods of the program's history,
legislators sought to use informal oversight techniques to convey to
bureaucratic implementation authorities their dissatisfaction with the new
administrative measures. Employing such devices as previously unscheduled
oversight hearings, published letters of objection, direct correspondence
charging HUD with "defiance of the will of Congress", and threats to make
use of legislative veto proceedings, Congressional authorities sought to
compel modification in HUD's regulatory design.
But where in earlier periods these tools had, even in the absence of
Congressional comity, succeeded in inducing HUD to seek appeasement of
legislative stewards of the program by making concessions in its regulatory
offering, now bureaucratic implementers assumed a far less deferential
stance. Yielding to the weight of OMB counterpressures, HUD moved to
willfully exploit the weaknesses in the statute to the advantage of the
President by verbally affirming, despite unanimous Congressional objection,
its commitment to its regulatory plans. Feeling its prerogatives to set
the course of domestic policy trammeled by wayward bureaucrats,
Congressional authorities did, finally, move to provide clear unarguable
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directives to the bureaucracy by writing their desired regulatory language
in the 1983 law.
Significance of Executive Activism for Implementation Politics
As with Congressional actions observed in the 1974-78 period, it must
be left to others to assess whether HUD's actions of this era represented
an appropriate use or misuse of its delegated powers. Some would argue
that Congressional failure to codify guidelines in law during previous
periods left HUD with legitimate authority to cast guidelines in accord
with Executive wishes. Others would argue with equal vigor that though the
statute was ambiguous, a sufficient legislative history had been crafted
(sufficient Congressional consensus revealed) that HUD should not have
sought to chart, under OMB's guidance, so independent and legislatively
errant a guideline path. Indeed so profound and complex are the questions
raised by the case history of this period that ultimately their answers
hinge on interpretations of Constitutional law and attendant visions of
which masters - their legislative or executive ones - bureaucracies are
properly meant to serve. Thus, their resolution clearly falls beyond the
scope of this work.
Nonetheless, regardless of one's stance on the appropriateness of
overhead executive efforts to shape the guideline-setting process, one
important observation regarding the timing of OMB attempts to singularly
pilot bureaucratic action should be made. While one might not be surprised
to find strong Executive initiative to be exercised when programs are
fledgling, when Executives may have had a direct role in their legislative
creation and feel commitments to sustain their programmatic vision in the
guidelines the bureaucracy sets forth, in the CDBG case, OMB's attempts to
commandeer bureaucratic operations emerged not at the onset of the
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programmatic effort but after the program had been in operation for nearly
eight years. This finding suggests that, under the new activism manifest
in the overhead executive, significant conflicts with the Congress over the
course of domestic policy action may not erupt primarily at junctures where
legislative edicts are crafted, nor in the period in which program
operations are institutionalized, informal accord over administrative
activity reached. Rather with each Executive succession, conflicts may be
induced to not only surface but resurface over any administrative issue on
which legislative cloture has not definitively been secured.
Overall Implications for Our Understanding of Implementation Politics
Though cognizant that a politics of implementation exists, we have
tended, by and large, to approach guideline development as though it were
more purely an exercise in neutral technocratic administration. 2 5 Moreover,
even where we have acknowledged that "politics" may have bearing on the
process of crafting administrative regulations (that discretionary
"policymaking" elements are inherent in this phase of bureaucratic work),
we have been inclined to presume that implementation politics - in contrast
to the broader politics of lawmaking - encompasses a set of relatively
routine and modulated negotiations between "autonomous" bureaucratic
discretion-holders and their allied constituent interest groups.26 Major
governmental institutional actors (like Congress and the overhead
executive) are held to "opt out" of the political interplay; to seek in
implementation proceedings no significant or direct manifest part. Yet in
the CDBG rulemaking case, Congressional oversight agents and
representatives of the institutional presidency sought recurrently to
intervene not only to partake in the political interchange, but to assume a
major directorial role in implementation. These interventions can be seen
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to have had on the conduct of bureaucratic regulatory tasks significant
(albeit erratic) effects. In all eras these institutional forces
overshadowed in import direct interest group efforts to attain bureaucratic
influence; in one (the Reagan era) they eclipsed direct interest group-
bureaucratic ties entirely.
It is possible that the case findings with respect to Congressional/
executive activism are idiosyncratic; a false reflection of what might be
construed as a broader underlying shift in the inclinations of Congress and
the executive establishment to garner strategic control over the conduct of
bureaucratic implementation work. But it is also plausible that they are
not.
Within the case itself, the pattern of evidence suggests that Congress
has undertaken a far more systematic and sustained effort to oversee and
pilot urban program implementation than was true in the pre-CDBG
programmatic years. Congressional monitoring of and intervention into
agency activities proved fairly regularized from the very onset of the
implementation effort, and consistently attracted involvement of a
surprisingly broad array of participants from both chambers and both sides
of the Congressional aisle. The establishment of formal legislative
regulatory review and veto procedures in 1978 has served to reinforce and
institutionalize these oversight practices, and though the legislative veto
elements were invalidated by Supreme Court action in 1983, the legislative
review and delay procedures continue to be utilized today.
Moreover, supporting the view that inclinations toward Congressional
assumption of a new stewardship role in implementation are not solely case-
bound is the fact that the legislative review mechanism, though a direct
outgrowth of CDBG controversies, was deliberately constructed so as to have
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far broader applicability. It encompasses all regulatory implementation
actions in each and every one of HUD's programmatic areas of jurisdiction
and has been employed by the Congress in other reported but unanalyzed
housing and urban policy cases.
In addition, while we as yet have far too few studies of bureaucratic
rulemaking from which to adequately assess whether the kind of aggressive
and sustained Congressional activism unveiled in this case history is
becoming commonplace, at least one recent study has uncovered similar
patterns of Congressional behavior in domestic program implementation
outside the urban policy sphere. In his analysis of administrative
rulemaking for the foodstamp program, Jeffrey Berry found evidence of
"vigorous and continuing legislative intervention",27 affirming that the
CDBG findings may indeed not be at all anomalous but reflective instead of
a wider though less-recognized contemporary Congressional trend.
With respect to the overhead executive as well, there are signs that
inclinations toward regulatory activism extend well beyond the particulars
involved in the CDBG case. OMB's intervention into the implementation
process was but one piece of a broader and more concerted strategy on the
part of the Reagan administration to secure greater executive control over
bureaucratic administrative activity in all areas of domestic policy - a
strategy accomplished through formal recasting of OMB's regulatory
oversight role. And while it has yet to be seen whether other Presidential
successors will pursue this path as avidly as the current President, the
institutionalization of OMB as a regulatory control instrument of the White
House may serve to induce more fervent Presidential pursuit of this end.
It is plausible then, that what this case has unveiled as a more
widespread and generic shift in Congressional and Executive predispositions
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toward direct involvement in the administrative process, perhaps in
recognition of the important policymaking qualities inherent in modern day
bureaucratic regulatory work. It may well be that efforts to commandeer
bureaucratic implementation operations are claiming an increasing share of
Congressional and Executive energies - that a new era of "administrative
politics" has begun to emerge. More studies of contemporary administrative
rulemaking are critically needed to assess whether such a change has
occurred. If proven to be so, the findings of this case have special
relevance, for they portend a more complex and problematic future ahead for
administrative agencies; a future in which the bureaucracy (though more
"democratized") may increasingly fall victim to intra-Congressional battles
over the course policy implementation, and become a pawn in broader
struggles for governmental mastery by the Executive and the Legislative
branch.
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